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Abstract
Distributed and dynamic trafﬁc congestion controls without
requiring demand forecasting: Tradable network permits and its
implementation mechanisms
Kentaro Wada
Cities worldwide still face heavily trafﬁc congestion due to urbanization and increasing travel
demand. To address the problem, there has been a great deal of research into transportation
management (TDM) schemes. A common characteristic of almost all the TDM schemes is
based on demand forecasting and requires detailed demand information. However, it is al-
most impossible for a road manager to obtain such private information due to an asymmetric
information between road managers and road users.
To resolve the asymmetric information problem, Akamatsu et al. (2006) and Akamatsu
(2007a,b) proposed a new TDM scheme—tradable network permits (TNP) scheme—and
proved its efﬁciency properties. In this thesis, we extend the theory of the TNP in two
important directions: (i) to develop a supply side control based on the TNP scheme; (ii) to
design implementation mechanisms for the TNP scheme in three different situations. The
common objective of the control and mechanisms is to achieve an efﬁcient allocation of
network capacity without requiring demand forecasting. To accomplish this objective, we
employed an evolutionary approach to achieving an optimal supply level while acquiring
demand information sequentially. In the following, the results of this thesis are summarized.
Chapter 3 proposes a distributed signal control policy based on the TNP scheme. The
proposed signal control policy can determine the green time proportion of each intersection
by using only local information. An equilibrium trafﬁc assignment under the proposed policy
coincides with a system optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern that minimizes the total transportation
cost in a network. Furthermore, we construct an evolutionary implementation method for
the proposed policy and prove that the day-to-day trafﬁc ﬂow dynamics under the scheme
converge to the system optimal trafﬁc pattern.
iii
Chapter 4 proposes an implementation mechanism for trading markets of network per-
mits on general networks. Speciﬁcally, we make use of a hybrid mechanism that consistently
combines an auction mechanism with a path capacity control; these are repeated on a day-to-
day basis. The former phase involves selling bundles of permits, and the latter phase involves
adjustment of the number of bundles of permits, which corresponds to the path capacities.
We prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: truthful bid-
ding is a dominant strategy for each user on each day, and the permit allocation pattern under
the mechanism converges to an approximate dynamic system optimal allocation pattern in
the sense that the achieved social surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of
users is large. Furthermore, we show that the proposed mechanism can be extended to obvi-
ate path enumeration by introducing a column generation procedure.
Chapter 5 also proposes an implementation mechanism for trading markets, considering
a more general situation where network permits for a speciﬁc day are sold in multiple period
markets. Under such circumstances, the road manager needs to allocate a bottleneck capacity
to these markets, as well as allocate permits to users. As a ﬁrst step in implementing these
markets, we design a dynamic auction mechanism in which the number of permits for each
market is ﬁxed. This mechanism can determine optimal permit allocation, along with the
actual sequence of time under a certain condition. It is proved that the truthful bidding is a
dominant strategy for each user, and that it guarantees that the market choice of the user is
optimal. We then derive an adjustment rule of the number of permits sold for each market
and demonstrated that combining the dynamic auction and the adjustment rule maximizes
the social surplus in a ﬁnite number of iterations.
Chapter 6 develops an evolutionary mechanism for a hybrid scheme of the TNP and
congestion pricing, considering multiple negative externalities (i.e., queuing congestion and
ﬂow congestion). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst describe a mechanism consisting of trading rules of
the permit markets and users’ behaviors expressed by a stochastic learning model. We then
derive a stochastic dynamics of the learning process from the mechanism. Finally, we show
that that the stochastic dynamics converges to an equilibrium state, and trafﬁc ﬂow pattern at
equilibrium is efﬁcient in the sense that the social surplus is maximized.
Overall, this thesis contributes to the development of distributed trafﬁc congestion con-
trols without requiring demand forecasting, and in particular provides further insights into
the market-based schemes of managing trafﬁc congestion.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Trafﬁc congestion remains a signiﬁcant problem faced by cities worldwide. The Japanese
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism estimated that the time loss due to
trafﬁc congestion in Japan in 2006 was 3.5 billion person-hours1, with the Tokyo metropoli-
tan area accounting for about 25% of the total loss (Road Bureau, MLIT, 2007). Trafﬁc
congestion also has negative side effects including waste of fuel, air pollution, greenhouse
gas emissions, and increasing trafﬁc accidents (e.g., Parry, Walls, and Harrington, 2007).
Furthermore, trafﬁc congestion could be more severe with continuously increasing vehicle
ownership and worldwide urbanization. Indeed, there are more than one billion vehicles
worldwide, and the number will increase primarily in South and East Asia, Eastern Europe,
and South America. Within the next 20 years, it is predicted that the number of vehicles will
reach two billion (Sperling and Gordon, 2009).
The traditional remedy to trafﬁc congestion is to build new roads or to expand road
capacities. However, these are very costly. In addition, improvements to a congested trafﬁc
network do not necessarily lead to a reduction in trafﬁc congestion, which relates to a set
of known paradoxes in the transportation ﬁeld. For example, the “Pigou-Knight-Downs
paradox” (Downs, 1962) states that expanding road capacity can induce new demand without
reducing trafﬁc congestion; the “Braess paradox” (Braess, 1968) states that creating a new
road can raise total travel costs. One reason for these paradoxes is that new road capacities
elicit their own demand (induced demand); another reason is that each road user does not
1 The monetary equivalent of the time loss is about 11 trillion yen.
1
2recognize the real cost of a trip including the additional cost he or her impose on others,
which leads to socially inefﬁcient choices of travel modes, paths, and departure times (Arnott
and Small, 1994). Therefore, we have to pay attention to establish control methods to manage
travel demand and encourage the efﬁcient use of existing infrastructure.
Based on this motivation, there has been a great deal of research into transportation de-
mand management (TDM) schemes. TDM schemes can be roughly divided into two types:
price-based regulation and quantity-based regulation. The next section reviews past efforts
to develop both price-based and quantity-based TDM schemes.
1.2 Literature review
1.2.1 Price-based regulation
Congestion pricing is a representative scheme of the price-based approach, and was ﬁrst
advocated by Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924). Standard congestion pricing (i.e., marginal
cost pricing) is theoretically desirable for reducing trafﬁc congestion in a distributed manner:
if a road manager imposes the marginal cost of road use on road users, an optimal trafﬁc ﬂow
pattern for the system is achieved at Wardrop equilibrium (Wardrop, 1952). For decades,
various types of pricing schemes for both static and dynamic situations have been proposed;
see textbooks written by Button and Verhoef (1998), Yang and Huang (2005), and Small and
Verhoef (2007), and surveys written by Maruyama (2009), Tsekeris and Voß (2009), and
de Palma and Lindsey (2011), for references and comprehensive reviews. However, there
exist two major limitations to implement congestion pricing schemes2.
The ﬁrst and most serious limitation is that the congestion pricing scheme requires de-
tailed demand forecasts/estimations to calculate optimal toll levels3; to obtain reliable fore-
casts, the road manager requires accurate demand information (e.g., the willingness to pay,
value of time, and desired arrival time). However, it is almost impossible for the road man-
ager to obtain such private information due to an asymmetric information between road man-
agers and road users. If the scheme is implemented with imperfect information, this may in-
evitably result in an economic loss. For instance, suppose that the road manager estimates a
2 Other limitations/complications of congestion pricing schemes have been described by de Palma and Lind-
sey (2011).
3 Some weakness of forecast-based schemes were deeply discussed in Daganzo (2007).
3demand function higher than the actual demand function; i.e., optimal congestion tolls based
on the incorrect demand function are higher than tolls based on the actual demand function.
As a result, although trafﬁc congestion is reduced, there is an excessive occurrence of road
users choosing not to make trips (i.e., there are losses of consumer surplus arise) and the
social surplus may decrease to a level lower than that before the scheme was implemented.
The second limitation results from the necessity of imposing a time-varying (or dynamic)
congestion toll. Negative externalities of trafﬁc congestion are created due to the temporal
concentration of travel demands as well as the spatial concentration, and thus dynamic pric-
ing schemes are important in mitigating these externalities effectively. As an example of
such schemes, dynamic congestion pricing models that explicitly consider queuing conges-
tion have been studied by several researchers (e.g., Vickrey, 1969; Arnott, de Palma, and
Lindsey, 1990, 1993; Mun, 1999; Kuwahara, 2007; Doan, Ukkusuri, and Han, 2011). How-
ever, these studies were limited to simple networks (e.g., a single bottleneck or parallel link)
even though they derived an optimal dynamic congestion toll. For more general networks
with a many-to-one (or one-to-many) origin-destination (OD), Carey and Srinivasan (1993)
and Nie (2011) showed a marginal cost analysis for a convex reformulation of the system op-
timal dynamic trafﬁc assignment (SO-DTA) problem of the seminal works of Merchant and
Nemhauser (1978a,b). Ziliaskopoulos (2000) conducted the similar analysis of a SO-DTA
problem that is expressed by the cell transmission model (Daganzo, 1994). These models,
however, face the so-called holding-back problem, which is that vehicles are arbitrarily held
back on links although downstream capacity is available (Doan and Ukkusuri, 2012). Friesz,
Kwon, and Mookherjee (2007), Ban and Liu (2009), and Lin, Unnikrishnan, and Waller
(2011) formulated dynamic second-best toll pricing models for general networks as mathe-
matical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) and developed solution algorithms
for the problems. However, convergence of these algorithms have not been well addressed:
there is no guarantee that an optimal solution is obtained by these methods. In conclusion,
no study established a theory of dynamic congestion pricing for general networks4.
The primary factors preventing extension of the theory are the intractabilities of ana-
lyzing the dynamic trafﬁc equilibrium assignment for general networks (see, for example,
4 Simulation-based approaches that evaluate path marginal costs using trafﬁc simulation or dynamic loading
models can be founded in Ghali and Smith (1995), Peeta and Mahmassani (1995), and Shen, Nie, and
Zhang (2007).
4Kuwahara and Akamatsu, 1993; Heydecker and Addison, 1996; Akamatsu, 2001; Peeta and
Ziliaskopoulos, 2001; Szeto and Wong, 2011). Alternatively, there is an approach that at-
tempts to model trafﬁc dynamics in cities at an aggregate level (Daganzo, 2007; Geroliminis
and Daganzo, 2008). These papers proposed and tested a “macroscopic fundamental dia-
gram” that relates the number of vehicles in the area to the area’s average density. Following
this approach, Geroliminis and Levinson (2009) proposed a dynamic cordon pricing scheme.
Gonzales and Daganzo (2012) applied the scheme to the morning commute problem with
multiple transport modes. While the approach offers a remarkable method for managing
complex urban trafﬁc systems, it does not resolve the ﬁrst limitation described above: it has
to estimate demand information on heterogeneous commuters.
To overcome the problem of asymmetric information, Sandholm (2002, 2005, 2007) pro-
posed an evolutionary method to implement a scheme without a demand function. The
method leads trafﬁc ﬂow patterns to a system optimal state by exploiting a trial-and-error
toll adjustment procedure, which relies on the description of a static trafﬁc assignment as a
potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996; Sandholm, 2001). More speciﬁcally, Sand-
holm (2002, 2005, 2007) demonstrated that evolutionary dynamics of trafﬁc ﬂows (i.e., day-
to-day dynamics determined by aggregating users’ route choice behavior) converges to an
equilibrium in a way that minimizes the total transportation cost in a network; i.e., the dy-
namics converges to the minimum point of a Beckmann-type potential function (Beckmann,
McGuire, and Winsten, 1955). In the ﬁeld of transpiration science, Yang, Meng, and Lee
(2004) and Han and Yang (2009) also proposed a similar trial-and-error method5. However,
these methods cannot be applied to dynamic cases directly since dynamic trafﬁc assignment
problems generally do not have potential functions. Moreover, even if the methods can be
extended to such cases, there remains a serious problem of economic losses due to queuing
congestion in disequilibrium states.
5 Yang, Xu, He, and Meng (2010) developed an iterative toll adjustment method for the case that both de-
mand and cost functions are unknown, which corresponds to the solution algorithm for a trafﬁc equilibrium
problem with asymmetric link ﬂow interactions formulated as a variational inequality.
51.2.2 Quantity-based regulation
The second approach, quantity-based regulation, directly restricts the use of road usage by
assigning priority-service permits to road users using particular rules; e.g., license numbers
based rationing6 and advance highway bookings (e.g., Akahane and Kuwahara, 1996; Wong,
1997; Teodorovic´ and Edara, 2005; Edara and Teodorovic´, 2008). Unlike the price-based
regulation, these schemes can achieve a quantitative policy target (e.g., an appropriate level
of congestion) without requiring detailed user information by issuing the number of permits
less than the target level. However, there may be cases in which road users cannot select their
desired choice (e.g., their desired route and arrival time) if the permits are assigned according
to unreﬁned rules (e.g., a simple “quota” scheme). Such an infringement on freedom of
choice necessarily causes economic losses.
To circumvent this problem, we need to add an appropriate mechanism in which each
user can choose his or her desired permit. A market-based quantitative scheme, which is
called the tradable permit scheme7, includes such a mechanism and has recently received
much attention in the transportation ﬁeld as an alternative to traditional congestion pricing
(e.g., Goddard, 1997; Verhoef, Nijkamp, and Rietveld, 1997; Viegas, 2001). In this scheme,
each road user is free to choose permits through a trading market, which will lead to increase
the efﬁciency of quantity-based regulation8. Verhoef et al. (1997) discussed the possibilities
of using tradable permits in the various type of regulations of road transport externalities.
Viegas (2001) argued a tradable mobility rights scheme that can be used both for private
car driving in the tolled area and for riding public transport from the perspective of quality
and equity in urban mobility. Teodorovic´, Triantis, Edara, Zhao, and Mladenovic´ (2008)
proposed an auction-based congestion pricing, in which drivers who want to enter downtown
have to participate a downtown time slot auction. While formulating an allocation problem of
the time slots, this study did not address how to set their prices, which is the core problem of
6 This is the most simplest scheme and has been applied worldwide (e.g., Athenes, Mexico City and Bei-
jing). For the scheme, Han, Yang, and Wang (2010) analyzed the price of anarchy (Roughgarden and
Tardos, 2004) for a general network.
7 For environmental protection, various tradable permit schemes were proposed and analyzed (e.g., Dales,
1968; Montgomery, 1972; Tietenberg, 1980).
8 Another line of researches on improving quantity-based regulations, Daganzo (1995) and later Daganzo
and Garcia (2000) demonstrated that a hybrid scheme of combining pricing and rationing has possibilities
of achieving Pareto-improvement.
6auction mechanisms. More recently, Yang and Wang (2011) proposed a tradable travel credit
scheme, and several extensions have been made by Wang and Yang (2012), Wang, Yang,
Zhu, and Li (2012), Nie (2012), Chen and Yang (2012), and Wu, Yin, Lawphongpanich, and
Yang (2012). Basically, under the scheme, the road manager initially distributes credits to all
eligible travelers and predetermined a link-speciﬁc charge. Credits are freely tradable among
credits holders. They then showed that, if the manager can appropriately set total number of
credits and link charges, a desirable trafﬁc ﬂow pattern is achieved. However, when to do
this, it is apparent that the manager requires detailed user information. As Nie (2012) puts it,
Sufﬁce it to say here that the information that the government would need to
run a mobility credit market is as much as the information required to operate a
conventional pricing scheme. Therefore, the mobility credit market does not re-
duce the administrative burden of the government, unlike in the case of emission
control.
Thus, the main advantage of the scheme over the ordinary congestion pricing is to improve
equity and socially acceptability, rather than to resolve the two limitations described above.
Furthermore, although the above studies give on the possibilities and some useful insights
into tradable permit schemes for managing trafﬁc congestion, no study exists to provide
time-dependent tradable permits for eliminating bottleneck congestion.
As one possible way to both to eliminate bottleneck congestion and to resolve the asym-
metric information problem, Akamatsu, Sato, and Nguyen (2006), and Akamatsu (2007a,b)
proposed a novel system of “tradable bottleneck permits” (we call a system of tradable bot-
tleneck permits for general networks “tradable network permits” system). Their proposed
scheme comprises two parts:
a) the road manager issues a right (bottleneck permit or network permits) that allows the
permit holder to pass through a bottleneck during a pre-speciﬁed time period,
b) a trading market is established for network permits that are differentiated on the basis
of a pre-speciﬁed time.
Under this scheme, the arrival ﬂow rate at a bottleneck in any time period is, from deﬁnition
of the scheme, equal to the number of permits issued for that time period. This implies that
we can completely eliminate the occurrence of queuing congestion by setting the number of
7permits issued per unit time to be less than or equal to the bottleneck capacity. Since permit
prices are determined through the trading market, the asymmetric information problem is
also resolved.
As we have seen, it is expected that the tradable network permits scheme will be the
most efﬁcient TDM scheme for using the limited resource of road capacity. Indeed, for a
single bottleneck, Akamatsu et al. (2006) showed that the proposed scheme has the following
desirable properties: (1) Pareto improvement for both the road manager and all users can be
achieved; (2) the equilibrium under the scheme achieves a dynamic system optimal trafﬁc
assignment, i.e., the scheme can achieve the desirable state in a distributed manner; (3) the
“self-ﬁninacing principle” holds for the equilibrium. Akamatsu (2007a,b) extended these
properties (2) and (3) to general networks.
However, there is still a potential for improvement of efﬁciency of the tradable network
permits scheme by incorporating not just demand side conditions but also supply side con-
ditions. This is analogous to the welfare theorem of microeconomic theory, i.e., an efﬁcient
resource allocation can be obtained at a demand-supply equilibrium in competitive markets.
Another point to consider is the implementation issues of tradable network permits. In
particular, despite the main results of the scheme were built on the assumption that a compet-
itive equilibrium can be achieved in the trading markets, micro mechanisms that attains the
equilibrium have not been studied in depth. In other words, trading processes were treated
as a black-box9. Therefore, we have to address a question of what trading rules (of buying
or selling tradable permits) encourage competition and achieve the efﬁcient equilibrium. For
a single bottleneck case, Wada and Akamatsu (2010) designed an auction mechanism for
implementing the tradable permit market. They then showed that (1) the network permit
allocation achieved by the mechanism is efﬁcient and (2) the mechanisms is strategy-proof,
which means that a dominant strategy employed by each user is the truthful revelation of
the value of the permits. However, whether or not the desirable properties hold for more
spatially and temporally general situations is a problem yet to be studies.
9 This is true for other tradable permit schemes mentioned above.
81.3 Purpose of the thesis
The purpose of this thesis is twofold: (i) to extend a theory of tradable network permits to
include supply side conditions and (ii) to design implementation mechanisms of tradable
network permits in three different situations. More speciﬁcally, it ﬁrst explores properties of
a signal control policy based on tradable network permits. Next we design auction mecha-
nisms for implementing a hybrid scheme of tradable network permit markets according to
auction theory (Milgrom, 2004; Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg, 2006). Finally, we de-
velops an evolutionary mechanism for implementing a hybrid scheme of tradable network
permits and congestion pricing.
Overall, this thesis contributes to the development of distributed trafﬁc congestion con-
trols without requiring demand forecasting, and in particular provides further insights into
the market-based schemes of managing trafﬁc congestion. The following subsection brieﬂy
describes the results in this thesis.
1.3.1 Overview of the results in this thesis
A distributed signal control policy based on tradable network permits
Chapter 3 proposes a distributed signal control policy based on the tradable network per-
mits. Main idea of underlying the proposed policy is to exploit useful information on the
equilibrium permit prices provided by the trading markets. This enables us to appropriately
incorporate demand conditions into the signal control policy. Speciﬁcally, the proposed pol-
icy has two desirable characteristics. First, it can determine a green time proportion (i.e.,
capacity allocation) of each intersection by using only local information. Second, an equi-
librium trafﬁc assignment under the proposed policy coincides with a system optimal trafﬁc
ﬂow pattern that minimizes the total transportation cost in a network. Moreover, we con-
struct an evolutionary implementation method for the proposed policy and prove that the
day-to-day trafﬁc ﬂow dynamics under the scheme converges to the system optimal trafﬁc
pattern.
9Auction mechanisms for implementing tradable network permit markets
In the following two chapters, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we design auction mechanisms for
implementing tradable network permit markets in general networks and in a dynamic setting,
respectively. In order to account for individual strategic behavior, we here conduct a game-
theoretic analysis of a dynamic trafﬁc assignment with atomic users. Under this setting,
we need to establish mechanisms in which no user has incentive to manipulate the markets.
Furthermore, unlike the single bottleneck case treated in Wada and Akamatsu (2010), we
have to deal with more complex markets, including network structures and multiple period
markets. Nevertheless, we can resolve these complexities by relying on suitable adaptation
of the supply side control developed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 focuses on trading markets on general networks. Under the situation, a naive
formulation of a problem of ﬁnding a dynamic system optimal allocation of network permits
leads to a NP-hard problem due to the complex relationship between link and path. To avoid
such computational infeasibility, we develop a hybrid mechanism that consistently combines
an auction mechanism with a path capacity control, which are repeated on a day-to-day
basis. The former phase involves selling bundles of permits, and the latter phase involves
adjustment of the number of bundles of permits, which corresponds to the path capacities.
We prove that the proposed mechanism has two desirable properties: (1) truthful bidding is a
dominant strategy for each user on each day, and (2) the permit allocation pattern under the
mechanism converges to an approximate dynamic system optimal allocation pattern in the
sense that the achieved social surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of users
is large. Furthermore, we show that the proposed mechanism can be extended to obviate path
enumeration by introducing a column generation procedure.
Chapter 5 considers a more general situation where network permits for a speciﬁc day
are sold in multiple period markets. Under this situation, the road manager faces a problem
of how to allocate a bottleneck capacity to individual market as well as allocating permits
to users in each market. As a ﬁrst step for implementing the markets, we design a dynamic
auction mechanism in which the number of permits for each market is ﬁxed. This mechanism
can determine an optimal permits allocation with the actual sequence of time under a certain
condition. It is proved that the mechanism is strategy-proof, which also guarantees that the
market choice of the user is optimal. Then we derive an adjustment rule of the number of
permits sold for each market and demonstrate that combining the dynamic auction and the
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adjustment rule maximizes the social surplus in a ﬁnite number of iterations.
An evolutionary mechanism for a hybrid scheme of tradable network permits and con-
gestion pricing
Chapter 6 develops an evolutionary mechanism for a hybrid scheme of tradable network
permits and congestion pricing, considering multiple negative externalities (i.e., queuing
congestion and ﬂow congestion). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst describe a mechanism consisting of
trading rules of the permit markets and users’ behaviors expressed by a stochastic learning
model. We then derive a stochastic dynamics of the learning process from the mechanism.
Finally, we show that that the stochastic dynamics converges to an equilibrium state, and
trafﬁc ﬂow pattern at equilibrium is efﬁcient in the sense that the social surplus is maximized.
1.4 Organization
This thesis is organized into a series of self-contained chapters. Before presenting results
in the thesis, Chapter 2 reviews a basic framework and properties of tradable network per-
mits. Chapter 3 extends the above theory to include supply side controls. In then investi-
gates implementation mechanisms of tradable network permits. Chapter 4 designs an auction
mechanism for implementing trading markets for general networks. Chapter 5 considers a
more general situation where network permits are sold in multiple period markets and con-
structs an implementation mechanism for these markets. Chapter 6 develops an evolutionary
mechanism for a hybrid scheme of tradable network permits and congestion pricing, consid-
ering multiple negative externalities (i.e., queuing congestion and ﬂow congestion). Finally,
Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of this thesis and discusses some topics for future work.
Chapter 2
Tradable network permits: Basic
framework and its properties
This chapter reviews a basic framework and properties of the tradable network permits sys-
tem from Akamatsu (2007a,b). Section 2.1 outlines the framework of the tradable network
permits system. Section 2.2 provides a mathematical model that describes the equilibrium
under the tradable network permit system. Section 2.3 shows that the equilibrium coin-
cides with a dynamic system optimal assignment. Section 2.4 further shows other desirable
properties of tradable network permits: advantages over congestion pricing, self-ﬁnancing
principle and Pareto improvement. Finally, Section 2.5 presents the recent development of
micro mechanisms for implementing tradable network permits.
2.1 A system of tradable network permits in transportation
networks
2.1.1 Networks
We consider dynamic trafﬁc ﬂows on a general network with multiple origin-destination
(OD) pairs (i.e., a transportation network with general topology). The network consists of a
set N of nodes, a set A of directed links, and a set W of OD pairs. The node set N includes
a subset O of origin nodes from which users start their trip, and a subset D of destination
nodes at which users terminate their trips. Each element of N (i.e., each node) is identiﬁed
by k, and each element of A (i.e., each link) is denoted by a pair (k, l) of the upstream node k
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and the downstream node l. The time interval [0,T] for which we assign the dynamic trafﬁc
ﬂow is ﬁxed. We assume that the travel demand Qod that makes trips for the time interval
[0,T] is a given constant.
We also assume, without any loss of generality, that each link in a network consists of a
free ﬂow segment and a single bottleneck segment. The travel time to pass through the free
ﬂow segment of link (k, l) is a constant tkl (i.e., tkl is independent of time and ﬂow). The
bottleneck of each link is represented by a point queue model with constant capacity μkl.
2.1.2 Network permits and trading markets
A road manager aims to restrain trafﬁc congestion on the network and minimize the “social
transportation cost.” To achieve this, the manager regulates the trafﬁc ﬂow rates entering into
each bottleneck in the network by using “time-dependent network permits.” The network
permit is a right that allows the permit holder to pass through a pre-speciﬁed bottleneck at a
pre-speciﬁed time. In this study, we assume that the road manager can issue time-dependent
network permits for all bottlenecks (i.e., links) in the network. This implies that the trafﬁc
ﬂow entering into link (k, l) at time t consists of only users who have a “time t permit for link
(k, l),” and users without this permit cannot pass through this link at this time.
Throughout this study, we assume that the number of permits issued for each link for
each unit time is equal to or less than the trafﬁc capacity of each link in the network. This
means that queuing congestion never occurs in the network under this permits-issue scheme.
This may be easily seen from this explanation of permits: the inﬂow rate of each link is equal
to (or less than) the number of permits issued, and hence the inﬂow rate cannot exceed the
trafﬁc capacity of each link, which implies that queuing congestion at each link can never
occur.
For assigning the network permits to users, we can consider two representative schemes:
“market selling scheme” and “free distribution scheme” (Akamatsu et al., 2006). In the
market selling scheme, the road manager sells all the network permits to users in network
permits markets. All sales from selling the permits result in revenue for the road manager in
this scheme. In the free distribution scheme, the road manager distributes all the permits to
users for free according to methods that consider the equity among users, and permits can
then be traded freely among users in the network permits markets. Thus, all income transfers
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take place only among the users in this scheme.
We here explain only the former scheme (“market selling scheme”) that is exploited in
the following chapters. The permits issued for each link (bottleneck) are put on sale by
the road manager. There are as many markets for trading permits as there are links, and
each market is dedicated for trading the permits for each link. The permits for each link are
further distinguished by a speciﬁed time allowable to use the link. Under the network permits
system, each user who would like to use a path must have a set of permits corresponding to
a set of links included in the path before making a trip. To fulﬁll this requirement, each
user is assumed to purchase the needed set of permits in the trading markets. The price of
each permit is determined by an auction system, which implies that the price is adjusted so
as to clear the excess demand for each type of permit. We also assume that the markets are
perfectly competitive; that is, neither a monopoly nor oligopoly occurs (this assumption will
be relaxed in later chapters).
2.1.3 Dynamic travel costs in general networks
Each user makes a single trip (for the time interval [0,T]) from an origin o ∈ O (e.g., res-
idential zone) to a destination d ∈ D (e.g., central business district (CBD)) in the network.
The user chooses a destination arrival time and a path between the origin and the destination
so as to minimize his or her disutility (or “generalized transportation cost”). The transporta-
tion cost for a single trip of a network user consists of the following three types of costs: (a)
“schedule cost,” (b) “travel cost,” (c) “permit purchase cost.”
(a) The “schedule cost” for a user is the cost due to the difference between the user’s
desired arrival time and the actual arrival time t. The desired arrival time is assumed to be
the same for all users and is equal to tˆ. The schedule cost is represented by the function sd(t)
of destination arrival time t, which is common to all users that have same destination.
(b) The “travel cost” is the monetary equivalent of the travel time needed for a trip from
the origin to the destination. The travel time of a path between the origin-destination pair
r ∈ Rod is deﬁned as the sum of travel times of the links included in the path. Note that
the travel time of each link (k, l) is a constant tkl at equilibrium under the permits system, in
which no queuing occurs.
(c) The “permit purchase cost” is the total payment for purchasing a set of link permits
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required for going through a path from the origin to the destination. To put it another way,
the permit purchase cost of a user is deﬁned as the sum of permit prices of the links included
in the path used. Each link permit price pkl(t) varies depending on what path is taken and at
what time because the permits for each link are further differentiated by the speciﬁed time
and each permit is priced depending on the time and the link.
2.2 Equilibrium under the tradable network permits
For the settings above, it is assumed that an equilibrium trafﬁc ﬂow pattern is achieved. At
equilibrium, the following ﬁve conditions should hold. Here we describes the equilibrium
by using the arc-node formulation1.
1a) Flow conservation at each node:
Conservation of the dynamic trafﬁc ﬂow in a network is represented as the equality of inﬂow
and outﬂow at each node at each time point. To formalize this, let yokl(t) be the ﬂow rate
arriving at link (k, l) at time t with respect to origin o, and zokl(t) be the ﬂow rate departing
from link (k, l) at time t with respect to origin o. Then the ﬂow conservation is represented
as
∑
l∈NO(k)
yokl(t) −
∑
l∈NI(k)
zolk(t) = −qod(t)δkd, ∀t ∈ [0,T], ∀o ∈ O, ∀k ∈ N (2.1)
where qod(t) is a OD ﬂow rate for a OD pair (o, d) arriving at the destination d at time t, and
δkd is Kronecker’s delta (i.e., 1 if k = d, zero otherwise ); NO(k) is a set of downstream
nodes of the links incident from node k; NI(k) is a set of upstream nodes of the links incident
to node k.
1b) First-In-First-Out conditions on each link:
We assume that the dynamic trafﬁc ﬂow in our model should satisfy the First-In-First-Out
(FIFO) property on each link (i.e., we assume that passing can be neglected). As shown in
the literature (see, for example, Kuwahara and Akamatsu, 1993; Akamatsu and Kuwahara,
1 The path-based formulation can be found in Akamatsu (2007a,b)
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Figure 2.1 Equilibrium conditions for path choice
1994), the FIFO condition for each link can be written as
yokl(t) = z
o
kl(t + tkl(t)) · (1 + dtkl(t)/dt), (2.2)
where tkl(t) is the travel time of link (k, l) for a user entering into the link at time t. Note
here that tkl(t) is a constant regardless of the arrival time when there is no queue. Hence, at
equilibrium under the permits system (i.e., when there is no queue in the network), the FIFO
condition (2.2) reduces to the following simpler representation:
yokl(t) = z
o
kl(t + tkl) ∀t ∈ [0,T], ∀o ∈ O, ∀kl ∈ A (2.3)
2) Equilibrium conditions for path choice:
Consider a user arriving at node k at time t. If the user chooses link (k, l), the arrival time
at node l is t + tkl. Hence, at equilibrium, link (k, l) should be on the minimum path for a
user arriving at node l at time t + tkl if there exists a user entering into link (k, l) at time t.
Denoting πok(t) as the minimum path cost from the origin o to node k for a user arriving at
the node at time t, we can represent this condition as
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
πol (t + tkl) = ckl(t) + π
o
k(t) i f y
o
kl(t) > 0
πol (t + tkl) ≤ ckl(t) + πok(t) i f yokl(t) = 0
∀t ∈ [0,T], ∀o ∈ O, ∀kl ∈ A (2.4)
where ckl(t) is the transportation cost for a user who enters into link (k, l) at time t:
ckl(t) ≡ pkl(t) + αtkl (2.5)
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3) Flow conservation for OD ﬂow rates and OD travel demand:
Each OD travel demand Qod have to be assigned to each time point in the interval [0,T]; that
is, the time-dependent OD ﬂow rates should satisfy
∫ T
0
qod(u)du = Qod od ∈W (2.6)
4) Equilibrium conditions for destination arrival time choice:
At equilibrium, no one can improve his or her own generalized transportation cost by chang-
ing the destination arrival time unilaterally. It follows from the path choice equilibrium
condition in 2) that the generalized transportation cost for a user arriving at the estination d
at time t is sd(t) + πod. Therefore, the equilibrium condition for the user’s arrival time choice
can be expressed as
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
ρod = πod(t) + sd(t) i f qod(t) > 0
ρod ≤ πod(t) + sd(t) i f qod(t) = 0
∀t ∈ [0,T], ∀od ∈W. (2.7)
5) Demand-supply equilibrium (market clearing) conditions in each link permit mar-
ket:
Since the trading markets are assumed to be perfectively competitive, the price pkl(t) of each
permit type adjusted to clear the excess demand for each type of permit. More precisely,
at equilibrium, if the price of a certain type of permit is positive, the quantities supplied
and the quantities demanded for the permit are equal; for the permit whose supply quantity
exceeds the quantity demanded, the price is zero. Note here that, for each link (k, l) and each
allowance time t, the demand of the time t permit of the link is equal to the inﬂow rate ykl(t).
On the other hand, the maximum supply (upper bound) of the time t permit of link (k, l) is
given by the link capacity μkl. Therefore, the demand-supply equilibrium condition for the
permits market is represented as
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
ykl(t) = μkl i f pkl(t) > 0
ykl(t) ≤ μkl i f pkl(t) = 0
∀t ∈ [0,T], ∀kl ∈ A (2.8)
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2.3 Efﬁciency of the equilibrium under tradable network
permits
In order to examine the efﬁciency of the equilibrium allocation patterns deﬁned in (2.1)-(2.8),
consider the following optimization problem [P-M]:
min
(q,y)≥0
.
∑
o∈O
∑
d∈D
∫ T
0
qod(t)sd(t) + α
∑
(k,l)∈A
∫ T
0
ykl(t)tkldt (2.9)
subject to∫ T
0
qod(u)du = Qod ∀od ∈W (2.10)
ykl(t) =
∑
o∈O
yokl(t) ∀t ∈ [0,T], ∀kl ∈ A (2.11)
ykl(t) ≤ μkl ∀t ∈ [0,T],∀kl ∈ A (2.12)∑
l∈NO(k)
yokl(t) −
∑
l∈NI(k)
yolk(t − tkl) = −qod(t)δkd, ∀t ∈ [0,T], ∀k ∈ N, ∀o ∈ O (2.13)
This is the problem of ﬁnding a dynamic trafﬁc ﬂow pattern that minimizes the total gen-
eralized transportation cost in the network, subject to the physical constraints of ﬂows rep-
resenting the network performance2. Speciﬁcally, the objective function is the generalized
transportation cost (the sum of schedule cost and travel time) expensed by all users in the
network. The ﬁrst constraint (2.10) is conservation of the OD demand, the third constraint
(2.12) is the trafﬁc capacity constraints on each link. The ﬁnal constraint (2.13) is the conser-
vation of dynamic link ﬂows at each node (2.1) combined with the FIFO condition on each
link (2.3).
Now the most important property that characterizes the equilibrium assignment can be
derived by the fact that [P-M] is an equivalent optimization problem to the equilibrium con-
ditions (2.1)–(2.8). That is,
Proposition 2.1 (Akamatsu, 2007a,b) For any networks with many-to many OD pairs in
which [P-M] has feasible solutions, the equilibrium assignment under the system of time-
dependent tradable link permits minimizes the “social transportation cost” deﬁned by (2.9).
2 Note that “permit purchase costs” should not be counted as the “social cost” because they are just income
transfers between the users and the road manager.
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Proof This proposition can be proven by showing that a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for the optimality of the optimization problem [P-M] coincides with the equilibrium condi-
tions (2.1)–(2.8). See Akamatsu (2007a,b) for a complete proof.
The equilibrium generalized transportation cost ρ, the permit prices p, and the minimum
path cost π are given as the optimal Lagrange multipliers for constraints (2.10), (2.12), and
(2.13). Thus, the equilibrium prices/costs can be obtained as the solution of the dual problem
[D-M], of the problem [P-M]:
max
(ρ,π,p)≥0
.
∑
od∈W
ρodQod −
∑
(k,l)∈A
∫ T
0
pkl(t)μkldt (2.14)
subject to
ρod ≤ sd(t) + πod(t) ∀t ∈ [0,T], od ∈W (2.15)
πol (t + tkl) ≤ πok(t) + (αtkl + pkl(t)) ∀t ∈ [0,T], ∀kl ∈ A, o ∈ O (2.16)
It it obvious that the object function of this problem is the social transportation cost repre-
sented as [total generalized transportation cots]−[total permits payments].
2.4 Other desirable properties
This section brieﬂy summarizes other desirable properties of tradable network permits: ad-
vantages over congestion pricing, self-ﬁnancing principle, and Pareto improvement.
2.4.1 Advantages over congestion pricing
The equilibrium permit prices shown in Section 2.2 can be interpreted as the optimal dy-
namic toll levels for a congestion pricing scheme in which the road manager imposes a
time-dependent toll for each link in the network so as to eliminate queuing congestion (e.g.,
Yang and Meng, 1998). If the road manager can predict users’ behaviors (i.e., inﬂow rate
of each link ykl(t)) accurately and set an appropriate toll levels based on the condition (2.8)
(i.e., queuing congestion never occurs), the equilibrium trafﬁc ﬂow pattern that arises under
the congestion pricing scheme is coincides with one under the tradable network permits; it
can achieve the system optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern that minimizes the social transportation
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cost. In other words, the tradable network permits and the congestion pricing scheme are
equivalent under the case that the road manager has perfect information.
In contrast, in imperfect information cases, large differences can arise from the discrep-
ancy in the amount and accuracy of the information needed for the road manager to imple-
ment these schemes. Speciﬁcally, in the tradable network permits, the road manager needs
to know only the trafﬁc capacity of each link. In the congestion pricing scheme, on the other
hand, the road manager is required to know accurate information on users’ behaviors (i.e.,
precise demands) in addition to the trafﬁc capacity; it is almost impossible for the road man-
ager to obtain such private information. If the congestion pricing scheme is implemented
with imperfect information, toll levels based on the condition (2.8) may not be appropriate
(i.e., queuing congestion may occur), which does not minimize the social transportation cost
and cause an additional economic loss due to queuing congestion.
Considering the differences between the two schemes, the desirable transportation de-
mand management scheme must be found. In generalized terms, this becomes the problem
of comparing between “quantity-based regulation” and “price-based regulation.” According
to the standard theory in the ﬁeld of economics (see, for example, Weitzman, 1974; Laffont,
1977), quantity-based regulation produces more efﬁcient outcomes than price-based regula-
tion if a regulation authority has only imperfect information on the demand side conditions
(i.e., demand functions) while having perfect information on the supply side conditions (i.e.,
supply functions). For the our problem, we obtain a similar conclusion, although the under-
lying assumptions of our problem are different from those in conventional economic theory.
2.4.2 Self-ﬁnancing principle
In order to improve social acceptability of the market selling scheme of the tradable network
permits, it may be necessary to use the revenue (or redistribute it to road users) in a socially
desirable way. As a representative scheme of the redistribution, Akamatsu et al. (2006)
considered the case in which the revenue is used for ﬁnancing the capacity expansion for a
single bottleneck. Under a certain condition3, they proved the total equilibrium revenue of
tradable network permits is equal to the cost required for increasing the bottleneck capacity
to a socially optimal level, which has been well known as the “self-ﬁnancing principle”
3 This condition is that the investment cost function is homogeneous of degree 1 with respect to link capac-
ities.
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(Mohring and Harwitz, 1962). Akamatsu (2007a,b) also extended this property to general
networks.
2.4.3 Pareto improvement
In a signal bottleneck, by introducing the tradable network permits, queuing congestion
can be eliminated completely, and a Pareto improvement can be achieved (Akamatsu et al.,
2006). More speciﬁcally, each user’s (equilibrium) generalized transportation cost does not
change with and without system because there is one-to-one correspondence between the
queuing delay (at equilibrium without the system) and the permit price (at equilibrium with
the system). As Newell (1987) puts it: “one could convert the worthless expense of queuing
into money.” From this property, in market selling scheme, it is easy to see that users’ utility
levels do not change because users pay a monetary that equals to queuing delay. On the other
hand, the total payments make the revenue of the road manager increasing. Therefore, we
conclude that the Pareto improvement can be achieved4. For a tandem bottleneck network,
Yodoshi and Akamatsu (2008) demonstrated that Pareto improvement can be achieved, if
revenue from the permits is redistributed to users. However, for networks with many bot-
tlenecks, the correspondences between equilibrium queuing delays and the permit prices are
not straightforward because the equilibrium model without the system has complex structure.
2.5 Implementation issues
Although the tradable network permits scheme has the theoretically-desirable properties
mentioned above, we should address two closely related problems to implement the scheme:
• the procedures for trading/purchasing network permits are cumbersome;
• no micro mechanisms that realize trafﬁc/market equilibrium have been reported in
previous studies.
The former problem must be resolved for the scheme to be socially acceptable. As a way
to meet this requirement, Akamatsu (2007a) suggested (but not analyzed) a “multi-agent
4 From the similar discussion, we obtain the Pareto improving result in free distribution scheme of tradable
network permits (Akamatsu et al., 2006).
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Figure 2.2 Concept of a multi-agent system
system” (see Figure 2.2). In this system, vehicle-installed agent software chooses, on behalf
of the user, an optimal path and arrival/departure times based on the user’s preferences and
deals with procedures for purchasing network permits on an e-market. The system is required
to have three properties:
1. each agent can choose a path and an arrival time using local information (autonomy of
behavior);
2. the algorithm for the agent’s behavior is simple (briefness of agent behavior rules);
3. the whole system can converge to equilibrium (stability of aggregate dynamics).
The essential components that determine (theoretical) properties of such a system are (i) a
trading rule for the e-market and (ii) a path/arrival time choice rule for each agent; if these
rules are appropriately designed, the multi-agent system can achieve the dynamic system
optimal trafﬁc assignment. In other words, these design problems provide micro mechanisms
with which to attaining trafﬁc/market equilibrium, thus addressing the latter problem.
Kikuchi and Akamatsu (2008), and Wada, Akamatsu, and Kikuchi (2008) addressed the
latter issue (ii) for general networks, assuming that trading markets for network permits are
described by a taˆtonnement process. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁrst deﬁned the micro behavior of
the agent (i.e., a kind of perturbed best response model) based on evolutionary game theory
(e.g., Vega-Redondo, 2003; Sandholm, 2010). They then derived day-to-day dynamics of
22
aggregated trafﬁc ﬂows and permit prices, and proved that mean dynamics of the aggregate
variables (ﬂows and prices) converge to a socially optimal state.
For a single bottleneck, Wada and Akamatsu (2010) constructed micro mechanisms con-
sists of both trading rules (auction protocol) and agents’ behavior model. More speciﬁcally,
they designed an auction mechanism based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mecha-
nism, which is a benchmark mechanism in auction theory (e.g., Milgrom, 2004; Cramton
et al., 2006). By analyzing a deterministic day-to-day trafﬁc ﬂow dynamics obtained from
the micro mechanisms, they proved that the dynamics converges to a socially optimal state.
Another line of research focuses on implementation issues under demand uncertainties.
Akamatsu et al. (2006) studied the case that users randomly arrive at a bottleneck (i.e., de-
mand uncertainty). In this case, queuing congestion may occur even if the number of permits
issued for the bottleneck is equal to its capacity. As a result, the road manager faces a trade-
off between total queuing delays and total schedule costs when issuing permits. For a single
bottleneck, Akamatsu et al. (2006) experimentally showed that if the number of permits is-
sued for the bottleneck is less than the capacity (about 80%), both mean and variance of
economic losses (i.e., queuing delays and schedule costs) are small. Nagae and Gai (2009)
considered a stochastic situation where users randomly cancel their trips and proposed a
refundable-tradable bottleneck permits (R-TBP) scheme. They ﬁrst revealed that social op-
timal allocation can be realized if the road manager can determine the proper issue amount
of the R-TBP. They then developed an algorithm trial-and-error process by which optimal
allocation is achieved only by observable information.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed a basic framework and several properties of the tradable network
permits scheme. The remarkable feature of this scheme is to achieve the most efﬁcient
resource allocation without requiring detailed user information. Under the scheme, the road
manager only needs to issue network permits according to the bottleneck capacity; this is
contrast to the conventional TDM schemes mentioned in Chapter 1, where the manager bears
a great burden (e.g., demand forecasts, price settings). This feature is brought about through
the market institution, i.e., permits prices are created by users’ autonomous decision-making
in the trading markets. Thus, to strengthen the properties of the scheme, Chapter 4 and
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Chapter 5 construct micro mechanisms for attaining market equilibrium in more spatially
and temporally general situations than a single bottleneck case (Wada and Akamatsu, 2010).
This is not the only beneﬁt from the market institution. Trading markets further provides
useful information on the equilibrium permit prices, which reﬂect demand conditions. This
suggests that there is every possibility of developing a non-forecast-based supply side control
using the information. On the basis, the next chapter explores a supply side control based on
the tradable network permits.

Chapter 3
Distributed signal control based on
tradable network permits
This chapter1 proposes a distributed signal control policy based on a tradable network per-
mits system taking into account a semi-dynamic trafﬁc ﬂow. Main idea of underlying the
proposed policy is to exploit useful information on the equilibrium permit prices provided
by the trading markets. This enables us to appropriately incorporate demand conditions into
the signal control policy. Speciﬁcally, this signal control policy can achieve a global opti-
mal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern by exploiting only local information: it can determine the green time
proportion of each intersection by using intersection information only. An equilibrium traf-
ﬁc assignment under the proposed policy achieves a system optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern that
minimizes the total transportation cost in a network. Moreover, we construct an evolutionary
implementation method for the proposed policy and prove that the day-to-day trafﬁc ﬂow
dynamics under the scheme converges to the system optimal trafﬁc assignment.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 reviews existing studies on a framework
of combining signal control and trafﬁc assignment. In Section 3.2, we describe the pre-
conditions used throughout the chapter and deﬁne a system optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern. In
Section 3.3, we show a framework that combines the tradable network permits system and
a novel signal control policy and its properties. In Section 3.4, we show an evolutionary
implementation method of the proposed control policy. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
1 This chapter is based on joint research with Takashi Akamatsu, presented in the 4th International Sympo-
sium on Dynamic Trafﬁc Assignment (Wada and Akamatsu, 2012).
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3.1 Related works
A framework of combining signal control and trafﬁc assignment was ﬁrst introduced by
Allsop (1974) and a considerable amount of research into developing this framework (see
Cascetta, Gallo, and Montella, 2006; Ghatee and Hshemi, 2007, for references and a detailed
review) has been conducted. These studies are divided into two major categories, i.e., global
and local optimization approaches (Marcotte, 1983; Cantarella and Improta, 1991).
The former approaches aim to determine an optimal signal settings by solving a global
optimization of the signal setting problem (Gossp) that optimizes a global network perfor-
mance function. In general, the Gossp is formulated as a bi-level problem (or a mathematical
problems with equilibrium constraints), i.e., the upper level is a signal setting problem, and
the lower level is a trafﬁc equilibrium assignment problem. Various solution methods for the
bi-level problem have been proposed by numerous authors, e.g., Marcotte (1983); Shefﬁ and
Powell (1983); Heydecker and Khoo (1990); Yang and Yangr (1995); Chiou (1999); Cipri-
ani and Fusco (2004) and Ghatee and Hshemi (2007). However, this global approach faces a
difﬁculty caused by the non-convexity of the Gossp. Since the Gossp may have many local
minima, there is no guarantee that the global optimal solution is obtained by those various
solution methods. For instance, Cascetta, Gallo, and Montella (1998) showed experimen-
tally that different methods might produce different solutions. In addition, this approach
requires knowledge of the entire network information (e.g., origin-destination information)
to solve the Gossp. Thus, the optimal signal setting is difﬁcult to obtain using global solution
methods.
The latter approach consists of iteratively adjusting signal parameters based on a lo-
cal criterion. Representative classical signal control policies are the equisaturation policy
(Webster, 1958) and the delay-minimization policy 2 (Allsop, 1974; Gartner, 1974). The eq-
uisaturation policy sets a green time proportion so as to equalize the saturation level of all
directions at an intersection, and the delay-minimization policy updates the signal parame-
ters by solving a current total delay minimization problem. Since these policies determine
the signal parameters in terms of a short run objective for a current trafﬁc ﬂow pattern, long
run interactions between user behaviors and the signal control policy are not properly con-
sidered. As a result, equilibrium states consistent with the policies may be unstable, which
2 This policy is also called iterative optimization assignment (IOA).
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may lead to poor performance (Smith, 1979b; Dickson, 1981). Smith also pointed out that
policies induce inefﬁcient user of network capacity.
To solve this problem, Smith (1979a, 1980, 1981) proposed a capacity-maximization pol-
icy P0, which takes into consideration the aforementioned long run iterations. In policy P0,
a stable equilibrium consistent with the policy is achieved by using only local information.
Smith, van Vuren, Heydecker, and van Vliet (1987) showed experimentally that this policy
is better than the above two policies in terms of total delay at high congestion levels. Fur-
thermore, in Smith and van Vuren (1993) and Smith and Mounce (2011), a day-to-day trafﬁc
ﬂow dynamics globally converges to a stable equilibrium when a responsive version of the
policy P0 is employed. However, the policy generally cannot achieve the global optimal
trafﬁc ﬂow pattern because it is one of the local optimization approaches.
As we have seen, a global optimization approach may not be promising way to establish
a robust signal control policy, which does not require detailed user information. Instead,
it will be more effective to develop local optimization approaches that can obtain a stable
equilibrium in a distributed manner. In that sense, our signal control policy is designed in
the spirit of policy P0. Note that the equilibrium states with these policies are different in
that the equilibrium trafﬁc assignment under the proposed policy coincides with the optimal
one, although the equilibrium under the policy P0 does not3. Thus, the proposed policy is
the ﬁrst one that can achieve a global optimal signal setting in a distributed manner, which is
guaranteed to be applicable to situations with asymmetric information.
3.2 System optimal trafﬁc assignment in signal-controlled
networks
The objective of a signal control policy, which we propose in this chapter, is to eliminate
queuing congestion and to achieve a system optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern that minimizes the
total transportation cost. This section deﬁnes this objective. After describing a discrete-
time semi-dynamic trafﬁc ﬂow on a signal-controlled network, we then formulate a global
optimization of the signal setting problem (Gossp) that provides the system optimal trafﬁc
ﬂow pattern.
3 Ghali and Smith (1993) showed that combining the policy P0 and a marginal cost pricing scheme can
achieve the global optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern. However, when to implement this, the entire network
information is needed.
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3.2.1 Signal-controlled networks
We consider a discrete-time semi-dynamic trafﬁc ﬂow (e.g., Kikuchi and Akamatsu, 2007;
Nakayama, 2008) on general networks with multiple origin-destination (OD) pairs. The
semi-dynamic trafﬁc assignment model assumes that steady state trafﬁc equilibrium is real-
ized in each time period, and trafﬁc states only change between time periods. More specif-
ically, in this model, a queue on a link that cannot exit the link is propagated to the next
time period, which affects the next trafﬁc state. This model approximately represents a
continuous-time queue evolution.
The network consists of a set N of nodes and a set A of directed links. Each node repre-
sents each road section between signalized intersections; each link represents each direction
in a signalized intersection. The node set includes a subset O of origin nodes from which
users start their trip, and a subset D of destination nodes at which users terminate their trips.
A set of OD pairs is denoted by W. Each element of A (i.e., each link) is denoted by a pair
(k, l) of the upstream node k and the downstream node l. The time interval for which we
assign the semi-dynamic trafﬁc ﬂow is ﬁxed, and each time period is denoted by t ∈ T. We
assume that each OD pair’s travel demand Qod in the time interval is a given constant.
We assume, without any loss of generality, that each link in a network consists of a free-
ﬂow segment and single bottleneck segment (i.e., signalized intersection). The travel time
to pass through the free-ﬂow segment of link (k, l) is a constant tkl (i.e., tkl is independent of
time and ﬂow)4. The bottleneck of each link has a constant saturation ﬂow rate μkl, and a
signal delay may occur.
Signal setting constraints
We also assume that all links are signal-controlled. A set of signalized intersections is de-
noted by J, and a set of green phases at an intersection j in a time period t is denoted by
Ej(t). A cycle time and a loss time of each intersection are given exogenously. Let ge, j(t) be
the green time proportion of phase e at intersection j in time period t. For each intersection
j in each time period t, the sum of the green time proportions and a loss time proportion lj
equals to 1:
4 The free-ﬂow travel time includes the travel time to pass through a node (i.e., road section).
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Figure 3.1 Network representation of a signalized intersection
∑
e∈Ej(t)
ge, j(t) + lj = 1 ∀ j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T. (3.1)
Each signalized intersection consists of multiple links (Figure 3.1), and each link belongs
to multiple green phases. A set of links of phase e at intersection j in time period t is denoted
by Ae, j(t). Then, the green time proportion Gkl(t) of link (k, l) is the sum of the green times
of the phases to which the link belongs, i.e.,
Gkl(t) =
∑
e:kl∈Ae, j(t)
ge, j(t) ∀kl ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T. (3.2)
As mentioned before, our objective is to eliminate queuing congestion and to minimize
the total transportation cost. Thus, in addition to above signal setting constraints, we here
consider capacity constraints, i.e., the inﬂow rate ykl(t) of each link cannot exceed the trafﬁc
capacity Gkl(t)μkl of each link:
ykl(t) ≤ Gkl(t)μkl ∀kl ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T, (3.3)
Then over-saturated delay (i.e., queuing delay) at each link never occurs.
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Transportation costs in signal-controlled networks
Each user makes a single trip from an origin o ∈ O to a destination d ∈ D in the network. The
transportation cost for a single trip of a network consists of two types of cost: (a) “schedule
cost,” (b) “travel cost.” (a) The schedule cost for a user is the cost due to the difference
between the user’s desired arrival time period and the actual arrival time period t. The desired
arrival time is assumed to be the same for all users and is equal to tˆ. The schedule cost is
represented by the function sd(t) of the arrival time t at destination d, which is common to
all users.
(b) The travel cost is the monetary equivalent of the travel time required for a trip from the
origin and the destination. The travel times are divided in two parts, the free-ﬂow travel time
and the signal delay. The free-ﬂow travel time of link (k, l) is a constant tkl. The signal delay
that arises at each intersection under the capacity constraints (3.3) is not a queuing delay (i.e.,
over-saturated delay) but the waiting time caused by the red phase of the intersection. Since
this under-saturated delay is often smaller than the time in queue, the change (or externality)
of the delay due to the ﬂow and the green time is assumed to be negligible, i.e., the signal
delay of the link (k, l) is assumed to be a constant dkl.
3.2.2 Global optimization of signal setting problem
Under the setting, the total transportation cost is deﬁned as the sum of all user costs. Thus,
we formulate a global optimization of signal setting problem [Gossp] to determine both the
system optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern and the optimal green time proportions:
TTC∗ ≡ min
(q,y,g)≥0
.
∑
t∈T
∑
o∈O
∑
d∈D
qod(t)sd(t) + α
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
ykl(t)[tkl + dkl] (3.4)
subject to
∑
t∈T
qod(t) = Qod ∀od ∈W (3.5)
∑
l∈NO(k)
yokl(t) −
∑
l∈NI(k)
yolk(t) = −qod(t)δkd ∀k ∈ N, ∀o ∈ O, t ∈ T (3.6)
ykl(t) ≤ Gkl(t)μkl ∀kl ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (3.7)∑
e∈Ej(t)
ge, j(t) + lj = 1 ∀ j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T (3.8)
31
where
ykl(t) =
∑
o∈O
yokl(t) ∀kl ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (3.9)
Gkl(t) =
∑
e:kl∈Ae, j(t)
ge, j(t) ∀kl ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T, (3.10)
where qod(t) is the OD ﬂow rate for a user arriving at the destination at time period t, and α
is a coefﬁcient that converts travel time into the monetary equivalent.
This is the problem of ﬁnding a semi-dynamic trafﬁc ﬂow pattern (q∗,y∗) and green time
proportions g∗ that minimize the social transportation cost in the network5. Speciﬁcally, the
ﬁrst term of the objective function is the total schedule cost expensed by all users, and the
second term is the monetary equivalent of the total travel time paid by all users. The ﬁrst
constraint (3.5) is the conservation of the OD demand; the second constraint (3.6) is the
conservation of the semi-dynamic trafﬁc ﬂows at each node6. The next constraint (3.7) is the
trafﬁc capacity constraints on each bottleneck. The ﬁnal constraint (3.8) is the condition that
should be satisﬁed by the green time proportions.
We should note here that this problem does not incorporate users’ behaviors (i.e., desti-
nation arrival time choice, path choice). In addition, when to solve this problem, the entire
network information is needed. As shown later in Section 3.3, however, a framework that
combines the tradable network permits system and a distributed signal control policy can
achieve an equilibrium trafﬁc assignment that coincides with the system optimal trafﬁc ﬂow
pattern.
5 This problem does not necessarily have a feasible solution due to the capacity constraint (3.7) on each
link. However, if the assignment time interval is large enough that we can make the OD ﬂow rates smaller
than the maximum capacity of the underlying network, the problem [Gossp] always has feasible solutions.
Thus, throughout this chapter, we only deal with the case where the problem [Gossp] has feasible solutions.
6 In the semi-dynamic trafﬁc assignment model, an inﬂow rate and an outﬂow rate of each link are different
when a queue exists. However, in the present case there is no need to distinguish between the in- and
outﬂow rates because a queue never occurs.
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3.3 Distributed signal control policy based on tradable net-
work permits
This section presents a framework that combines the tradable network permits system and
a signal control policy. In Subsection 3.3.1, we ﬁrst describe behaviors of agents in our
framework. In Subsection 3.3.2, we show the equilibrium that takes place after introducing
the tradable network permits, and provide an optimization problem that is equivalent to the
equilibrium. From the problem, we can see that the problem [Gossp] includes users’ behav-
iors. In Subsection 3.3.3, we propose a signal control policy based on the tradable network
permits. In Subsection 3.3.4, we introduce the most important property that characterizes the
equilibrium assignment under the proposed signal control policy.
3.3.1 Behavoirs of agents
A road manager aims to restrain trafﬁc congestion on the network and minimize the total
transportation cost. To achieve this, the manager regulates the trafﬁc ﬂow rates entering
each bottleneck (i.e., signalized intersection) in the network using time-dependent network
permits. We assume that the number of permits issued for each link for each time period is
equal to or less than the trafﬁc capacity, which results in eliminating over-saturated delay at
each link. We also assume that trading markets are perfectly competitive. In addition, the
manager employs a signal control policy based on tradable network permits for controlling
green time proportions of each intersection. The precise deﬁnition of the signal control
policy is introduced in Subsection 3.3.3.
Each road user, on the other hand, chooses a destination arrival time and a path so as to
minimize own generalized transportation cost. Under the system of network permits each
user must purchase a set of permits corresponding to a set of links included in the user’s
chosen path. Thus, the generalized transpiration cost is the sum of the transportation cost
described above (i.e., schedule cost and travel cost) and the permit purchase cost that is
deﬁned as the sum of permit prices of the links included in the path used.
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3.3.2 Equilibrium under the tradable network permits system
Let us now assume that a signal setting is ﬁxed. At equilibrium, the following three condi-
tions should hold in addition to physical conditions of the trafﬁc ﬂows (3.5), (3.6), and (3.7)
(also see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion).
1) Equilibrium conditions for path choice:
Consider a user arriving at node k at time period t. At equilibrium, no user can improve his
or her own cost by changing the path choice unilaterally (i.e., no user has the incentive to
deviate from his or her strategy). Hence, if there exists a user entering into link (k, l) at time
period t, link (k, l) should be on the minimum path for a user arriving at node l. Denoting
πok(t) as the minimum path cost from the origin o to node k for a user arriving at time period
t, we can represent this condition as
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
πol (t) = α(tkl + dkl) + pkl(t) + π
o
k(t) if y
o
kl(t) > 0
πol (t) ≤ α(tkl + dkl) + pkl(t) + πok(t) if yokl(t) = 0
∀kl ∈ A, ∀o ∈ O, ∀t ∈ T, (3.11)
where pkl(t) is the permit price of link (k, l) at time period t.
2) Equilibrium conditions for destination arrival time choice:
At equilibrium, no one can improve his or her own generalized transportation cost by chang-
ing the destination arrival time unilaterally. It follows from the path choice equilibrium
condition above that the generalized transportation cost for a user arriving at the destination
d at time period t is sd(t) + πod(t), where sd(t) is the schedule cost for a user arriving at the
destination d at time period t. Therefore, the equilibrium condition for the user’s arrival time
choice can be expressed as
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
ρod = πod(t) + sd(t) if qod(t) > 0
ρod ≤ πod(t) + sd(t) if qod(t) = 0
∀od ∈W, ∀t ∈ T, (3.12)
where ρod represents the minimum generalized transportation cost between the origin and
the destination.
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3) Demand-supply equilibrium conditions in each link permits market:
Since the trading markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive, the price pkl(t) of each
permit type is adjusted to clear the excess demand for each type of permit. As we shown in
Chapter 2, the demand-supply equilibrium condition for the permits market is represented as
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
ykl(t) = Gkl(t)μkl if pkl(t) > 0
ykl(t) ≤ Gkl(t)μkl if pkl(t) = 0
∀kl ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T. (3.13)
For a given a signal setting g, the equilibrium conditions under the tradable network per-
mits mentioned above, which determine the OD ﬂow rates q, link inﬂow rates y, and permit
prices p, are equivalent to the following linear programming program [TAP-P] (Chapter 2):
min
(q,y)≥0
.
∑
t∈T
∑
o∈O
∑
d∈D
qod(t)sd(t) + α
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
ykl(t)[tkl + dkl] (3.14)
subject to
∑
t∈T
qod(t) = Qod ∀od ∈W (3.15)
∑
l∈NO(k)
yokl(t) −
∑
l∈NI(k)
yolk(t) = −qod(t)δkd ∀k ∈ N, ∀o ∈ O, t ∈ T (3.16)
ykl(t) ≤ Gkl(t)μkl ∀kl ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (3.17)
ykl(t) =
∑
o∈O
yokl(t) ∀kl ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T. (3.18)
This is the problem of ﬁnding the semi-dynamic trafﬁc ﬂow pattern that minimizes the total
generalized transportation cost in the network under the condition that the signal setting is
ﬁxed. In other words, the problem [TAP-P] is a sub-problem of the problem [Gossp], which
does not involve the determination of the signal settings. Hence, we see that the problem
[Gossp] contains user behaviors under the tradable network permits system.
This problem further provides information on the equilibrium prices/costs as well as
the equilibrium ﬂow patterns. Speciﬁcally, the optimal Lagrange multipliers for constraints
(3.15), (3.16), and (3.17) give the generalized transportation cost ρ, the minimum path cost
from the origin to each node π, and the link permit prices p, respectively. These Lagrange
multipliers (ρ,π,p) represent the equilibrium prices under the system of tradable permits
and are given as a solution of the dual problem, [TAP-D], of the problem [TAP-P]:
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max
(ρ,π,p)≥0
.
∑
od∈W
ρodQod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
pkl(t)Gkl(t)μkl (3.19)
subject to
ρod ≤ sd(t) + πod(t) ∀od ∈W, ∀t ∈ T (3.20)
πol (t) ≤ πok + α(tkl + dkl) + pkl(t) ∀kl ∈ A, ∀o ∈ O, ∀t ∈ T. (3.21)
3.3.3 A distributed signal control policy
In the previous subsection, we described behaviors of agents (i.e., users) that use road ca-
pacities. Our signal control policy, on the other hand, is described as behaviors of agents
(i.e., suppliers) that supply road capacities. Each supplier is an owner of each intersection
in the network and chooses the green time proportion (i.e., capacity allocation) of the inter-
section so as to maximize his or her proﬁt for given constant permit prices p. This proﬁt
maximization problem at the intersection k is formulated as
max
g j≥0
.
∑
t∈T
∑
e∈Ej(t)
∑
kl∈Ae, j(t)
Gkl(t)pkl(t)μkl (3.22)
subject to
∑
e∈Ej(t)
ge, j(t) + lk = 1. ∀t ∈ T (3.23)
Gkl(t) =
∑
e:kl∈Ae, j(t)
ge, j(t) ∀kl ∈ Ae, j(t) ∀e ∈ Ej(t), ∀t ∈ T. (3.24)
Then the signal control policy is derived as a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the opti-
mality of the proﬁt maximization problem:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ j(t) =
∑
kl∈Ae, j(t) pkl(t)μkl if ge, j(t) > 0
φ j(t) ≥ ∑kl∈Ae, j(t) pkl(t)μkl if ge, j(t) = 0
∀e ∈ Ej(t), j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T, (3.25)
where φ j(t) is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint (3.23).
The proposed signal control policy can determine the green time proportion of the inter-
section by using information on permit prices and saturation ﬂows of the intersection; it does
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not require knowledge of entire network information (e.g., origin-destination information).
More speciﬁcally, the policy (3.25) chooses the green time proportion of each intersection
such that
Less proﬁtable phases receive no green time.
3.3.4 Efﬁciency of the equilibrium under the proposed signal control
policy
The most important result in this chapter can be derived by combining user behaviors and
the proposed signal control policy in the previous subsections. In particular, we obtain the
following proposition on the relationship between the global optimization of signal setting
problem [Gossp] and the equilibrium conditions (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13) consistent with
the propose policy (3.25).
Proposition 3.1 For any networks with many-to-many OD pairs in which the problem [Gossp]
has feasible solutions, the trafﬁc equilibrium assignment under the tradable network permits
consistent with the proposed signal control policy minimizes the total travel cost deﬁned by
(3.4).
Proof This proposition can be proved by showing that a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for the optimality of the optimization problem [Gossp] coincides with the equilibrium condi-
tions (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13) and the proposed signal control policy (3.25). See Appendix
3.A for a complete proof.
To understand the Proposition 3.1 intuitively, we present another interpretation of the
proposed control policy, i.e., the proposed policy preferentially allocates capacities to the
phases that reduce the social transportation cost more. This comes from the fact that the
Lagrange multiplier p (i.e., the permit prices) corresponding to the capacity constraint (3.7)
equals to the decrease in the value of the objective function (3.4) by augmenting 1 unit of
link capacity (Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin, 1993).
In addition, our signal control policy is similar to the simple type of policy P0 by Smith
(1987) in the sense that these policies can achieve a stable equilibrium in a distributed man-
ner. However, his setting allows intersections to over-saturate, and his policy P0 cannot
achieve the system optimal assignment even if the under-saturated delay is constant.
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3.4 Evolutionary implementation method for the proposed
signal control policy
To obtain the system optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern (q∗,y∗), the proposed signal control policy
requires the optimal permit price p∗, which may not be instantly available through tradable
permits markets. To resolve this difﬁculty, we construct an evolutionary (i.e., day-to-day)
implementation method for the proposed policy.
The scheme consists of two phases, a trafﬁc equilibrium assignment phase and a signal
setting adjustment phase, which are repeated on a day-to-day basis. In the former phase, an
equilibrium trafﬁc ﬂow pattern under the tradable network permit arises under the condition
that green time proportions are ﬁxed. In addition, the manager obtains the permit price
information. In the latter phase, green time proportions are adjusted by a modiﬁed version
of the proposed signal control policy.
This natural procedure corresponds to Benders decomposition algorithm (Benders, 1962;
Lasdon, 1970; Geoffrion and Graves, 1974) for the problem [Gossp] (see Appendix A for
a basic framework of the Benders decomposition). Hence, we ﬁrst decomposes the prob-
lem [Gossp] into two problems, a master problem and a sub-problem. We then explain the
procedure of the implementation method. Finally, we prove that a day-to-day trafﬁc ﬂow
dynamics under the scheme converges to the system optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern.
3.4.1 Applying Benders decomposition principle to the Gossp
Let us decompose the problem [Gossp] into two problems based on Benders decomposition
principle:
TTC∗ = min
g≥0 .
∑
t∈T
∑
o∈O
∑
d∈D
qod(g(t))sd(t) + α
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
ykl(g(t))[tkl + dkl] (3.26)
subject to
∑
e∈Ej(t)
ge, j(t) + lk = 1 ∀ j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T (3.27)
Gkl(t) =
∑
e:kl∈Ae, j(t)
ge, j(t) ∀kl ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (3.28)
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where q(g) and y(g) are obtained by
min
(q,y)≥0
.
∑
t∈T
∑
o∈O
∑
d∈D
qod(t)sd(t) + α
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
ykl(t)[tkl + dkl] (3.29)
subject to∑
t∈T
qod(t) = Qod ∀od ∈W (3.30)
∑
l∈NO(k)
yokl(t) −
∑
l∈NI(k)
yolk(t) = −qod(t)δkd ∀k ∈ N, ∀o ∈ O, t ∈ T (3.31)
ykl(t) ≤ Gkl(t)μkl ∀kl ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (3.32)
ykl(t) =
∑
o∈O
yokl(t) ∀kl ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T, (3.33)
where (q(g), y(g)) is an optimal solution of the lower level problem for a parameter g.
The upper level problem (master problem) determines the optimal signal setting so as to
minimize the total transportation cost; the lower level problem (sub-problem) is the same
as the problem [TAP-P] shown in Subsection 3.3.2, which represents the trafﬁc equilibrium
assignment under the tradable network permits.
To understand that the master problem corresponds to our signal control policy, we need
to show the relationship between the master problem and the permit prices. Then we recall
the problem [TAP-D] which is the dual problem of the problem [TAP-P]:
TTC(g) ≡ max
(ρ,π,p)≥0
.
∑
od∈W
ρodQod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
pkl(t)Gkl(t)μkl (3.34)
subject to
ρod ≤ sd(t) + πod(t) ∀od ∈W, ∀t ∈ T (3.35)
πol (t) ≤ πok + α(tkl + dkl) + pkl(t) ∀kl ∈ A, ∀o ∈ O, ∀t ∈ T. (3.36)
From the duality theorem, the optimal value of the objective function of [TAP-D] coincides
with the optimal value of the objective function of [TAP-P], i.e.,
TTC(g) =
∑
od∈W
ρod(g)Qod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
pkl(g(t))Gkl(t)μkl (3.37)
=
∑
t∈T
∑
o∈O
∑
d∈D
qod(g(t))sd(t) + α
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
ykl(g(t))[tkl + dkl],
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where (ρ(g),p(g)) is an optimal solution of the [TAP-D] for a parameter g, i.e., it is an
extreme point of the convex feasible region Ω that consists of the constraints (3.35) and
(3.36). By using the optimal value function (5.40), we can transform the master problem
into the following problem:
min
g≥0 .TTC(g) =
∑
od∈W
ρod(g)Qod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
pkl(g(t))Gkl(t)μkl (3.38)
= min
g≥0 .
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ max(ρ(s),p(s))∈V(Ω) .
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∑
od∈W
ρ(s)odQod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
p(s)kl (t)Gkl(t)μkl
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (3.39)
subject to Eq. (3.27) and Eq. (3.28).
whereV(Ω) is all (a ﬁnite set of) extreme points of the convex feasible regionΩ. In the prob-
lem (3.39), the coefﬁcients of the green time proportions are permit prices, i.e., it indicates
that green time proportions are determined based on permit prices.
Problem (3.39) is equivalent to the original problem [Gossp] if all extreme points are
known. However, it is difﬁcult to obtain the extreme points in advance because a number
of extreme points is generally too large. Hence, we consider a relaxation problem of (3.39)
that has a subset of extreme points in V(Ω) and produce an lower bound on the optimal
objective value of the problem (3.39) (or the problem [Gossp]). This relaxed problem is
called the restricted master problem. We then employ an iterative approach by adding an
extreme point to the restricted master problem to improve the lower bound. Note that an
extreme point is generated by solving the problem [TAP-D] for a ﬁxed signal setting g.
3.4.2 Procedure of the evolutionary implementation method
The evolutionary implementation method for the proposed signal control policy corresponds
to solving the above two problems iteratively. Hence, the day-to-day procedure of the scheme
can be summarized in the following steps:
Step 0 : Initial setting. Set s = 1. Determine the initial green time proportions g(1). Start
with a set of extreme points V(1)(Ω) = {∅} and a lower bound θ(1) = 0.
Step 1 : Trafﬁc equilibrium assignment phase. For a ﬁxed signal setting g(s), the consistent
equilibrium (q(s), y(s),p(s)) arises under the tradable network permits system, which is
shown in Subsection 3.3.2. The equilibrium generalized transportation cost ρ(s) is also
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determined. If the total transportation cost TTC(g(s)) equals the lower bound θ(s), then
stop. Otherwise go to Step 2.
Step 2 : Signal setting adjustment phase. Add an extreme point to the set: V(s+1)(Ω) ≡
{V(s)(Ω)∪ (ρ(s),p(s))}, and produce the signal setting g(s+1) by a modiﬁed version of the
proposed signal control policy and update the lower bound θ(s+1). Let s = s + 1. Go to
Step 1.
At Step 1, through the trading markets, the equilibrium permit allocation pattern and
permit prices are determined, which leads to the equilibrium trafﬁc ﬂow pattern shown in
Subsection 3.3.2. As an example of concrete mechanisms for the trading markets, we may
utilize the auction mechanism constructed in Chapter 4. In this mechanism, the net utility,
which corresponds to the generalized transpiration cost ρ(s), can be obtained through a proxy-
ascending auction.
At Step 2, the road manager considers all extreme points information (ρ(s),p(s)) for the
current day and past days and adjusts the green time proportion of each intersection. This
corresponds to solving the following linear programming problem that is equivalent to the
restricted master problem:
min
g,θ≥0
.θ (3.40)
subject to
θ ≥
∑
od∈W
ρ(s)odQod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
p(s)kl (t)Gkl(t)μkl ∀(ρ(s),p(s)) ∈ V(s+1)(Ω), (3.41)
Eq. (3.27) and Eq. (3.28).
The optimal value of the objective function is the lower bound θ(s+1) on the optimal value
of the problem (3.39). A modiﬁed signal control policy is derived as the necessary and
sufﬁcient optimality condition of the problem:
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⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ =
∑
od∈W ρ
(s)
odQod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A p
(s)
kl (t)Gkl(t)μkl if η
(s) > 0
θ ≥ ∑od∈W ρ(s)odQod −∑t∈T ∑kl∈A p(s)kl (t)Gkl(t)μkl if η(s) = 0
{(ρ(1),p(1)), . . . , (ρ(s),p(s))} ∈ V(s+1)(Ω) (3.42)⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 =
∑
s η
(s) if θ > 0
1 ≥ ∑s η(s) if θ = 0
(3.43)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ j(t) =
∑
s η
(s) ∑
kl∈Ae, j(t) p
(s)
kl (t)μkl if ge, j(t) > 0
φ j(t) ≥ ∑s η(s) ∑kl∈Ae, j(t) p(s)kl (t)μkl if ge, j(t) = 0
∀e ∈ Ej(t), j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T, (3.44)
where η(s) is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (3.41). The modiﬁed version of the
proposed signal control policy (i.e., (3.42), (3.43), and (3.44)) is not a complete distributed
policy but is described as behaviors of a central agent and the local agents.
The central agent coordinates the local agents to improve the lower bound. Speciﬁcally,
the central agent determines the weight parameter η(s) for each day so as to maximize the
lower bound based on the conditions (3.42) and (3.43). If the condition (3.42) of day s is
bounded, all weight 1 is allocated to the parameter of day s, i.e., η(s) = 1. Note that we
assume that the lower bound is θ > 0 (i.e.,
∑
s η
(s) = 1) because the lower bound becomes
positive within a few iterations from the starting point θ(1) = 0.
After allocating the weight to the parameter of day s by the central agent, the local agents
determine the green time proportion of each intersection based on the permit prices on day
s. Thus, the behavior of each local agent described as the condition (3.44) coincides with the
proposed signal control policy described in Subsection 3.3.3: Less proﬁtable phases receive
no green time.
3.4.3 Convergence of the evolutionary implementation method
In the implementation method, the optimal solution of the original problem [Gossp] is achieved
when the lower bound θ(s) coincides with the transportation cost TTC(g(s)). This is because
the trafﬁc ﬂow pattern (q(s),y(s)) is a feasible solution of the original problem and is not
equal to the lower bound, except for the optimal solution. On the other hand, as we showed
in Subsection 3.4.1, the restricted master problem coincides with the problem [Gossp] when
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all extreme points are known, which implies that the restricted master problem is sure to pro-
duce the optimal signal setting by the time all extreme points are generated. Furthermore, a
new extreme point is always generated in each Step 1 before the procedure terminates. These
statements suggest the following convergence result of the day-to-day trafﬁc ﬂow dynamics
under the implementation method.
Proposition 3.2 For any networks with many-to-many OD pairs in which the problem [TAP-
P] has feasible solutions, the day-to-day trafﬁc ﬂow dynamics under the implementation
method globally converges to the optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern in a ﬁnite number of steps.
Proof See Appendix 3.B for the proof.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed a distributed signal control policy based on a tradable network
permits system. The main feature of the proposed policy is the determination of a green
time proportion for each intersection by exploiting only local information. We proved that
the equilibrium trafﬁc assignment under the tradable network permits consistent with the
proposed signal control policy coincides with the system optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern that
minimizes the total transportation cost. Finally, we constructed an evolutionary implemen-
tation method for the proposed policy and proved that the day-to-day trafﬁc ﬂow dynamics
under the scheme converges to the system optimal trafﬁc assignment.
We showed the implementation method of the proposed signal control policy (supply
side conditions). However, we should note here that (demand side) trafﬁc equilibrium under
the tradable network permits system is assumed to be achieved. Therefore, the next chapter
constructs an implementation mechanism that can attain the equilibrium.
While this chapter only dealt with the green time proportion as a signal control param-
eter, an interesting direction for future research is the problem that includes other control
parameters (e.g., number of phases, cycle length, and offsets) for the determination of a de-
tailed signal setting within each time period. Since queuing congestion is eliminated under
our framework, we can easily deal with detailed signal settings.
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Appendix 3.A Proof of Proposition 1
We will show that a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the optimality of the optimization
problem [Gossp] coincides with the equilibrium conditions (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13), and
the proposed signal control policy (3.25). To derive the optimality conditions, we ﬁrst deﬁne
the Lagrangean function L for the problem [Gossp]:
L ≡ TTC +
∑
od∈W
ρod
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩Qod −
∑
t∈T
qod(t)
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ (3.45)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
o∈O
∑
k∈N
πok(t)
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩qod(t)δkd +
∑
l∈NO(k)
yokl(t) −
∑
l∈NI(k)
yolk(t)
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
+
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
pkl(t)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑
o∈O
yokl(t) −
∑
e:kl∈Ae, j(t)
ge, j(t)μkl
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭ +
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J
φ j(t)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑
e∈Ej(t)
ge, j(t) + lk − 1
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭
where the TTC is the objective function of [Gossp] deﬁned in (3.4); the variables {ykl(t)} are
eliminated by substituting the constraint (3.9) into the objective function and the constraint
(3.7); the variables {Gkl(t)} are also eliminated by substituting the constraint (3.10) into the
constraint (3.8); and ρ, π, p, and φ are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraint
(3.5), (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8), respectively. Then, the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for
the optimality of [Gossp] are given by the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂L/∂q∗od(t) = 0 if q∗od(t) > 0
∂L/∂q∗od(t) ≥ 0 if q∗od(t) = 0
∀od ∈W, ∀t ∈ T (3.46)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂L/∂yo∗kl (t) = 0 if yo∗kl (t) > 0
∂L/∂yo∗kl (t) ≥ 0 if yo∗kl (t) = 0
∀kl ∈ A, ∀o ∈ O, ∀t ∈ T (3.47)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂L/∂g∗e, j(t) = 0 if g∗e, j(t) > 0
∂L/∂g∗e, j(t) ≥ 0 if g∗e, j(t) = 0
∀e ∈ Ej(t), ∀ j ∈ J, ∀t ∈ T (3.48)
∂L/∂ρ∗od = 0 ∀od ∈W (3.49)
∂L/∂πo∗k (t) = 0 ∀k ∈ N, ∀o ∈ O, ∀t ∈ T (3.50)⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂L/∂p∗kl(t) = 0 if p∗kl(t) > 0
∂L/∂p∗kl(t) ≤ 0 if p∗kl(t) = 0
∀kl ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T. (3.51)
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It can be easily seen that conditions (3.49), (3.50), and (3.51) reduce to the physical
conditions (3.15), (3.16), and the demand-supply equilibrium condition (3.13), respectively.
To examine conditions (3.46), (3.47), and (3.48), we calculate the partial derivatives of the
Lagrangean function:
∂L/∂q∗od(t) = sd(t) + πod(t) − ρod (3.52)
∂L/∂yo∗kl (t) = α(tkl + dkl) + pkl(t) + πok(t) − πol (t) (3.53)
∂L/∂g∗e, j(t) =
∑
kl∈Ae, j(t)
pkl(t)μkl − φ j(t) (3.54)
Substituting (3.52) into (3.46), we have the same form of conditions as in equilibrium condi-
tion (3.12); similarly, we see that (3.47) and (3.48) reduce to the equilibrium condition (3.11)
and the proposed signal control policy (3.25), respectively. Thus, the Lagrange multipliers
ρ∗, π∗, p∗, and φ∗ in the optimality conditions (3.46)–(3.51) coincide with the equilibrium
permit prices, the equilibrium minimum path costs, equilibrium generalized transportation
costs in equilibrium conditions (3.11)–(3.13), and the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to
the constraint (3.23); the optimal ﬂow patterns (q∗,y∗) and the optimal signal setting g∗ also
coincide with the equilibrium consistent with the proposed signal control policy.
Appendix 3.B Proof of Proposition 2
We will show that a new extreme point is always generated in every Step 1 until the conver-
gence criterion is satisﬁed. We denote the green time proportions on day s by g(s), the lower
bound by θ(s), and the extreme point of the day by (ρ,p) ∈ V(s)(Ω) bounded by condition
(3.42). Then
θ(s) =
∑
od∈W
ρodQod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
pkl(t)G
(s)
kl (t)μkl (3.55)
holds. In contrast, for another point (ρ′,p′) in the set V(s)(Ω),
∑
od∈W
ρodQod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
pkl(t)G
(s)
kl (t)μkl ≥
∑
od∈W
ρ′odQod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
p′kl(t)G
(s)
kl (t)μkl (3.56)
is satisﬁed by condition (3.42). From the duality theorem, the optimal value of the objective
function of [TAP-P] coincides with the optimal value of the objective function of [TAP-D]
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for the parameter g(s), that is,
TTC(g(s)) =
∑
od∈W
ρ(s)odQod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
p(s)kl (t)G
(s)
kl (t)μkl (3.57)
=
∑
t∈T
∑
o∈O
∑
d∈D
q(s)od sd(t) + α
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
y(s)kl (t)[tkl + dkl]
where (ρ(s),p(s),q(s),y(s)) is the optimal solution of [TAP-P] and [TAP-D], which represents
the equilibrium state under the signal setting g(s). In addition, since (q(s),y(s)) is a feasible
solution of the original problem [Gossp],
∑
t∈T
∑
o∈O
∑
d∈D
q(s)od sd(t) + α
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
y(s)kl (t)[tkl + dkl] ≥ TTC∗ (3.58)
holds. TTC∗ represents the optimal value of the objective function of the problem [Gossp].
From the above discussion, the following relationship is satisﬁed:
∑
od∈W
ρ(s)odQod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
p(s)kl (t)G
(s)
kl (t)μkl (3.59)
=
∑
t∈T
∑
o∈O
∑
d∈D
q(s)od sd(t) + α
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
y(s)kl (t)[tkl + dkl]
≥ TTC∗
≥ θ(s)
=
∑
od∈W
ρodQod −
∑
t∈T
∑
kl∈A
pkl(t)G
(s)
kl (t)μkl.
Hence, (ρ(s),p(s))  (ρ,p) is achieved when θ(s) < TTC(g(s)), i.e., a new extreme point is
generated until the convergence criterion is satisﬁed. Since the number of extreme points is
ﬁnite, we can conclude that the day-to-day trafﬁc ﬂow dynamics converges to the optimal
trafﬁc ﬂow pattern in a ﬁnite number of steps.

Chapter 4
A hybrid implementation mechanism of
tradable network permits system which
obviates path enumeration
This chapter1 designs an auction mechanism for implementing the tradable network permit
markets on general networks. An important factor that affects the success of such a mar-
ket mechanism is incentive of an individual market participant. More speciﬁcally, it is well
known that a well-designed market mechanism will encourage a competition and increase
efﬁciency, and otherwise the poor efﬁciency may arise due to participants’ strategic manip-
ulations (e.g., McMillan, 2002). Hence, we have to design trading rules in which no partic-
ipant has incentive to manipulate the markets with careful consideration of the possibilities
of the manipulations.
To accomplish this, the present chapter conducts a game-theoretic analysis of a dynamic
trafﬁc assignment with atomic users, while the previous chapters consider continuous ﬂows.
A difﬁculty of treating atomic users on general networks is that a naive formulation of a
dynamic system optimal allocation of network permits leads to a NP-hard problem owing
to the complex relationship between link and path. As a result, it is almost impossible to
apply the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is a benchmark in auction theory
(Milgrom, 2004; Cramton et al., 2006).
1 This chapter is based on joint research with Takashi Akamatsu, is accepted in the 20th International Sym-
posium on Transportation and Trafﬁc Theory (Wada and Akamatsu, 2013). A preliminary version pub-
lished in Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser. D3 (Infrastructure Planning and Management)
(Wada and Akamatsu, 2011).
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To avoid such computational infeasibility, we develop a hybrid implementation mecha-
nism that consistently combines an auction mechanism with a path capacity control, which
are repeated on a day-to-day basis. The former phase involves selling of bundles of permits
corresponding to the paths, and the latter phase involves adjustment of the number of bun-
dles, which corresponds to the path capacity. We prove that the proposed mechanism has
two desirable properties: (1) truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for each user on each
day, and (2) the permit allocation pattern under the mechanism converges to an approxi-
mate dynamic system optimal allocation pattern in the sense that the achieved social surplus
reaches its maximum value when the number of users is large. Furthermore, we show that the
proposed mechanism can be extended to obviate path enumeration by introducing a column
generation procedure.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 discusses related works. Section 4.2
describes pre-conditions used through the chapter. Section 4.3 deﬁnes a dynamic system op-
timal allocation of network permits and discusses the impossibility of employing the VCG
mechanism. Section 4.4 presents ideas of a novel auction mechanism that is readily imple-
mentable for general networks. Section 4.5 shows details of the proposed mechanism and
clarify its properties. Section 4.6 constructs an extended mechanism which obviates path
enumeration. Section 4.7 demonstrates convergence properties of the proposed mechanism
by a numerical example. Section 4.8 concludes the chapter.
4.1 Related works
this chapter is mainly concerned with dynamic trafﬁc assignments (DTA), some types of
transportation demand management (TDM) schemes (i.e., dynamic congestion pricing schemes
and tradable permits schemes) and combinatorial auctions. The ﬁrst two areas provide an an-
alytical framework for modeling and managing trafﬁc congestion in transportation networks,
whereas the third area provides a foundation for constructing an auction mechanism to im-
plement trading markets. In particular, auctions for bundled items with network structure are
relevant to our study.
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Dynamic trafﬁc assignment models
Due to the successful incorporation of queuing phenomena into transportation network anal-
ysis, there has been much research into DTA models (e.g., Vickrey, 1969; Kuwahara and
Akamatsu, 1993; Cascetta, 2001). For instance, departure time choice models have been
developed by Smith (1984b), Daganzo (1985), Newell (1987), and Iryo and Yoshii (2007),
while dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) models have been developed by Kuwahara and Aka-
matsu (1993), Smith (1993), Heydecker and Addison (1996), Akamatsu (2001), and Iryo
(2011) and many others (see Peeta and Ziliaskopoulos, 2001; Szeto and Wong, 2011, for
comprehensive reviews). These studies analyzed the properties of user equilibrium and dis-
cussed the effectiveness of dynamic congestion pricing as shown in the next subsection.
However, few studies have discussed the asymmetric information problem and the effective-
ness of quantity-based regulation for eliminating queues.
Dynamic congestion pricing schemes
Dynamic congestion pricing is a natural extension of the static congestion pricing and is
a benchmark TDM scheme to eliminate queuing congestion. Despite its importance, most
studies have been limited to simple networks (e.g., a single bottleneck) because analyzing
DTA models for more general networks is usually intractable (e.g., Arnott et al., 1990, 1993;
Kuwahara, 2007; Doan et al., 2011). However, there have been some attempts to overcome
this difﬁculty. For example, Ziliaskopoulos (2000) and Nie (2011) studied dynamic marginal
cost analyses for system optimal DTA problems with many-to-one (or one-two many) OD
pairs; Yang and Meng (1998) derived an optimal toll based on a time-space network for gen-
eral networks; Friesz et al. (2007) formulated a dynamic second-best toll pricing problem for
general networks as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints and developed a so-
lution algorithm, but they did not address theoretical questions (e.g., algorithm convergence).
In effect, no study has established a theory of dynamic congestion pricing for general net-
works in which queues arise. Furthermore, implementations of the abovementioned schemes
unsurprisingly face the difﬁculty associated with asymmetric information.
To address the asymmetric information problem, some studies have developed evolu-
tionary (trial-and-error) implementation methods for congestion pricing in static settings
(Sandholm, 2002, 2007; Yang et al., 2004; Han and Yang, 2009). These methods set toll
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levels based on realized trafﬁc ﬂow patterns. The studies then demonstrated that an appro-
priate adjustment process of route choice (e.g., Smith, 1984a) converges to an equilibrium
that minimizes the total transportation cost in the network2. This result relies on the fact
that there is an equivalent optimization problem (or a Beckmann-type potential function) for
a static user equilibrium. However, the properties of static and dynamic congestion pric-
ing are different since the mechanisms of ﬂow and queuing congestion are totally different.
The DUE model cannot also be reduced to an optimization problem in general. Thus, it is
not easy to generalize the methods to dynamic settings. Further, the methods need to set
a discriminatory toll to achieve an optimal state when users have heterogeneous costs (e.g.,
value of time), but information on such heterogeneities cannot be gathered by these methods,
which means that this approach is not a panacea for the problem even in static settings.
Tradable permits schemes for managing trafﬁc congestion
A tradable permits scheme that combines a quantity-based regulation and a market institution
has been studied for environmental protection (Montgomery, 1972; Tietenberg, 1980). The
capabilities and applicability of this scheme have been increasing, because the emergence
of the Internet enables a new market to be established inexpensively. For managing trafﬁc
congestion, a few researchers have studied such a scheme as an alternative to congestion
pricing. Verhoef et al. (1997) discussed the possibilities of using tradable permits in the
various types of regulations for road transport externalities; e.g., vehicle ownership permits,
tradable parking permits, and tradable permits in the regulation of road usage. Teodorovic´
et al. (2008) proposed an auction-based congestion pricing, for which drivers who want
to enter a downtown area have to participate a downtown time slot auction. Although it
formulated the allocation problem for the time slots, their study did not address how to set
their prices, which is the core problem of auction mechanisms. Moreover, the existing studies
provide some useful insights into tradable permit schemes for managing trafﬁc congestion,
but none describes time-dependent tradable permits for eliminating bottleneck congestion.
In addition, it is worth mentioning the tradable travel credit scheme proposed by Yang
2 Yang et al. (2004) and Han and Yang (2009) did not explicitly consider an adjustment process unlike
Sandholm (2002, 2007). Instead, they assumed that user equilibrium trafﬁc ﬂow patterns are realized for
any given temporal link toll patterns, which may imply that it takes a time to obtain each equilibrium by
the adjustment process.
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and Wang (2011), which is superﬁcially similar to but fundamentally different from the trad-
able network permits scheme3. Basically, under the tradable travel credit scheme, the road
manager initially distributes credits to all eligible travelers and predetermines a link-speciﬁc
credit charge. Credits are freely tradable among the credit holders in a market. Yang and
Wang (2011) showed that, if the manager can appropriately set the total number of credits
and the link-speciﬁc credit charges, a desirable trafﬁc ﬂow pattern is achieved. However, it is
apparent that this scheme requires detailed demand information unlike the tradable network
permits4. Further, it is fair to say that this scheme is not be a quantity-based regulation for
managing congestion but rather a redistribution scheme for income. Indeed, the main advan-
tage of this scheme over the standard congestion pricing is the improvement in equity and
social acceptability, not a direct reduction in trafﬁc congestion.
Auction mechanisms for networked items
Since the pioneering work of Rassenti et al. (1982), who proposed airport time slot auctions,
there has been a considerable amount of work on combinatorial auctions (e.g., de Vries
and Vohra, 2003; Cramton et al., 2006), which allow bids on combinations of items and
thus enhance the economic efﬁciency when bidders have preferences for sets of items (e.g.,
spectrum rights, airport time slots, railroad segments, and paths in networks). The most cel-
ebrated such auction is the VCG mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973).
This mechanism is strategy-proof and can achieve allocative efﬁciency. However, to main-
tain these properties, it requires the auctioneer to solve complex combinatorial optimization
problems to determine the allocation and prices (Vickrey payments). Therefore, the VCG
mechanism is computationally intractable in many circumstances, including ours (see Sec-
tion 4.3).
In this regard, several authors have showed that such a intractability can be avoided un-
der some restricted circumstances in which combinations of items have network structures.
3 Similar schemes of the tradable travel credit were also discussed in Viegas (2001) and Verhoef et al.
(1997).
4 Nie (2012) pointed out this fact in the context of comparison with tradable permits for emission control:
“Sufﬁce it to say here that the information that the government would need to run a mobility credit market
is as much as the information required to operate a conventional pricing scheme. Therefore, the mobility
credit market does not reduce the administrative burden of the government, unlike in the case of emission
control.”
52
Bikhchandani et al. (2002) demonstrated that the VCG outcome can be computed by solving
two linear programs in the case that a winner determination problem reduces to a spanning
tree problem or a shortest path problem5. Nisan and Ronen (2001) derived the Vickrey pay-
ments for a shortest path problem, and Hershberger and Suri (2001) developed an efﬁcient
algorithm to compute those payments. However, the auctions cannot be implemented for
trading markets because these are reverse auctions that cannot handle multiple buyers (i.e.,
users).
The studies on bandwidth auctions for communication networks are also related to our
study in the sense that they also focus on an allocation problem for a network capacity
that is a limited resource (e.g., Koutsopoulos and Iosiﬁdis, 2010). The studies consider the
case in which each bidder (e.g., provider) purchases a quantity of bandwidth over a path in
a network. Lazar and Semret (1999) proposed the “progressive second price auction” for
allocating a divisible quantity of bandwidth over a certain path. Dramitinos et al. (2007)
proposed a multi-unit Dutch auction, which allocates an indivisible quantity of bandwidth
over a certain path. Both of these auction mechanisms can induce truth-telling. However, in
contrast to the mechanism that is proposed in this chapter, neither takes into account the route
choice problem of the bidders (i.e., each bidder is interested in a single ﬁxed path). From the
above discussion, we conclude that there is no network auction mechanism that enables us
to assign network capacities (i.e., network permits) to multiple users who choose a route in
a network, and thus, the proposed mechanism is a major contribution of this chapter.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Networks
In this chapter, we consider discrete-time dynamic trafﬁc ﬂows on a general network. The
network consists of a set N of nodes and a set A of directed links. The node set N includes
a subset O of origin nodes from which users start their trips, and a subset D of destination
nodes at which users terminate their trips. A set of origin-destination (OD) pairs is denoted
by W. Each element of A (i.e., each link) is identiﬁed by a sequential natural number a.
The time interval [0, I] for which we assign the dynamic trafﬁc ﬂow is ﬁxed. We assume
5 Bikhchandani et al. (2002) also dealt with more general cases.
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that each OD pair’s potential travel demand Qod in the time interval [0, I] is a given constant.
The time interval [0, I] is discretized into small intervals of length Δt: each time point is
represented by t = mΔt, where m = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,M. Each time interval [t, t + Δt] is denoted
by t ∈ T and we call this interval time period t.
We also assume, without any loss of generality, that each link in a network consists of
a free-ﬂow segment and a single bottleneck segment. The travel time to pass through the
free-ﬂow segment of link a is a constant ta. We then assume that travel time ta is represented
by a natural multiplier of Δt (i.e., an integer na satisﬁes ta = naΔt). The bottleneck of each
link is represented by a point queue model with constant capacity μa = vehicles/time interval
Δt.
4.2.2 Road network manager and users
A road manager aims to restrain trafﬁc congestion in the network and maximize the social
surplus. To achieve this, the manager regulates the trafﬁc ﬂow rates entering each bottleneck
in the network using time-dependent network permits. The precise deﬁnition and setup of
the network permit system are described in Subsection 4.2.3.
Within the time interval [0, I], each atomic user i ∈ Nod (i.e., |Nod| = Qod) makes at
most a single trip in the network from an origin (e.g., residential zone) to a destination (e.g.,
the central business district). This means that all users do not necessarily make trips, which
corresponds to the conventional trafﬁc assignments with elastic demand (see also Subsection
4.5.1). The user chooses a destination arrival time period and a path between the origin and
destination so as to maximize his or her utility. Under the system of network permits, each
user must purchase a bundle of permits corresponding to a set of links included in the user’s
chosen path. This implies that choosing a destination arrival time period and a path directly
corresponds to purchasing time-dependent network permits in the trading markets.
4.2.3 Network permits and trading markets
In this chapter, we assume that the manager can issue time-dependent network permits for
all bottlenecks (i.e., links) in the network. We also assume that the number of permits issued
for each link in each time period is equal to or less than the trafﬁc capacity of each link in
the network. This means that queuing congestion never occurs in the network under this
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permit-issue scheme.
The permits issued for each link (bottleneck) are put on sale by the road manager. Each
user who would like to use a path must purchase a bundle of permits corresponding to a set of
links included in the user’s preferred path. In the trading markets, prices and the allocation of
time-dependent permits are determined through an auction mechanism. The detailed trading
rules are given in Section 4.5.
It must be admitted that the procedures for trading network permits seem unrealistic at
ﬁrst glance, but implementation of these would become feasible with futuristic vehicles in
which an agent software is installed to manage driving, navigation and safety. From this
perspective, the mechanism proposed in this chapter can be viewed as the protocol of a
multi-agent system in which the agent software executes the procedures for trading network
permits on behalf of users.
4.2.4 Dynamic travel costs and user utility in general networks
The transportation cost for a single trip made by a network user consists of “schedule cost”
and “travel cost.” The schedule cost for user i is the cost due to the difference between the
user’s desired arrival time period ti and the actual arrival time period t. The schedule cost
is represented by a function si(t, ti) of both destination arrival time and desired arrival time.
The travel cost is the monetary equivalent of the travel time for a trip from the origin to the
destination. The travel times differ among the paths. The travel time of a path between the
OD pair is deﬁned as the sum of travel times of the links included in the path. Note that the
travel time of each link a is a constant ta under the permit system since there is no queuing.
Hence, the travel time Tr for path r ∈ Rod between the OD pair is also constant:
Tr =
∑
a∈A
taδa,r(o,d), (4.1)
where δa,r(o,d) is a typical element of the path-link incidence matrix for the node pair (o, d); it
is 1 if link a is on path r connecting the OD pair (o, d) and zero otherwise.
We suppose that each user has a private valuation vi,r(t) for each path r and each des-
tination arrival time period t. This valuation vi,r(t) represents a nonnegative value of trip
between OD pair along path r in time period t. For example, to show a correspondence with
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conventional trafﬁc assignments, we can specify the valuation as
vi,r(t) ≡ wi − (si(t, ti) + αiTr) , (4.2)
where wi is a parameter, which is interpreted as the trip utility (or willingness-to-pay) be-
tween the OD pair, and αi is a coefﬁcient that converts travel time into a monetary equivalent.
Each user is assumed to have a quasi-linear utility function (we use the term “payoff”
interchangeably with “utility”). Speciﬁcally, each user’s utility ui,r(t) for path r in time period
t is represented as the difference between private valuation and the “permit purchase cost
Pr(t)” determined in an auction:
ui,r(t) ≡ vi,r(t) − Pr(t). (4.3)
The permit purchase cost is the total payment for purchasing the bundle of link permits
required for traveling along a path and arriving at the destination in a certain time period.
4.3 Dynamic system optimal allocation of network permits
The objective of an auction mechanism, such as that designed in this chapter, is to achieve
a network permit allocation pattern that maximizes a social surplus (i.e., dynamic system
optimal allocation). The social surplus is deﬁned as the sum of user’s valuations. This
excludes user payments to the road manager to purchase permits because these payments are
simply income transfers between the users and the road manager. Thus, we formulate an
optimization problem [DSO] of providing the dynamic system optimal allocation of network
permits:
max
(f,y)
. SS(f) ≡
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) fi,r(t) (4.4)
subject to
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
fi,r(t) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W (4.5)
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
yi,a(t) ≤ μa ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (4.6)
yi,a(t) =
∑
r∈Rod
fi,r(t + Ta,r)δa,r(o,d) ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ Nod ∀od ∈W (4.7)
fi,r(t), yi,a(t) ∈ {0, 1} ∀a ∈ A, ∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W, (4.8)
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where fi,r(t) denotes the allocation of a bundle of permits to user i and yi,a(t) denotes the
allocation of a network permit to user i. Speciﬁcally, fi,r(t) is 1 if user i is allocated a bundle
of permits for a set of links required to travel along path r and to arrive in time period t and
is zero otherwise. Hence, yi,a(t) is 1 if user i is allocated a network permit for link a in time
period t and is zero otherwise.
The combinatorial optimization problem of ﬁnding an efﬁcient network permit allocation
pattern (f∗,y∗), subject to the physical constraints on ﬂows representing the network perfor-
mance. The ﬁrst constraint (4.5) is the condition that each user makes at most one trip in the
interval [0, I]. The second constraint (4.6) is the capacity constraint on each link. The third
constraint (4.7) expresses the ﬂow conservation between link ﬂows and path ﬂows for each
user; that is, the link ﬂow yi,a(t) entering into link a in time period t is the sum of the ﬂows
on all paths going through that link and arriving at the destination at time t+ Ta,r. The travel
time required for arriving at the destination from the upstream node k (of the link a) through
path r (containing link a) is given by:
Ta,r =
∑
a′∈A
ta′δa′,r(k,d), (4.9)
where δa′,r(k,d) is a typical element of the path-link incidence matrix for node pair (k, d).
Although the road manager seeks to solve the problem [DSO] to achieve the system op-
timal permit allocation pattern, solving the problem directly poses two major difﬁculties: (i)
the objective function of the problem includes users’ private valuations, and (ii) the problem
is NP-hard (i.e., no polynomial-time algorithm exists for it). The ﬁrst difﬁculty comes from
the obvious fact that the manager cannot accurately obtain such private information. The
second difﬁculty comes from the fact that the problem [DSO] is an integer multicommodity
ﬂow problem.
One possible way to address these difﬁculties might be to apply conventional combi-
natorial auctions to this problem. For example, the VCG mechanism can overcome the ﬁrst
difﬁculty, at least in principle, because it gives users an incentive (Vickrey payment) to report
their valuations truthfully (i.e., strategy-proofness). However, the VCG mechanism cannot
overcome the second difﬁculty because the above mentioned problem [DSO] must be solved
exactly to determine the optimal permit allocation and to compute the Vickrey payments (i.e.,
it is computationally infeasible). One natural approach to handling the problem is to seek a
sub-optimal solution instead of the optimal solution. However, the VCG mechanism allow-
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ing nonoptimal allocations is not strategy-proof, as each user has an incentive to bid false
valuations to increase one’s own utility (Nisan and Ronen, 2007). Therefore, it is difﬁcult to
apply the VCG mechanism directly to the trading markets.
4.4 Day-to-day auction mechanism: an auction mechanism
with day-to-day capacity control
In this section, we propose a novel auction mechanism including a day-to-day capacity con-
trol, which is readily implementable for general networks. We call this mechanism the day-
to-day auction mechanism. To avoid computational infeasibility such as that in the case of
the VCG mechanism, the proposed mechanism employs an evolutionary approach. Although
the evolutionary approach cannot be employed for the one-shot auctions that are typically
treated in auction theory, it can be utilized for a tradable network permits scheme in which
the auction is opened to morning commuters each day.
Before describing the proposed mechanism, we introduce some modiﬁcations of the
model. In the proposed mechanism, we consider time-dependent permit allocation patterns
and their day-to-day dynamics. We then denote the day by s ∈ S. Suppose that each user
behaves myopically and makes one’s own choice so as to maximize the following utility
deﬁned for each day s:
u(s)i,r (t) ≡ vi,r(t) − P(s)r (t). (4.10)
This implies that the user considers only his or her allocation of the bundles and payment on
each day, so the user’s true valuations are constant for all days.
4.4.1 Reformulation of the DSO problem with path capacities and the
Benders decomposition principle
The day-to-day auction mechanism is based on the idea of reformulating the problem [DSO]
by introducing non-individual variables and then applying the Benders decomposition prin-
ciple (see Appendix A for a basic framework) to obtain two problems, a master problem
and a sub-problem. We then solve these problems on day-to-day basis. Further, in order to
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obtain an efﬁcient permit allocation with imperfect information about users, the mechanism
also exploits an auction mechanism to solve the sub-problem.
We let Fr(t),Ya(t) ∈ Z+ denote a non-individual path variable and a non-individual link
variable, respectively. By using these variables, the problem [DSO] with non-individual
variables is formulated as
max
(f,F,Y)
. SS(f,F) ≡
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) fi,r(t) (4.11)
subject to
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
fi,r(t) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W (4.12)
∑
i∈Nod
fi,r(t) ≤ Fr(t) ∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀od ∈W (4.13)
Ya(t) ≤ μa ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (4.14)
Ya(t) =
∑
od∈W
∑
r∈Rod
Fr(t + Ta,r)δa,r(o,d) ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (4.15)
fi,r(t) ∈ {0, 1}, Fr(t),Ya(t) ∈ Z+ ∀a ∈ A, ∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W. (4.16)
Each non-individual path variable Fr(t) in Eq.(4.13) is interpreted as a path capacity that
is the number of bundles of permits sold for the path. Constraint (4.12) is the condition
that each user makes at most one trip. Constraint (4.13) is the path capacity constraint on
each path. Constraints (4.14) and (4.15) are the conditions that the path capacity satisﬁes
constraints stemming from link capacities.
This problem includes two types of variables, individual variables f and non-individual
variables (F,Y), and is naturally becomes a bi-level problem based on Benders decomposi-
tion principle:
max
(F,Y)
.
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) fi,r(F(t)) (4.17)
subject to Eq. (4.14), Eq. (4.15), and Fr(t),Ya(t) ∈ Z+,
where f(F) is an optimal solution of the following problem for a parameter F:
max
f≥0
.
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) fi,r(t) (4.18)
subject to Eq. (4.12) and Eq. (4.13),
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The upper level problem (master problem) determines the optimal path capacity that max-
imizes the social surplus. The lower level problem (sub-problem) determines the efﬁcient
allocation of bundles of permits under the condition that each path capacity is ﬁxed. Note
that the sub-problem reduces to independent sub-problems in terms of OD pairs because
path capacities differ among OD pairs. Furthermore, the sub-problem (4.18) is the Hitchcock
transportation problem and so a linear relaxation of the sub-problem satisﬁes total unimod-
ularity (e.g., Papadimitriou and Steiglitz (1982)). Thus, we can obtain an integer solution by
solving a linear relaxation of the sub-problem because the path capacities are integer valued.
To demonstrate a clear relationship between the master problem and the sub-problem,
we consider the following dual problem of the sub-problem:
Z(F) ≡ min
(π,P)≥0
.
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
πi +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fr(t)Pr(t) (4.19)
subject to
πi ≥ vi,r(t) − Pr(t) ∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W (4.20)
where (π,P) are Lagrange multipliers for constraints (4.12) and (4.13). As shown in 4.5.1,
these Lagrange multipliers equal to the user payoffs and competitive equilibrium bundle
prices that are realized in an auction as shown in Subsection (we call these variables demand
information). From the duality theorem, the optimal value of the objective function (4.19)
coincides with the optimal value of the objective function (4.18); that is,
Z(F) =
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
πi(F) +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fr(t)Pr(F(t)) =
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) fi,r(F(t)),
(4.21)
where (π(F),P(F)) is an optimal solution of the dual problem (4.19) for a parameter F.
Hence, (π(F),P(F)) is an extreme point of the convex feasible region ΩSD that consists of
the constraints (4.20) and non-negative constraints. By using the function (4.21), we can
transform the master problem into the following problem:
max
(F,Y)
. Z(F) =
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
πi(F) +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fr(t)Pr(F(t)) (4.22)
= max
(F,Y)
.
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ min(π(s),P(s))∈V .
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
π(s)i +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fr(t)P
(s)
r (t)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (4.23)
subject to Eq. (4.14), Eq. (4.15), and Fr(t),Ya(t) ∈ Z+,
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where V is the ﬁnite set of all extreme points of the convex feasible region ΩSD. From this
formulation, we see that path capacities are adjusted on the basis of the demand information.
Moreover, this problem is equivalent to the following problem:
max
θ≥0, (F,Y)
. θ (4.24)
subject to Eq. (4.14), Eq. (4.15), Fr(t),Ya(t) ∈ Z+,
θ ≤
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
π(s)i +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
Fr(t)P
(s)
r (t) ∀(π(s),P(s)) ∈ V (4.25)
Problem (4.24) is equivalent to the problem [DSO] (with non-individual variables) if all
extreme points are known. However, it is difﬁcult to obtain the extreme points in advance
because the number of extreme points is generally too large. Hence, we consider a relax-
ation problem (4.24) that has a subset of the extreme points in V and produces an upper
bound on the optimal objective value of the problem [DSO]. This relaxed problem is called
the restricted master problem [RMP]. We then employ an iterative approach by adding an
extreme point to the problem [RMP] to improve the upper bound. Note that an extreme point
is generated by solving the problem (4.19) for ﬁxed path capacities F.
The procedure of the proposed mechanism corresponds to solving the above two prob-
lems, iteratively. One of the greatest differences between the Benders decomposition and
the proposed mechanism is whether or not coefﬁcient parameters vi (i.e., truthful valuations
of each user) are initially given. As mentioned in Section 4.3, the manager cannot observe
such private information. Nevertheless, the proposed mechanism can obtain the demand
information by exploiting an auction mechanism for solving the sub-problem.
4.4.2 Interpretation as an auction mechanism with day-to-day capacity
control
The day-to-day auction mechanism comprises an auction phase and a path capacity adjust-
ment phase; the two phases are repeated on a day-to-day basis (Fig.4.1). In the auction phase
corresponding to the sub-problem, the manager sells bundles of permits to the users through
an ascending auction under the condition that each capacity is ﬁxed. In addition, the bundle
prices are determined during the ascending auction so as to maximize each user’s payoff. In
the path capacity adjustment phase corresponding to the restricted master problem, the man-
ager adjust each path capacity to an appropriate level by considering the demand information
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Figure 4.1 Procedure of the proposed mechanism
that was determined in the previous auction phases. Hence, the procedure of the day-to-day
auction mechanism can be summarized as follows (more details of the mechanism and its
properties can be found in Section 4.5):
Step 0: Set s = 1. Determine the initial path capacities F(1). Start with a set of extreme
points V(1) = {∅} and a convergence criterion θ(1) = ∞.
Step 1: Auction phase (Subsection 4.5.1). For ﬁxed path capacities F(s), the manager sells
bundles of permits through an ascending auction. The user payoffs and the bundle
prices (π(s),P(s)) are also determined. If the social surplus SS(s) achieved in the as-
cending auction is equal to or greater than the convergence criterion θ(s) that is deﬁned
in Subsection 4.5.2, then stop. Otherwise go to Step 2.
Step 2: Path capacity adjustment phase (Subsection 4.5.2). Add an extreme point to the
set; i.e., V(s+1) ≡ {V(s) ∪ (π(s),P(s))}. Produce the path capacities F(s+1) by solving the
problem [RMP] and update the convergence criterion θ(s+1). Let s = s + 1. Go to Step
1.
Note that stop in Step 1 means that optimal path capacities are obtained. Therefore,
once the above procedure stops, the manager no longer adjusts the path capacities and sells
bundles through the auction with the same optimal path capacities each day.
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4.4.3 Comparisons of the proposed mechanism and iterative combina-
torial auctions
Our approach presented in this chapter is related to iterative combinatorial auctions (e.g.,
Parkes and Ungar, 2000a; de Vries, Schummer, and Vohra, 2007) that implement the VCG
outcome (i.e., allocation and prices) in the sense that the original social surplus maximization
problems (winner determination problem) are reformulated by adding new variables and con-
straints. Indeed, the problem [DSO] (with aggregate ﬂows) corresponds to the formulation
(P2) presented in Bikhchandani et al. (2002). However, the objectives of the reformulations
are different. Our objective is to decompose the original problem to more simple and small
problems. On the other hand, their main objective is to characterize the competitive equi-
librium based on LP and to develop iterative auctions (e.g., ascending auctions) using LP
algorithms. More speciﬁcally, they ﬁrst focus on a strong (or extended) formulation for the
original problem that has integral property, i.e., the linear relaxation of the strong formula-
tion characterizes competitive equilibrium (see Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002). Then, the
linear relaxation problem is solved by using a dual-based algorithm (i.e., primal-dual algo-
rithm and subgradient algorithm), which is interpreted as (within-day) auction mechanisms
(e.g., Parkes and Ungar, 2000a; de Vries, Schummer, and Vohra, 2007).
The iterative combinatorial auctions may overcome the problem of the VCG mechanism
discussed in Section 4.3 (and Appendix B). Speciﬁcally, these auctions can obtain the VCG
outcome by solving only one linear program. Also, these auctions do not require bidders
to report bids for possible combination of all items, which enables bidders to participate in
auctions without revealing private information more than necessary.
However, it may be difﬁcult or undesirable to apply the iterative combinatorial auctions
to our situation directly, while we employ a similar (non-combinatorial) auction to imple-
ment the sub-problem. First, a strong formulation of the winner determination problem has
an exponential of number of variables if the number of bidders or items is large like our
situation. Second, in general, these auctions need to set a bidder-speciﬁc price to achieve the
efﬁcient allocation. Employing such a price necessarily causes unfairness among road users.
In contrast, in the proposed mechanism, the sub-problem (winner determination prob-
lem) is just the transportation problem not a combinatorial optimization problem. The size
of the winner determination problem is also small because the sub-problem reduces to the
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independent sub-problems in terms of OD pairs. Furthermore, the proposed mechanism
achieves an efﬁcient allocation for a ﬁxed path capacity by setting a bundle-speciﬁc price.
From the above discussion, we conclude that our proposed mechanism will be more suitable
for controlling transportation networks.
4.5 Details of proposed mechanism and its properties
This section presents the details and properties of each phase of the day-to-day auction mech-
anism. Subsection 4.5.1 gives a detailed explanation of the auction phase. Subsection 4.5.2
gives the detailed path capacity adjustment rule. Subsection 4.5.3 analyzes the proposed
overall mechanism combining two phases and proves that the day-to-day dynamics of the
network allocation pattern converges to the dynamic system optimal allocation when the
number of users is large.
4.5.1 Auction phase
Let F(s) be the path capacities as determined in the path capacity adjustment phase on day
s − 1. Then, the sub-problem for each OD pair is given by the following linear program:
SS(s)od ≡ maxf(s)≥0 .
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) f
(s)
i,r (t) (4.26)
subject to Eq. (4.12) and Eq. (4.13)
The necessary and sufﬁcient optimality conditions of the problem are given by the following
Kuhn-Tucker conditions:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
π(s)i = vi,r(t) − P(s)r (t) if f (s)i,r (t) = 1
π(s)i ≥ vi,r(t) − P(s)r (t) if f (s)i,r (t) = 0
∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T,∀i ∈ Nod (4.27)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑
i∈Nod f
(s)
i,r (t) = F
(s)
r (t) if P
(s)
r (t) > 0∑
i∈Nod f
(s)
i,r (t) ≤ F(s)r (t) if P(s)r (t) = 0
∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T (4.28)
π(s)i ,P
(s)
r (t) ≥ 0 ∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W. (4.29)
Note that the allocation variables f(s) are integer because each sub-problem (4.26) satisﬁes
total unimodularlity. The solution (f(s),π(s),P(s)) consists of a competitive equilibrium allo-
cation, the payoffs and the prices, respectively. In the competitive equilibrium, each user
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acquires the bundle of permits that maximizes his or her utility (i.e., (4.27)) for the given set
of competitive equilibrium prices that satisfy the market clearing condition (4.28). Further,
all users who acquire bundles have nonnegative payoffs (i.e., the user’s willingness-to-pay is
greater than the price), which is consistent with conventional trafﬁc assignments with elastic
demand.
The concept of the competitive equilibrium for indivisible items is a natural extension
of the classical economic concept but for divisible items. Here the necessary and sufﬁ-
cient condition for the existence of this competitive equilibrium is that the optimal solution
to the linear relaxation problem of the sub-problem is integer (Bikhchandani and Mamer,
1997). In addition, it has been shown that the competitive equilibrium, if it exists, is efﬁcient
(Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002). This can be summarized as follows:
Lenmma 4.1 In the tradable network permit markets on day s, there always exists a com-
petitive equilibrium that provides an efﬁcient network permit allocation pattern for a ﬁxed
path capacity.
Proof See Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) and Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002).
Note that the set of competitive equilibrium prices discussed above is not necessarily
strategy-proof. However, Leonard (1983) showed that minimal competitive equilibrium
prices such that the payment for each user is equal to the decrease in the value of the social
surplus by adding the user to the auction are equivalent to Vickrey payments that produce
the strategy-proofness. In addition, Leonard (1983) formulated the problem of ﬁnding the
minimal competitive equilibrium prices:
min
(π(s),P(s))≥0
.
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
F(s)r (t)P
(s)
r (t) (4.30)
subject to Eq. (4.20),∑
i∈Nod
π(s)i +
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
F(s)r (t)P
(s)
r (t) = SS
(s)
od . (4.31)
The problem minimizes equilibrium competitive prices (or maximizes user payoffs) subject
to the condition that the solution of this problem also solves the dual of the sub-problem.
From the above discussions, we ﬁnd that the sub-problem can be solved through the
VCG mechanism in a computationally efﬁcient manner: the allocation problem (4.26) is
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merely the transportation problem and Vickrey payments are computed by solving only one
linear program (4.30). However, there remains the problem of complication of the bidding
rule: each user has to submit sealed bids reporting the value of all bundles of permits. This
bidding rule is also undesirable in terms of the privacy, as users are required to reveal more
of their private information than is necessary.
Ascending proxy auction
The proposed mechanism employs an ascending auction to resolve the problems of sealed
bid auctions and to produce outcomes (i.e., allocation and prices of bundles of permits) in an
informationally efﬁcient manner. More speciﬁcally, we employ the (exact) ascending auction
proposed by Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986) (we call this the DGS auction). In this
auction, users report only the “names” of bundles of permits in which they are interested. The
procedure of the DGS auction corresponds to solving the sub-problem using a primal-dual
algorithm, which is described as follows (see also Bikhchandani et al., 2002, and Appendix
C):
Step 0: Initialization. Set P(s) = 0 for all bundles.
Step 1: Bidding phase. Each user reports “names” of the bundles that maximize one’s own
payoff under the current prices P(s), i.e., a demand set Di(P(s)) ≡ arg maxr,t[vi,r(t) −
P(s)r (t)]. If each user can be allocated a bundle from his or her demand set, then stop
because P(s) are equilibrium prices. Otherwise go to Step 2.
Step 2: Price adjustment phase. The manager chooses a minimal overdemanded setM(P(s))
and raises the prices of the bundles in that set (i.e., P(s)r (t) = P
(s)
r (t) + 1, ∀(r, t) ∈
M(P(s))). Go to Step 1.
Here, an overdemanded set is a set of bundles for which the number of users demanding
only bundles in that set exceeds the number of bundles sold in the auction, and the minimal
overdemanded set is an overdemanded set of bundles with no proper overdemanded subset.
In the DGS auction, the prices of the bundles converge to the minimal competitive equi-
librium prices if each user reports the demand set truthfully (i.e., a myopic best response
strategy) because the minimal overdemanded set is chosen in Step 2. Hence, the outcome of
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the DGS auction is equal to the VCG outcome. Further, the truthful reporting of the demand
set constitutes a Nash equilibrium for each user in each Step 3.
In a practical implementation of the DGS algorithm, it is hard for each user to report
the demand set in each bidding phase, i.e., the transaction cost is too large. We therefore
introduce a proxy agent system to support the bidding of users. Proxy systems are popular
and have been installed in many Internet auctions (e.g., eBay and Yahoo). Under such a
system, each user reports valuations to a proxy agent for some bundles that interest the user.
Then, the proxy agent bids in the auction on the basis of the information received from the
user. This system not only reduces the transaction cost of the bidding phase but also prevents
strategic behaviors (e.g., a non-myopic best response strategy) in each bidding phase.
Let us now introduce the proxy agent system proposed by Parkes and Ungar (2000b) into
the DGS auction. Step 0 and Step 1 are then modiﬁed as follows:
Step 0’: Before starting the auction, each user reports information of valuations for some
bundles to one’s own proxy agent. Set P(s) = 0 for all bundles.
Step 1’: Based on the information received and the current prices, each proxy agent submits
each user demand set Di(P(s)). If each user can be allocated a bundle from one’s own
demand set, then stop because the P(s) are equilibrium prices. Otherwise go to Step 2.
In Step 1’, the user needs to update information if the proxy agent does not have enough
information to submit the demand set. Since the proxy DGS auction restricts user strategies
(in each bidding phase) to a myopic best response strategy, the dominant strategy is truthful
reporting of the valuations to the proxy agent. From what has been discussed above and
Lemma 4.1, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1 The network permit allocation pattern achieved under the proxy DGS auc-
tion for implementing the tradable network permit markets on day s is efﬁcient, and the
prices of bundles of permits converge to the minimal competitive equilibrium prices. The
dominant strategy for each user is truth reporting of the valuations of bundles to the proxy
agent.
Proof See Demange et al. (1986) and Parkes and Ungar (2000b).
67
4.5.2 Path capacity adjustment phase
In the path capacity adjustment phase, the road manager ﬁrst generates the demand informa-
tion (i.e., payoffs and prices). The prices P(s) can be obtained directly in the auction phase for
all OD pairs. The payoffs π(s), however, are computed indirectly. In the proxy DGS auction,
since each user reports his or her true valuations for interesting bundles to the proxy agent,
the manager can obtain his or her winning valuation v∗i,r(t). Then, the manager calculates a
total payoff Π(s) from the duality theorem:
Π(s) ≡
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
π(s)i =
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
v∗i,r(t) −
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
F(s)r (t)P
(s)
r (t). (4.32)
Note that the manager needs to know only the total payoff to adjust path capacities.
After generating the demand information, the manager considers all demand information
for the current day and past days, V(s+1) ≡ {V(s) ∪ (Π(s),P(s))}, and adjusts each path capacity
by solving the restricted master problem [RMP]. However, this is computationally intensive
because the problem [RMP] (i.e., the problem (4.24)) is a large integer programming (IP)
problem with one continuous variable. To avoid this, we solve the linear relaxation of the
problem [RMP] and obtain an integer solution by rounding off the fractional solution. Such
a strategy was suggested by McDaniel and Devine (1977) and has successfully used in var-
ious problems (e.g., Cordeau, Soumis, and Desrosiers, 2000). This strategy is suitable for
our situation because non-individual variables (path capacities) in the problem [RMP] are
control variables of the road manager and can be treated as continuous variables, although
the individual variables (allocation of network permits) cannot be treated as continuous. In
addition, we should note here that the relaxation of integrality constraints does not affect
the convex feasible region ΩSD of the dual sub-problem and that an extreme point can be
generated from any integer solution. Thus, the problem with continuous variables (F˜, Y˜) that
the road manager needs to solve is given as
max
θ≥0, (F˜(s+1),Y˜(s+1))≥0
. θ (4.33)
68
subject to
θ ≤ Π(s) +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
F˜(s+1)r (t)P
(s)
r (t) (Π(s),P(s)) ∈ V(s+1) (4.34)
Y˜(s+1)a (t) ≤ μa ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (4.35)
Y˜(s+1)a (t) =
∑
od∈W
∑
r∈Rod
F˜(s+1)r (t + Ta,r)δa,r(o,d) ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T. (4.36)
The optimal objective value is an upper bound on the maximum social surplus SS∗ of the
problem [DSO], which is weaker than an upper bound that is produced with the integer
programming problem [RMP].
From the optimality conditions of the problem, a path capacity adjustment rule can be
derived as
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑
a∈A pa(t − Ta,r)δa,r(o,d) = Pr(t) if F˜(s+1)r (t) > 0∑
a∈A pa(t − Ta,r)δa,r(o,d) ≥ Pr(t) if F˜(s+1)r (t) = 0
∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀od ∈W, (4.37)
where the P are the (convex combinations of) bundle prices that produce the weak upper
bound (i.e., the constraint (??) is bounded), and p is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
(4.35). This Lagrange multiplier is interpreted as a permit price for each link that satisﬁes
the following (market clearing) condition:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
X˜(s+1)a (t) = μa if pa(t) > 0
X˜(s+1)a (t) ≤ μa if pa(t) = 0
∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T. (4.38)
If the path capacity is positive in the path capacity adjustment rule (4.37), the bundle price
estimated for the path by means of link permit prices and is equal to the bundle price deter-
mined in the auction phase. For a path whose the estimated price exceeds the realized price,
the path capacity is zero. This means that no path capacities are allocated to the worthless
paths. The integer path capacities F(s+1) on day s + 1 can be obtained by rounding-off all
continuous path capacities; i.e., F(s+1)r (t) = F˜(s+1)r (t).
Stabilizing strategy for Benders decomposition
Although the problem (4.33) is easy to solve, there remains one issue relevant to the conver-
gence rate of the Benders decomposition; i.e., path capacities usually oscillate, which results
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in slow convergence (Magnanti and Wong, 1981). To accelerate and stabilize the Benders
decomposition, we add “boxstep constraints” (Marsten, Hogan, and Blankenship, 1975) to
the above problem (4.33):
F˜(s)r (t) − 
 ≤ F˜(s+1)r (t) ≤ F˜(s)r (t) + 
 ∀r ∈ Rod, ∀t ∈ T, ∀od ∈W, (4.39)
where 
 is a boxstep parameter. At each step, the solution F˜(s+1) to the master problem is
constrained to lie within a box centered on the previous solution F˜(s) and so the oscillation
is dramatically reduced. Note that the problem including the boxstep constraints does not
necessarily produce an upper bound on the maximum social surplus SS∗. Thus, we solve the
problem (4.33) to obtain the upper bound θ.
4.5.3 Convergence of the day-to-day auction mechanism
We now establish the convergence result of the day-to-day auction mechanism on the basis
of the Benders decomposition technique. The standard Benders decomposition algorithm
converges to an optimal solution when the strong upper bound obtained by the problem
[RMP] is equal to the optimal objective value of the sub-problem (i.e., the social surplus
achieved in the auction phase). However, the weak upper bound θ obtained with the proposed
mechanism will exceed the maximum value of the social surplus SS∗ even if all the extreme
points are generated, and thus we cannot use θ as the convergence criterion.
To resolve this problem, we introduce a new convergence criterion θ:
θ ≡ min
(Π(s),P(s))∈V(s+1)
. Π(s) +
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
F(s+1)r (t)P
(s)
r (t), (4.40)
and an update rule of the criterion is
θ(s+1) = min
{
θ(s), θ
}
. (4.41)
The criterion θ optimizes (i.e., minimizes) the objective function of the problem [RMP] only
with respect to extreme points (Π(s),P(s)) given at the integer path capacities F(s+1), which
results in good convergence properties as shown in the proof of the proposition below. This
criterion θ is equal to or less than the strong upper bound since it does not maximize the
objective function of the problem [RMP] with respect to the path capacities. Therefore, we
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Figure 4.2
Relationship between the convergence criterion, the weak upper bound, the
achieved social surplus, and the maximum value of the social surplus
conclude that the permit allocation under the proposed mechanism converges to an approxi-
mate dynamic system optimal state when the achieved social surplus SS(s+1) (=
∑
od SS
(s+1)
od )
in the auction phase is equal or more than the convergence criterion θ(s+1).
Fig.4.2 shows the relationship between the convergence criterion θ(s), the weak upper
bound θ
(s)
, the achieved social surplus SS(s), and the maximum social surplus SS∗. The
horizontal axis represents the social surplus (or its upper bound) and dotted lines represent
the ranges in which the variables can exist. The achieved social surplus SS(s) can exist in the
range [0,SS∗]. The convergence criterion and the weak upper bound take minimum values
θ∗ and θ
∗
when we have all the extreme points.
By using the convergence criterion θ(s), we obtain the value of the social surplus in a
range that is represented by the solid arrow in Fig.4.2. The ratio SS(s)/SS∗ between the
achieved social surplus and the maximum value of the social surplus is conﬁned within in
the range
θ∗
SS∗
≤ SS
(s)
SS∗
≤ 1. (4.42)
Assuming that the ratio between the total number of users Q (=
∑
od |Nod|) and the total
link capacity
∑
t
∑
a μa is held constant, the range (4.42) converges to zero (i.e., the left-hand
side of Eq.(4.42) converges to 1) when the number of users is sufﬁciently large. This is
because the effect of rounding off the continuous path capacities is negligible in that case. In
addition, a new extreme point is generated in each auction phase when the achieved social
surplus does not satisfy the convergence criterion, so the proposed mechanism can converge
in a ﬁnite number of steps. Therefore, the following proposition holds.
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Proposition 4.2 Assume that the ratio between the number of users and total link capacity
is constant. Then, the day-to-day auction mechanism converges in a ﬁnite number of steps,
and the value of the social surplus achieved by the mechanism reaches its maximum value
when the number of users is large.
Proof See 4.A for the proof.
4.6 An extended mechanism which obviates path enumer-
ation
The day-to-day auction mechanism presented in the previous sections assumes that the road
manager can enumerate all the paths that users may choose. However, it is not necessarily
evident how the manager should do so for large-scale networks. To obviate path enumeration,
we construct an extended mechanism by introducing a path generation phase into the day-
to-day auction mechanism. This consists of applying a column generation procedure to the
system optimal allocation problem [DSO]. In the extended mechanism, users generate paths
successively, and hence path enumeration is obviated for the manager.
A column generation for a network ﬂow problem considers a problem that has only a
subset of the paths of the original problem (i.e., a restricted master problem) and paths are
generated as needed (Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin, 1993). Hence, by considering only a
subset of the (dynamic) paths of the problem [DSO], a restricted master problem [C-RMP]
is formulated as
max
(f,y)
.
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod(t)
vi,r(t) fi,r(t) (4.43)
subject to
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod(t)
fi,r(t) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W (4.44)
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
yi,a(t) ≤ μa ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (4.45)
yi,a(t) =
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod(t)
fi,r(t + Ta,r)δa,r(o,d) ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ Nod ∀od ∈W (4.46)
fi,r(t), yi,a(t) ∈ {0, 1} ∀a ∈ A, ∀r ∈ Rod(t), ∀t ∈ T ∀i ∈ Nod, ∀od ∈W, (4.47)
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where Rod(t) is a subset of paths in destination arrival time period t. Since the problem [C-
RMP] and the problem [DSO] have the same optimization problem except for the number
of paths, we can solve the problem [C-RMP] through the day-to-day auction mechanism
presented in the previous sections.
A new path is generated by solving a column generation sub-problem corresponding to
the pricing step of the simplex algorithm (for the liner relaxation of the problem [C-RMP]).
In the standard column generation for a multicommodity ﬂow problem, the sub-problem is
given as a shortest path problem for each commodity (Ahuja et al., 1993). Thus, by following
the standard theory, our sub-problem is formulated as the following all-or-nothing problem
for each user:
π∗i ≡ maxfi≥0 .
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣vi,r(t) −
∑
a∈A
pˆa(t − Ta,r)δa,r(o,d)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ fi,r(t) (4.48)
subject to
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
fi,r(t) ≤ 1, (4.49)
where pˆa(t) is an optimal Lagrange multiplier for the link capacity constraint (4.45) of the lin-
ear relaxation of the restricted master problem [C-RMP], which is interpreted as an optimal
link permit price. These link permit prices are obtained at the ﬁnal path capacity adjustment
phase of the day-to-day auction mechanism (see Subsection 4.5.2).
The column generation sub-problem yields a path that maximizes each user payoff for
given constant link permit prices pˆ. The path is generated if a maximum payoff exceeds
the current payoff achieved in the ﬁnal auction phase of the day-to-day auction mechanism.
Speciﬁcally, the path is generated if the optimal value of the objective function π∗i exceeds
an optimal Lagrange multiplier πˆi for the constraint (4.44); i.e., λi ≡ π∗i − πˆi > 0. To
improve his or her payoff, the user requests that the manager sells the bundle for the path in
the auction phase. The road manager receives the requests of all users and adds the paths
to the set Rod(t) (if the path do not exists in the set). Then the restricted master problem
[C-RMP] is again solved through the day-to-day auction mechanism.
The steps in the extended mechanism mentioned above can be summarized as follows:
Step 0: Initial setting. Set τ = 1. Determine the initial path set R(1)od (t) for each OD pair at
each destination arrival time period.
Step 1: Day-to-day auction phase. For ﬁxed path set R(τ)od (t), the restricted master problem
[C-RMP] is solved through the day-to-day auction mechanism (see Section 4.4 and
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4.5). The optimal link permit prices pˆ(τ) are determined at the ﬁnal path capacity
adjustment phase and are announced by the road manager.
Step 2: Path generation phase. Each user ﬁnds a path by solving the column generation
sub-problem and requests the manager to add the path if the maximum payoff π∗i ex-
ceeds the current payoff πˆ(τ). If all requested paths exist in path set R(τ)od (t), then stop.
Otherwise, the road manager creates a new path set R(τ+1)od (t) by adding requested paths
to the set R(τ)od (t). Let τ = τ + 1. Go to Step 1.
The paths are efﬁciently generated in Step 2 because the numerous number users generate
paths simultaneously. However, the road manager employs a path-adding rule that allows
each user to purchase not only paths generated by himself but also those generated by other
users of the same OD pair6, which promotes path generation. The extended mechanism is
guaranteed to converge because the number of paths is ﬁnite. Furthermore, when the number
of users is large, the allocation of network permits achieved under the extended mechanism
converges to the optimal one (i.e., the optimal solution of the problem [DSO]) since the gap
between the problem [DSO] and the linear relaxation converges to zero (Proposition 4.2).
4.7 Numerical example
We ﬁnally show a numerical example to demonstrate the convergence properties of the pro-
posed mechanism in a realistic network. The network that we employ is the Sioux Falls
network (LeBlanc et al., 1975) which has 24 nodes and 76 links (Fig.4.3). The physical
conditions of each link (i.e., free-ﬂow travel time, capacity), which is based on Han (2003),
are summarized in Table 4.1 in 4.B. The network has 528 OD pairs, which was used by
(LeBlanc et al., 1975), and the number of users for each OD pair is a quarter of the number
provided in Dr. Hillel Bar-Gera’s website (http://www.bgu.ac.il/˜bargera/tntp/); i.e., the total
number of users is 90150. We set time interval for each time period to Δt = 3 (minute) and
the number of time periods to |T| = 40. The desired arrival time period for each user is set
randomly and the distribution of the desired arrival time periods is shown in Fig.4.4. Under
6 If we employ the standard column generation procedure, subsets of the paths differ among users because
the column generation sub-problem (4.48) is formulated for each user. However, in the auction phase, it
will be more natural that the same set of paths are sold for all users of the same OD pair.
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Figure 4.3 Sioux Falls network
this distribution, the network is congested (i.e., almost links have positive permit prices) dur-
ing peak periods. As the initial path set for each OD pair, we simply choose some shortest
paths. A box step parameter 
 = 5 is chosen. An optimal social surplus is calculated by
10,000 iterations of the proposed mechanism for a sufﬁciently accurate determination of the
maximum one.
Fig.4.5 illustrates the convergence process of the proposed mechanism until the relative
error between the achieved social surplus SS(s) and the optimal social surplus is reduced
below 0.05%. The horizontal axis represents the number of days, s, and the vertical axis
represents the ratio between the achieved social surplus SS(s) on each day and the optimal
social surplus. The vertical lines (at day 59, 110, 164, 232, . . . ) show days at which a day-
to-day auction phase (or mechanism) terminated. On such a day, the path generation phase
starts. Note that the path set is ﬁxed in each day-to-day auction phase.
By using Fig.4.5, we explain the convergence properties of the ﬁrst day-to-day auction
phase from day 1 to day 59. In this phase, the achieved social surplus SS(s) (the solid black
curve) increases as path capacities are adjusted on a day-to-day basis. Conversely, the up-
per bound of the maximum social surplus θ
(s)
(the gray curve) for a ﬁxed path set and the
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Figure 4.4 Distribution of the desired arrival time
Figure 4.5 Convergence process of the proposed mechanism
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Figure 4.6 Number of paths in each day-to-day auction phase
convergence criterion θ(s) (the black dotted curve) that are obtained in the path capacity
adjustment phase decrease monotonically. Eventually, these three values converge to the al-
most the same value. This means that the allocation of network permits achieved under the
day-to-day auction phase converges to the approximate dynamic system optimal allocation
for a ﬁxed path set.
After the ﬁrst day-to-day auction phase terminates (at day 59), the ﬁrst path generation
phase starts. In the path generation phase, each user requests a path to improve his or her
payoff based on the current permit prices and payoff realized in the previous day-to-day
auction phase. The achieved social surplus increases drastically in the second day-to-day
auction phase. This is because a large number of paths is generated in the ﬁrst path generation
phase (see Fig.4.6). We also see from Fig.4.6 that the number of paths generated in each
subsequent phase decreases, and then the achieved social surplus reaches close to the optimal
value with a small number of iterations of the path generation phase.
4.8 Conclusion
To implement trading markets for the network permits, we proposed an auction mechanism
for general networks. We ﬁrst discussed the impossibility of applying the VCG mechanism to
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the trading markets due to NP-hardness. To avoid such computational infeasibility, we con-
structed a day-to-day auction mechanism that is readily implementable for general networks.
We then proved that the proposed mechanism is strategy-proof and the network allocation
pattern under the mechanism converges to an approximation of the socially optimal state in
the sense that the achieved social surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of
users is large. Furthermore, we showed that the proposed mechanism can be extended to
mitigate path enumeration by introducing a column generation procedure, and demonstrated
its convergence property in a realistic network.
While this chapter focused on managing road transportation networks, the mechanism
proposed seems applicable in principle to the management of other transportation networks
(e.g., railway and freight networks). For example, freight networks are used by many users
who choose routes and departure times so as to maximize their utility as is the case for
road transportation networks. In contrast, the behaviors of network managers totally differ;
i.e., while a road manager aims to maximize the social surplus, a freight network manager
(i.e., a freight company) aims to maximize his or her proﬁt. Nevertheless, managing other
transportation networks using the proposed mechanism seems a fruitful topic for future work.
Appendix 4.A Proof of the Proposition 4.2
We ﬁrst show that a new extreme point is generated in every auction phase until the conver-
gence criterion is satisﬁed. We denote the path capacities at day s by F(s) and the convergence
criterion by θ(s). From the Eq.(4.40), the following holds:
θ(s) ≤ Π(s) +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
F(s)r (t)P
(s)
r (t) ∀(Π(s),P(s)) ∈ V(s) (4.50)
holds. From the duality theorem, the optimal value of the objective function of the sub-
problem at day s (i.e., the value of the social surplus achieved by the ascending proxy auc-
tion), SS(s)od , coincides with the optimal value of the objective function of its dual problem,
that is
SS(s) =
∑
od∈W
SS(s)od =
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
vi,r(t) f s∗i,r(t) = Π
s∗ +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
F(s)r (t)Ps∗r (t), (4.51)
where (fs∗,Πs∗,Ps∗) is the optimal solution of the sub-problem and its dual problem. We here
consider the case that the convergence criterion is not satisﬁed (i.e., SS(s) < θ(s)). Then, the
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following relationships are hold:
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
πs∗i +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈T
∑
r∈Rod
F(s)r (t)Ps∗r (t) = SS
(s)
< θ(s) ≤ Π(s) +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
F(s)r (t)P
(s)
r (t) (∀(Π(s),P(s)) ∈ V(s)).
(4.52)
Hence, (Πs∗,Ps∗)  (Π(s),P(s)) ∈ V(s) is obtained; i.e., a new extreme point is generated.
Since the number of extreme points is ﬁnite, we can conclude that the proposed mechanism
converges in a ﬁnite number of steps.
Next, we show that the ratio θ∗/SS∗ in the left-hand side of Eq.(4.42) converges to 1 when
the number of users is large (assuming that the ratio between the number of uses and the total
link capacity is held constant). In order to show this, we prove that a ratio θ∗/θ
∗
that is less
than θ∗/SS∗ converges to 1. We denote the extreme point that minimizes the problem (4.40)
by (Π,P) ∈ V, and we denote the extreme point that produces the weak upper bound θ∗ by
(Π,P) ∈ V. Then the gap between θ∗ and θ∗ is investigated with the following equations:
θ
∗ − θ∗ =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Π+
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
F˜(s+1)r (t)Pr(t)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ −
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Π+
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
Fr(t)Pr(t)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (4.53)
≤
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Π +
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
F˜(s+1)r (t)Pr(t)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ −
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝Π+
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
Fr(t)Pr(t)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (4.54)
<
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∑
od∈W
∑
t∈I
∑
r∈R
Pr(t)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ = (the number of paths) × (average price). (4.55)
The second line represents the fact that the extreme points of minimizing (4.40) and (4.33)
are different. The third line follows because the maximum rounded value of each path ca-
pacity is 1.
Alternatively, θ
∗
can be estimated as follows:
θ
∗ ≥ SS∗ =
∑
od∈W
∑
i∈Nod
v∗i,r(t) = (the number of users) × (average winning valuation) (4.56)
where v∗i,r(t) is the winning valuation when the social surplus is maximized. By using the
above equations, the relative error between θ
∗
and θ∗ is obtained as follows:
θ
∗ − θ∗
θ
∗ <
(the number of paths) × (average price)
(the number of users) × (average winning valuation) <
(the number of paths)
(the number of users)
.
(4.57)
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Since the bundle prices obtained by the ascending proxy auction never exceed the truthful
valuation of each user, the ﬁnal inequality holds. When the number of users is large (i.e.,
Q → ∞) with the ratio between the number of users and the total link capacity held con-
stant, the relative error converges to zero because the number of paths is constant. Thus, the
following equations hold:
lim
Q→∞
θ∗
θ
∗ = 1 ⇒ limQ→∞
θ∗
SS∗
= 1 (4.58)
Hence, we can conclude that the range (4.42) converges to zero when the number of users is
large.
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Appendix 4.B Network and OD data
Table 4.1 Physical conditions of links in Sioux Falls network
Link Free-ﬂow Capacity Link Free-ﬂow Capacity
(upstream, travel time [vehicles (upstream, travel time [vehicles
downstream) [min] /min] downstream) [min] /min]
(1, 2) and (2, 1) 9 65 (11, 12) and (12, 11) 3 60
(1, 3) and (3, 1) 3 55 (11, 14) and (14, 11) 6 50
(2, 6) and (6, 2) 3 60 (12, 13) and (13, 12) 9 65
(3, 4) and (4, 3) 3 60 (13, 24) and (24, 13) 3 60
(3, 12) and (12, 3) 6 60 (14, 15) and (15, 14) 3 50
(4, 5) and (5, 4) 3 50 (14, 23) and (23, 14) 3 40
(4, 11) and (11, 4) 6 55 (15, 19) and (19, 15) 3 40
(5, 6) and (6, 5) 3 50 (15, 22) and (22, 15) 3 45
(5, 9) and (9, 5) 3 50 (16, 17) and (17, 16) 3 45
(6, 8) and (8, 6) 3 45 (16, 18) and (18, 16) 3 55
(7, 8) and (8, 7) 3 40 (17, 19) and (19, 17) 3 45
(7, 18) and (18, 7) 3 50 (18, 20) and (20, 18) 12 55
(8, 9) and (9, 8) 3 45 (19, 20) and (20, 19) 6 50
(8, 16) and (16, 8) 3 45 (20, 21) and (21, 20) 3 40
(9, 10) and (10, 9) 3 45 (20, 22) and (22, 20) 6 45
(10, 11) and (11, 10) 3 50 (21, 22) and (22, 21) 3 50
(10, 15) and (15, 10) 6 45 (21, 24) and (24, 21) 3 50
(10, 16) and (16, 10) 3 40 (22, 23) and (23, 22) 3 40
(10, 17) and (17, 10) 3 45 (23, 24) and (24, 23) 3 40
Chapter 5
A trading mechanism for network
permits with multiple purchase
opportunities
Chapter 4 constructed micro mechanism for implementing trading markets in more spatially
general situations than the single bottleneck case (Wada and Akamatsu, 2010). This chapter1
considers more temporally general situations where network permits for a speciﬁc day (a trip
day) are sold in multiple period markets (e.g., future markets and spot markets).
The main difference between this chapter and the previous chapters lies in the fact that
here we explicitly consider when road users would participate in trading markets or when
the markets would end. On the other hand, previous chapter implicitly assumed that all of
the users would gather in the markets on the day before making trips. This assumption is
reasonable for recurrent trips (e.g., a daily commute) because the users’ valuations for the
permits can be regarded as constants over time. In contrast, for non-recurrent trips, the users’
valuations will depend on when they purchase the permits. A typical example is the case in
which a person has multiple travel plans that depend on the purchase periods. The value of
the permit generally reﬂects not the utility of the trip itself but that of the activity associated
with the trip, i.e., the users’ valuations of the permits change over time. Thus, providing
multiple purchase opportunities can be expected to achieve more efﬁcient resource allocation
1 This chapter is based on joint research with Pengfei Wang, Takashi Akamatsu, and Takeshi Nagae (Wada,
Wang, Akamatsu, and Nagae, 2012). A preliminary version presented in Infrastructure Planning Confer-
ence, Japan Society of Civil Engineering, 2010 (Wang, Akamatsu, and Wada, 2010).
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than a single period market.
Under multiple period markets, each road user can be free to choose a purchase period
and a network permit for a pre-speciﬁed time within the trip day (i.e., a destination arrival
time). On the other hand, the road manager has to allocate a bottleneck capacity to these mar-
kets as well as allocating to users. As a ﬁrst step for implementing such markets, we design
a dynamic auction mechanism in which the number of permits sold for each market is ﬁxed.
This mechanism can determine an efﬁcient permits allocation along with the time sequence
if each user bids “net valuations” (valuations minus the option value of deferring purchase)
truthfully. It is proved that truthful revelation of net valuations is a dominant strategy for
each user, which also guarantees that the market choice of the user is optimal. Then we de-
rive an adjustment rule of the number of permits sold for each market and demonstrate that
combining the dynamic auction and the adjustment rule maximizes the social surplus in a ﬁ-
nite number of iterations. Finally, we numerically demonstrate that the proposed mechanism
works effectively for a dynamic population case under a certain condition.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 discusses related works. Section 5.2
outlines the tradable network permits scheme with multiple purchase opportunities. Section
5.3 formulates a system optimal network permits allocation problem. We also present the
design framework for a mechanism to implement the scheme by decomposing this problem.
Section 5.4 designs a dynamic auction mechanism. Section 5.5 derives an adjustment rule
of the number of permits for each market and clarify the properties of the whole mechanism.
Section 5.6 investigates the validity of the proposed mechanism for a dynamic population
case by numerical experiments. Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
5.1 Related works
The scheme considered in this chapter corresponds to introducing a reservation system to
the conventional tradable network permits scheme. Reservation systems have been widely
studied in the ﬁeld of revenue management for many years (see Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004;
Chiang, Chen, and Xu, 2007, for comprehensive reviews of the literature). Moreover, in
the transportation ﬁeld, much research has been performed on the theory and practice of
reservation systems (e.g., airline seat reservations). Furthermore, the several researchers
have examined reservation systems for better use of road infrastructure (e.g., Akahane and
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Kuwahara, 1996; Wong, 1997). Almost all of the above studies have aimed at maximizing
revenue or social surplus by market segmentation and discriminatory pricing. However, as
previously stated, it is difﬁcult to determine an optimal price because there is an asymmetric
information between suppliers (road managers) and buyers (road users).
One of the approaches to resolve the asymmetric information problem is to employ auc-
tion mechanisms. Recently, in the ﬁeld of mechanism design/auction theory, much effort has
been put into extending the theory to dynamic settings (Parkes, 2007; Bergemann and Said,
2011; Vohra, 2012). These studies can be classiﬁed into two groups: online mechanisms
and dynamic mechanisms. The former considers a situation where the population of agents
varies over time, but their private information is constant. Parkes and Singh (2004) proposed
an online VCG mechanism that generalizes the static VCG mechanism to a dynamic pop-
ulation setting and showed that this mechanism achieves the efﬁcient resource allocation.
The latter type is related to our study in the sense that these mechanism consider a situa-
tion where the population of agents is ﬁxed but their private information changes over time.
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010) also generalized the static VCG mechanism to a dynamic
setting (dynamic pivot mechanism)2. They then proved that the mechanism achieves the ef-
ﬁcient resource allocation and satisﬁes the ex post inventive compatibility. However, this
mechanism cannot be directly applied to our problem because, in our setting, each buyer
wishes to purchase at most one permit within multiple period markets unlike the setting in
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010). Moreover, they did not consider the adjustment problem
that arises when supplying items for each period. In the ﬁeld of revenue management, the
studies of dynamic auction mechanisms have been performed as an alternative to traditional
reservation systems (Vulcano, Van Ryzin, and Maglaras, 2002; Chiang, Chen, and Xu, 2007).
Vulcano et al. (2002) proposed a dynamic auction mechanism that determines both the items
allocation and the item supply for each period. In this mechanism, the item supply is con-
trolled by setting a threshold: if a bid is less than the threshold, the seller does not accept it.
However, this is a revenue maximization mechanism that will not maximize a social surplus.
From the above discussion, we conclude that a trading mechanism that combines a dynamic
auction and an adjustment rule is a major contribution of this chapter.
2 Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh (2006) proposed a mechanism similar to the dynamic pivot mechanism.
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Figure 5.1 Single bottleneck network
5.2 Model
5.2.1 Networks
In this chapter, we consider discrete time dynamic trafﬁc ﬂows on a single bottleneck net-
work where an origin (e.g., residential zones) is connected to a destination (Figure 5.1). All
of the road users must pass through a bottleneck to make trips. This bottleneck is represented
by a point queue model with constant capacity μ. The time interval to which we assign the
dynamic ﬂow is large enough and is divided into small intervals. Each time interval is de-
noted by t ∈ T. In addition to the aforementioned within-day trafﬁc assignment, this chapter
considers users’ dynamic decision-making during the periods leading up to a trip day: the
problem here involves the determination of when the user decides to take a trip (i.e., an op-
timal stopping problem). We assume that there are only two periods for users to make a
decision, the prior day m = 0 and the trip day m = 1.
5.2.2 Agents
The road manager aims to alleviate trafﬁc congestion in the network and maximize the social
surplus. To achieve this, the manager regulates the trafﬁc ﬂow rates entering each bottleneck
in the network using time-dependent network permits. The precise deﬁnition and setup of
the network permit system with multiple purchase opportunities are described in Subsection
5.2.3.
Each atomic user i ∈ N makes, at most, a trip on day m = 1 from the origin to the
destination in the network. The user chooses a destination arrival time on the trip day during
the decision-making period to maximize his utility. A detailed deﬁnition of utility is given
in Subsection 5.2.4. Under the system of tradable network permits, each user must purchase
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a permits corresponding to the user’s chosen destination arrival time through two period
trading markets.
5.2.3 Tradable network permits with multiple purchase opportunities
We assume that the number of permits issued for the bottleneck in each time is equal to or
less than the bottleneck capacity μ. Under this setting, the arrival ﬂow rate at a bottleneck
at any time, based on the deﬁnition of the scheme, is equal to the number of permits. This
implies that we can completely eliminate the occurrence of queuing congestion.
In this chapter, we consider the case in which network permits for the trip day are sold
both in the trading market on day m = 0 and in the trading market on day m = 1 (hereafter,
we refer to these as the future market and the spot market respectively). Therefore, the road
manager needs to determine the number of permits sold for each market μmt out of the total
number of issued permits μ; that is
μ1t + μ
0
t ≤ μ ∀t ∈ T. (5.1)
The permits are put on sale by the road manager. In the trading markets, the prices and the
allocation of time-dependent permits are determined through an auction mechanism. Note
that we assume that there is no resale and cancellation of the permits. The detailed trading
rules are given in Section 5.4.
5.2.4 User valuation and utility
We suppose that each user i has a valuation vmi,t of destination arrival time t on the trip day;
this valuation depends on the purchase period m. As an example of this type of situation,
a person can have multiple activity plans that depend on purchase periods: a person will
conduct a meeting with a business partner, if he schedules a trip in advance (i.e., m = 0);
otherwise, he meets with another partner3. In this case, the valuation vmi,t represents the utility
of the activity corresponding to purchase period m. We should note that the valuations of
each user are private information that cannot be observed by the road manager (or other
users).
3 Another example is a situation where people needs to make a reservation in advance to carry out an
activity.
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Each user is assumed to have quasi-linear utility umi,t. Hence, the utility of each user who
purchases a permit for destination arrival time t in market m is given by
umi,t ≡ vmi,t − pmt , (5.2)
where pmt is the permit purchase cost that determined in an auction.
5.3 System optimal allocation of network permits
In this section, we deﬁne the system optimal allocation of network permits to be achieved by
a mechanism. Then, by decomposing this problem, we present the design framework for a
mechanism to implement the scheme.
5.3.1 System optimal allocation problem
The objective of the mechanism proposed in this chapter is to maximize a social surplus.
The social surplus is given as the sum of the users’ valuations in every period because the
users’ valuations in each period are equal to the utility value obtained on the trip day. Thus,
we formulate an optimization problem [SO] to determines the system optimal allocation of
network permits:
SS := max
y0,y1,z0,μ0,μ1
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
v0i,ty
0
i,t +
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
v1i,ty
1
i,t (5.3)
subject to
μ0t + μ
1
t ≤ μ ∀t ∈ T (5.4)∑
i∈N
ymi,t ≤ μmt ∀t ∈ T, ∀m ∈ {0, 1} (5.5)
1 −
∑
t∈T
y0i,t = z
0
i ∀i ∈ N (5.6)
∑
t∈T
y1i,t ≤ z0i ∀i ∈ N (5.7)
ymi,t, z
m
i ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T, ∀m ∈ {0, 1} (5.8)
μmt ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T, ∀m ∈ {0, 1}. (5.9)
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where ymi,t is 1 if a network permit corresponding to destination arrival time t in market m is
allocated to user i and zero otherwise. A discrete variable z0i represents whether or not user i
has an option to purchase network permits at the end of period m = 0.
The problem [SO] ﬁnds an efﬁcient permit allocation ym := (ymi,t)∀i,t; the optimal pur-
chase timing for each user z0 := (z0i )∀i; and the optimal number of permits to sell in each
period market μm := (μmt )∀t. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst and second terms of the objective
function (5.3) represent the social surplus obtained in the future market and the spot mar-
ket respectively. The ﬁrst constraint (5.4) is the condition that the total number of permits
sold in these markets does not exceed the bottleneck capacity. The second constraint (5.5)
is the capacity (not the bottleneck capacity) constraint for each market. The third and fourth
constraints (5.6), (5.7) result in the unit-demand condition: each user purchases at most one
permit. Constraints (5.8) and (5.9) are the 0–1 integer constraint and nonnegative constraint,
respectively.
As is apparent from the above constraint conditions, the problem [SO] is a linear mixed-
integer problem. Although the mixed-integer problems are difﬁcult to solve in general, we
obtain an optimal integral solution by solving a linear relaxation of the problem [SO] if
the bottleneck capacity μ is integer-valued. This is because the constraint matrices satisfy
totally unimodularity (see Appendix 5.A for the proof). Therefore, ymi,t ≥ 0 and z0i ≥ 0
replace constraints (5.8), assuming that the bottleneck capacity is given as an integer.
5.3.2 Decomposition of the system optimal allocation problem
The problem [SO] optimizes three types of unknown variables, ym, z0, and μm, in a simul-
taneous manner. However, such a simultaneous optimization is difﬁcult unless the manager
accurately obtains users’ private information (v0,v1). Hence, we decompose the problem
into the following two problems by applying the Benders decomposition principle to the
problem [SO]:
1. Sub-problem: a problem that determines the allocation of permits, ym (and z0) ,
2. Master problem: a problem that adjusts the number of permits sold in each market,
μm.
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Sub-problem: Network permits allocation problem
Suppose that the number of permits sold in each period market is ﬁxed. Then a network
permits allocation problem [SOsub-P] that maximizes the social surplus is formulated as
max
y0,y1,z0≥0
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
v0i,ty
0
i,t +
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
v1i,ty
1
i,t (5.10)
subject to Eq.(5.5), Eq. (5.6), and Eq.(5.7).
This sub-problem [SOsub-P] has two meanings. First, it is obvious that its optimal solution
is equal to that of the problem [SO] if the number of permits for each market is given ap-
propriately. Second, the sub-problem [SOsub-P] is equivalent to an optimization problem for
a market equilibrium in which each user both chooses both a destination arrival time and a
purchase period.
To show the second point more precisely, we consider the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for
the sub-problem [SOsub-P]:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑
i∈N ymi,t = μ
m
t if p
m
t > 0∑
i∈N ymi,t ≤ μmt if pmt = 0
∀t ∈ T,∀m ∈ {0, 1} (5.11)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
vmi,t − pmt = πmi if ymi,t = 1
vmi,t − pmt ≤ πmi if ymi,t = 0
∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T, ∀m ∈ {0, 1} (5.12)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
π1i = π
0
i if z
0
i = 1
π1i ≤ π0i if z0i = 0
∀i ∈ N (5.13)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑
t∈T y1i,t − z0i = 0 if π1i > 0∑
t∈T y1i,t − z0i ≤ 0 if π1i = 0
∀i ∈ N (5.14)
+ equality constraint (5.6)
where pm := (pmt )∀t and π
m := (πmi )∀i are the optimal Lagerange multipliers for constraints
(5.5) and (5.7) respectively. The optimality conditions, (5.11)–(5.14), can be interpreted
as the market equilibrium by regarding the Lagrange multipliers pm and πm as equilibrium
permit prices and option values in market m. Speciﬁcally, Eq.(5.11) represents the market-
clearing condition, and Eqs.(5.12)–(5.14) are interpreted as the user choice equilibrium (i.e.,
arrival time and purchase period) conditions when permit prices are given. Hence, the fol-
lowing proposition holds:
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Proposition 5.1 Assume that the number of permits sold in each period market is ﬁxed. We
also assume that the trading markets are perfectly competitive. Then, the equilibrium permits
allocation pattern that is realized under the tradable network permits with multiple purchase
opportunities that maximizes the social surplus deﬁned by (5.10).
Proof We ﬁrst conﬁrm the demand-supply equilibrium condition for each destination ar-
rival time in each period corresponding to the optimality condition (5.11). This correspon-
dence is clear if the Lagerange multipliers (p0,p1) are regarded as permit prices (i.e., com-
petitive equilibrium prices) in the future market and the spot market, respectively.
We then show that the user choice equilibrium conditions are equivalent to the optimality
conditions (5.12)–(5.14). For given permit prices, each user determines a destination arrival
time and a purchase period so as to maximize his/her utility:
max
m∈{0,1,2}
max
t∈T
. {vmi,t − pmt } ∀i ∈ N . (5.15)
For convenience, we use m = 2 to show people that do not purchase any permits; their
payoff is zero. At this time, the Lagrange multipliers π0i and π
1
i can be viewed as optimal
value functions of the problem (5.15) in period m ∈ {0, 1}:
πmi := maxτ≥m maxt∈T
. {vτi,t − pτt } ∀m = {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ N . (5.16)
By applying the DP (dynamic programming) principle, we obtain the optimal decision-
making at the beginning of each market. More speciﬁcally, the optimal choice pair (m∗, k∗)
can be obtained by “backward induction.”
We ﬁrst solve the following choice problem (i.e., Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation) in
period m = 1 (i.e., the trip day):
π1i = max
{
max
t∈T
{
v1i,t − p1t
}
, π2i
}
, (5.17)
where π2i = 0. By using the optimal choice function (5.17), the optimal choice in period
m = 0 is given by ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
maxt∈T
{
v0i,t − p0t
}
≥ π1i
⇔ purchase: z0i = 0 and y0i,t > 0, ∃t ∈ T
maxt∈T
{
v0i,t − p0t
}
< π1i
⇔ non-purchase: z0i = 1 and y0i,t = 0, ∀t ∈ T.
(5.18)
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Then, we have the choice problem in period m = 0:
π0i = max
{
max
t∈T
{
v0i,t − p0t
}
, π1i
}
. (5.19)
Let us now conﬁrm the equivalence between the user choice equilibrium conditions
(5.17) and (5.19) and the optimality conditions (5.12)–(5.14). The equilibrium condition
(5.17) in period m = 1 can be rewritten as
π1i ≥ π2i (5.20)
π1i ≥ maxt∈T {v
1
i,t − p1t }. (5.21)
We see that Eq.(5.21) corresponds to the optimality (5.12); Eq.(5.20) corresponds to the
optimality condition (5.14). In the same way, the equilibrium condition (5.19) in period
m = 0 corresponds to the optimality conditions (5.12), (5.13). The above discussion shows
that both the equilibrium conditions and the optimality conditions have the exactly the same
form. Therefore, equilibrium permits allocation pattern is equal to that obtained by solving
the sub-problem [SOsub-P].
Proposition 5.1 states that the optimal solution of the problem [SOsub-P] can be achieved
as a result of distributed behavior of users. However, in order to hold this proposition, It
is necessary to assume that users do not play strategic behaviors that affect prices (e.g.,
perfectly competitive markets). For example, we suppose that a user manipulates a permit
price. This strategic behavior may decrease other users’ utility, which results in a failure to
achieve the system optimal state. Hence, we have to design a mechanism in which each user
has no incentive to exhibit a strategic behavior.
Master problem: Adjustment of the number of permits sold for each period market
The problem of adjusting the number of permits sold for each market is obtained as a Benders
master problem. Thus, the problem is formulated by exploiting a dual problem of the sub-
problem [SOsub-P] (the derivation of this problem is shown in Appendix 5.B):
max
μ0,μ1≥0
.
∑
t∈T
μ0t p
0(μt) +
∑
t∈T
μ1t p
1(μt) + π0(μ) (5.22)
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Figure 5.2 Procedures for the proposed mechanism
subject to Eq.(5.4)?
(p(μ), π0(μ))
= arg min
p,π≥0
∑
t∈T
μ0t p
0
t +
∑
t∈T
μ1t p
1
t + π
0 (5.23)
subject to
πmi ≥ vmi,t − pmt ∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T, ∀m ∈ {0, 1} (5.24)
π0i ≥ π1i ∀i ∈ N (5.25)
where π0(μ) :=
∑
i∈N
π0i (μ), π
0 :=
∑
i∈N
π0i .
where Eqs.(5.23)–(5.25) is the dual problem [SOsub-D] of the sub-problem [SOsub-P], and
(p(μ), π0(μ)) is the optimal solution of the dual problem for a parameter μ; that is, it is
an extreme point of the convex feasible region Ω that consists of the constraints (5.24) and
(5.25). By using the extreme points, the master problem is ﬁnally represented as
max
μ0,μ1≥0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ min
(p(s),π0(s))∈V(Ω)
∑
t∈T
μ0t p
0
t (s) +
∑
t∈T
μ1t p
1
t (s) + π
0(s)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (5.26)
subject to Eq.(5.4).
The master problem is equivalent to the problem [SO] if all of the extreme points are known.
Because it is difﬁcult to obtain the extreme points in advance, we employ an evolutionary
approach of generating an extreme point (or solving the sub-problem).
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5.3.3 Design framework of a mechanism for implementing the tradable
network permits with multiple purchase opportunities
From the above discussion, in order to implement the scheme, it is necessary to design a
mechanism for solving the master problem and the sub-problem iteratively (Figure 5.2).
More speciﬁcally, we have to design
1. a dynamic auction mechanism to implement the dynamic user choice equilibrium,
2. an adjustment rule for the number of permits sold in each market to converge to the
optimal one by using the extreme points.
We call the former the “auction phase” and the latter the “adjustment phase,” whereas one
iteration of both phases is a “stage.” Each stage is denoted by s. In addition, we assume that
each user behaves myopically and makes his/her choice so as to maximize the utility deﬁned
at each stage s (i.e., a myopic best response strategy). In the following two sections, we
concretely design mechanisms and clarify the desired properties.
5.4 Auction phase
Assuming that the number of permits sold in each period market (μ0(s),μ1(s)) is ﬁxed, we
showed that the sub-problem [SOsub] is equivalent to the market and the user choice equilib-
rium state (Proposition 5.1). However, the problem simultaneously determines the permits
allocation variables of both the future market and the spot market: it cannot represent an
actual sequence of the multiple period markets; the network permits allocation in the future
market is determined before that in the spot market. Hence, we ﬁrst show that the prob-
lem [SOsub] can be decomposed to be consistent with the actual sequence of the markets (or
time) under a certain condition. By doing this, we can apply a standard incentive-compatible
multi-item auction to each market. Moreover, in this auction, the optimal market choice of
each user is guaranteed.
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5.4.1 Time decomposition of multiple period markets
Let us rewrite the objective function of the dual sub-problem [SOsub-D]:
∑
t∈T
μ0t (s)p
0
t +
∑
i∈N
(π0i − π1i ) +
∑
t∈T
μ1t (s)p
1
t +
∑
i∈N
π1i . (5.27)
By using this equation, we can transform the problem [SOsub-D] into the following equivalent
bi-level problem:
[SOsub-D0]
min
p0≥0,π0
∑
t∈T
μ0t (s)p
0
t +
∑
i∈N
(π0i − π1i ) (5.28)
subject to
π0i ≥ v0i,t − p0t ∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T (5.29)
π0i ≥ π1i ∀i ∈ N (5.30)
[SOsub-D1]
min
p1,π1≥0
∑
t∈T
μ1t (s)p
1
t +
∑
i∈N
π1i (5.31)
subject to
π1i ≥ v1i,t − p1t ∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T. (5.32)
The upper level problem [SOsub-D0] represents the permits allocation problem in the future
market; the lower level problem [SOsub-D1] represents the permits allocation problem in the
spot market. From this bi-level problem, we see the following two facts: (i) the spot market
can be treated as independent of the future market; (ii) the future market also can be treated
independently if the option values π1i are given. In other words, if each user can know his/her
own option value in the spot market, the multiple period markets can be decomposed to be
consistent with time sequence. From now on, we discuss the auction mechanism, assuming
the condition holds.
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Let us introduce a new variable vˆ0i,t := v
0
i,t − π1i ; it represents the“net valuation” (i.e.,
a truthful valuation minus the option value). Then, the problem [SOsub-D0] is equal to the
following problem with a new unknown variable πˆ0i := π
0
i − π1i :
min
p0,πˆ0≥0
∑
t∈T
μ0t (s)p
0
t +
∑
i∈N
πˆ0i (5.33)
subject to
πˆ0i ≥ vˆ0i,t − p0t ∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ T. (5.34)
This problem has the same form as the problem [SOsub-D1] that is described by using vˆ1i,t :=
v1i,t?πˆ
1
i := π
1
i . Finally, an independent assignment problem for each period market is given
as the primal problem [SOsub-Pm] of the dual problem (5.33):
max
ym≥0
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
vˆmi,ty
m
i,t (5.35)
subject to
∑
i∈N
ymi,t ≤ μmt (s) ∀t ∈ T (5.36)
∑
t∈T
ymi,t ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N . (5.37)
where the constraint (5.37) is the unit-demand condition. From the above discussion, we
ﬁnd that the sub-problem [SOsub-D] can be solved to be consistent with time sequence if
each user reports net valuations truthfully in the future market.
5.4.2 Auction mechanism for multiple period markets
Because the problem [SOsub-Pm] is the standard assignment problem, we can apply the vari-
ous incentive compatible auction mechanisms to it (e.g., the VCG mechanism). Now, let us
employ the proxy DGS auction (shown in Chapter 4 and Appendix C) for implementing the
multiple period markets. Then, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 5.2 Assume that the number of permits sold in each period market is ﬁxed. We
also assume that each user knows his/her own option value realized in the spot market. Then,
the proxy DGS auction mechanism for each period market is strategy-proof and achieves an
efﬁcient network permits allocation.
95
Proof Each market can be treated independently when each user knows his/her own option
value realized in the spot market. Therefore, each market is strategy-proof from Demange
et al. (1986) and Parkes and Ungar (2000b). The allocation of the network permits of each
market is the optimal solution of the decomposed sub-problem [SOsub-Pm]. On the other
hand, the (undecomposed) sub-problem [SOsub-P] maximizes the social surplus under the
condition that the number of permits sold for each market is ﬁxed. Because the undecom-
posed sub-problem [SOsub-P] and the decomposed sub-problems [SOsub-Pm] are equivalent,
the network permits allocation achieved by the DGS auction also maximizes the social sur-
plus.
Furthermore, we reveal that the user’s market choice is optimal by using the Proposition
5.2. Because the future market is strategy-proof, each user’s allocation of permits is given
by
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
vˆ0i,t − p0t = πˆi0 if y0i,t = 1
vˆ0i,t − p0t ≤ πˆi0 if y0i,t = 0
∀i ∈ N . (5.38)
Thus, for all users,
πˆi
0 = max
{
max
t∈T
{
vˆ0i,t − p0t
}
, 0
}
⇔ π0i − π1i = max
{
max
t∈T
{
v0i,t − π1i − p0t
}
, 0
}
(5.39)
⇔ π0i = max
{
max
t∈T
{
v0i,t − p0t
}
, π1i
}
holds. This equation is equal to the optimal market choice condition in period m = 0 (i.e.,
Eq.(5.19)). That is, truthful reporting of the net valuations in the future market simultane-
ously means choosing a purchase period so as to maximize the utility of each user.
Proposition 5.3 Assume that each user knows his/her own option value realized in the spot
market. Then, the market choices of all of the users that participate in the multiple period
markets are optimal.
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5.5 Adjustment phase of the number of permits sold for
each period market
5.5.1 Adjustment rule
In the adjustment phase, the road manager generates a new extreme point (p(s), π0(s)) from
the information obtained in the multiple period markets, and then determines the number
of permits sold in each period market in the next stage. The prices (p0,p1) can be obtained
directly in the auction phase for each period market. The total payoffπ0(s), on the other hand,
is computed in an indirect way. In the proxy DGS auction, because each user reports true
(net) valuations to the proxy agent about the permits that they are interested in, the manager
can obtain his/her winning valuations vˆm∗i,t∗ through the agent. By using this information, the
manager calculates the total payoff from the duality theorem (see Appendix 5.C for more
details):
π0(s) =
∑
i∈N
vˆm∗i,t∗ −
∑
t∈T
μ0t (s)p
0
t −
∑
t∈T
μ1t (s)p
1
t . (5.40)
Note here that the extreme point (p(s), π0(s)) consists of aggregate information.
After generating the extreme point, the road manager considers the set of extreme points
until stage s:
V′(Ω) :=
{
(p(1), π0(1)), . . . , (p(s), π0(s))
}
⊆ V(Ω) .
Then, the road manager adjusts the number of permits sold in each period market by solving
the following optimization problem:
max
μ0,μ1≥0
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ min
(p(s),π0(s))∈V′(Ω)
∑
t∈T
μ0t p
0
t (s) +
∑
t∈T
μ1t p
1
t (s) + π
0(s)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (5.41)
subject to Eq.(5.4).
The solution to this problem is the number of permits sold in the each market at the next
stage, μ(s + 1). Unlike the master problem (5.26), this problem (5.41) uses a subset of the
extreme points V′(Ω) ⊆ V(Ω), which produce an upper bound on the optimal value of the
problem [SO]. Moreover, the problem can be reduced to the following linear program:
max
θ,μ0,μ1≥0
θ (5.42)
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subject to? Eq.(5.4)
θ ≤
∑
t∈T
μ0t p
0
t (s) +
∑
t∈T
μ1t p
1
t (s) + π
0(s) ∀(p(s), π0(s)) ∈ V′(Ω). (5.43)
Thus, the problem can be solved in a very efﬁcient way.
5.5.2 Convergence of whole mechanism
The whole mechanism combining the dynamic auction and adjustment rule corresponds to
the Benders decomposition algorithm. The algorithm terminates (i.e., converges to an op-
timal solution) when the upper bound θ is equal to the optimal objective value of the sub
problem (i.e., the social surplus achieved in the auction phase); otherwise, a new adjustment
phase begins. Furthermore, a new extreme point is always generated in the auction phase
before the procedure terminates, and the set of extreme points is ﬁnite. Hence, we have the
following convergence result for the whole mechanism.
Proposition 5.4 The proposed mechanism combining the dynamic auction and adjustment
rule achieves the optimal permits allocation pattern in a ﬁnite number of iterations.
Proof Because the decomposed sub-problem [SOsub-Dm] is bounded (from below), an ex-
treme point always generated at every stage. Therefore, the proposed mechanism corre-
sponds to the Benders decomposition algorithm excluding the step for the case where ex-
treme rays are generated. For a complete proof see, for example, Lasdon (1970).
5.6 Numerical experiments
In the preceding section of this chapter, we described the design of the implementation mech-
anism for multiple period markets with a ﬁxed population (i.e., the same users participate in
the markets at every stage s). Nevertheless, concerning the adjustment rule without requiring
individual information, the mechanism may work effectively for a dynamic population case
in which markets participants change over stage but the valuation distribution of the markets
participants is ﬁxed. This section examines the validity of the above conjecture by numerical
experiments.
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Case (i) Case (ii)
Figure 5.3 Desired arrival time distributions
5.6.1 Fixed population case
Before discussing the dynamic population case, we show numerical examples for the ﬁxed
population case for clarifying convergence properties (e.g., the speed of convergence) of the
proposed mechanism. In the numerical examples, the two cases with different population
sizes are considered: (i) 250 users with 60 arrival times and (ii) 500 users with 60 arrival
times. The bottleneck capacity μ is 5 vehicles/unit time for the case (i); that is 10 vehi-
cles/unit time for the case (ii). The valuation distribution of the population is given by the
following equation:
vmi,t = wi −max{α(tmi − t), β(t − tmi )} (5.44)
where wi represents the trip utility of user i, which is randomly generated from a normal
distribution. The second term of the equation represents a linear schedule delay function
with identical values for the positive earliness rate α and lateness rate β; tmi is the desired
arrival time of user i in period m, which is randomly generated from the desired arrival time
distribution shown in Figure 5.3. Under these setting, each user’s valuations changes over
period depend on his/her desired arrival time.
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Table 5.1 Number of iterations required to converge (100 samples)
Case (i)
[iterations]
Average (100%) 7.18
Average (99%) 4.00
Maximum sample (100%) 18
Minimum sample (100%) 4
Case (ii)
[iterations]
Average (100%) 11.70
Average (99%) 6.00
Maximum sample (100%) 22
Minimum sample (100%) 6
Table 5.1 summarizes the convergence results of 100 samples for each case4. According
to this table, we ﬁnd that the social surplus achieved through the auction phase rapidly con-
verges to (close to) the maximum value. Only a small number of iterations are required to
achieve 99% of the maximum social surplus, whereas about twice as many are required to
reach 100%. To show this more intuitively, the convergence process of the worst case (i.e.,
the maximum sample for case (ii)) is presented in Figure 5.4. The horizontal axis shows
the number of iterations s, and the vertical axis shows the ratio between the achieved social
surplus at each stage and the maximum value. Also in this case, the social surplus reaches
99% of the maximum value at six iterations; however, the ﬁnal convergence is very slow (this
phenomenon is well known as the tailing-off effect, Lu¨bbecke and Desrosiers, 2005). Note
that the effect would be insigniﬁcant because the achieved social surplus is high enough.
Thus, we conclude that the convergence speed of the proposed mechanism would be fast.
5.6.2 Dynamic population case
We next consider the dynamic population case in which markets participants change between
stages but the valuation distribution of the participants is ﬁxed. To estimate the convergence
properties, we ﬁrst show the probability distribution of the maximum social surplus for each
case (5000 samples). As indicated in Figure 5.5, the distributions of both cases follow the
4 To stabilize the convergence process, we here add the box constrains (Martsen, 1975):
μmt (s) − γ ≤ μmt (s + 1) ≤ μmt (s) + γ (5.45)
to the master problem. γ, γ are the boxstep parameters.
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Figure 5.4 Example of convergence process of the proposed mechanism (worst case)
Case (i) Case (ii)
Figure 5.5 Distributions of the maximum social surplus (5000 samples)
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Case (i) Case (ii)
Figure 5.6 Distributions of the achieved social surplus at 20 iterations (1000 samples)
normal distributions (the red lines represent their corresponding normal distributions).
We next show the results of a Monte Carlo simulation of the proposed mechanism. For
each case, we generated 1000 sample paths where each user’s valuations were randomly
chosen from the Eq.(5.44) at each stage s. From the observation in the previous subsection,
we set the number of iterations of each sample path at 20. Figure 5.6 depicts the probability
distribution of the achieved social surplus at the ﬁnal stage s = 20 for each case. Each
blue line represents the normal distribution corresponding to the distribution of the achieved
social surplus. From this ﬁgure, we can observe that the mean of the achieved social surplus
is smaller than that of the maximum social surplus, which means that perfect efﬁciency is not
always obtained. This is because the number of permits sold for each market is optimized by
using information available until the current stage and may not be optimal for a new users
valuations pattern that arises at the next stage. Nevertheless, the mean of the achieved social
surplus reaches 99% of that of the maximum social surplus. It is also worth mentioning
that the standard deviation of the achieved social surplus tends to be smaller than that of
the maximum social surplus; the lower three sigma levels of both distributions are almost
the same. The reason for this is not clear, but the social surplus that consists of a users
valuations pattern corresponding to the lower three sigma level may be maximized under
any (or many) permit issue pattern. Finally, Figure 5.7 shows that the mean (and three sigma
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Case (i) Case (ii)
Figure 5.7 Mean of the achieved social surplus at each iteration (1000 samples)
level) of the achieved social surplus at each iteration. The process of the mean value shows
the same tendency as in the case of ﬁxed population. Furthermore, the three sigma levels of
the achieved social surplus are almost within that of the maximum social surplus.
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the proposed mechanism works
effectively for the dynamic population case if the valuation distribution of the population
does not change. More speciﬁcally, the achieved social surplus rapidly converges to close to
the maximum value (about 99%), and its standard deviation is small compared to that of the
maximum social surplus.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter considered a situation where network permits for a speciﬁc day are sold in mul-
tiple period markets and designed a trading mechanism of these markets. We ﬁrst showed
that the system optimal permits allocation for a ﬁxed permit issue pattern is equivalent to the
user equilibrium in perfectly competitive markets. This enabled us to decompose the system
optimal allocation problem into two sub-problems. We then constructed the mechanism for
implementing each sub-problem independently, and proved that the proposed mechanisms
have the following desirable properties: (1) the dynamic auction for multiple period markets
is strategy-proof and guarantees that the market choice of each user is optimal when each user
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knows his/her own option value realized in the market on the trip day; (2) the whole mech-
anism combining the dynamic auction and the adjustment rule achieves the optimal permits
allocation pattern in a ﬁnite number of iterations. Finally, we numerically demonstrated that
the proposed mechanism works effectively for a dynamic population case.
While it was assumed that each user knows his/her own option value realized in the
market on the trip day, the thought behind this assumption is that the user has a prediction
formation mechanism based on some learning dynamics. However, it is not obvious what
kind of learning dynamics would be suitable. For example, in the ﬁeld of the evolutionary
and learning game theory (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Young, 2004), various learn-
ing dynamics were proposed. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify which learning processes
encourage an accurate and efﬁcient prediction.
Another important expansion of our model would be to consider the users’ dynamic
decision-making under uncertainty. Because the proposed mechanism considers important
aspects of dynamic allocation problems (i.e., the users’ dynamic decision-making and irre-
versibility of resource allocation), it seems applicable under uncertainty. Thus, generalizing
the proposed mechanism to handle uncertainty situations is an important topic for future
work.
Appendix 5.A Proof of totally unimodularity of problem
[SO]
A totally unimodular (TU) matrix is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5.1 An integer matrix A is totally unimodular if any subdeterminant of A is 0 or
±1.
Then, if a constraint matrix A is a TU matrix, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 5.1 Let A be totally unimodular. Then, for any integer vector b, extreme points of
the following polyhedron:
{x : Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0}
are integers.
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Therefore, a bounded linear program in which the constraint matrix is a TU matrix always
produces integer solutions. Well-known problems that have such a constraint matrix are
weighted mating problems and network ﬂow problems (e.g., the maximum ﬂow problem,
the minimum cost ﬂow problem).
Because the problem [SO] is different from the typical problems, we prove that the con-
straint matrix of the problem is a TU matrix by using the following sufﬁcient condition
(Heller and Tompkins, 1956):
Theorem 5.2 (Heller and Tompkins, 1956) Let A be a 0, ±1 matrix with at most two nonzero
entries per column. Then, A is totally unimodular if there is a partition of rows such that
1. if two nonzero entries in a column have the same sign, then the rows are partitioned
into disjoint sets T1,T2;
2. if the nonzero entries in a column have opposite sign, then the rows are in the same set
(i.e., T1 or T2).
Let us conﬁrm that the constraint matrices of the problem [SO] satisfy the sufﬁcient
condition. We ﬁrst transpose the unknown variables of the constraints to the left-hand side
and partition the constraints as follows:
T1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑
i∈N ymi,t − μmt ≤ 0 ∀t ∈ T, ∀m ∈ {0, 1}
μ0t + μ
1
t ≤ μ ∀t ∈ T
1 −∑t∈T y0i,t − z0i = 0 ∀i ∈ N
z0i −
∑
t∈T y1i,t ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N
T2 = ∅
We let A be the coefﬁcient matrices of the left-hand side. Then, every entry of A is 0 or
±1, and A has two nonzero entries. In addition, two nonzero entries in every column have
opposite signs. Then all of the rows are in T1; the set T2 is empty. Thus, the constraint matrix
of the problem [SO] is totally unimodular.
105
Appendix 5.B Derivation of master problem
We ﬁrst decompose the problem [SO] into the following bi-level problem:
max
μ0,μ1≥0
.
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
v0i,ty
0
i,t(μ) +
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
v1i,ty
1
i,t(μ) (5.46)
subject to Eq.(5.4)?
(y0(μ),y1(μ))
= arg max
y0,y1,z0≥0
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
v0i,ty
0
i,t +
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
v1i,ty
1
i,t
subject to Eq.(5.5), Eq.(5.6), Eq.(5.7).
where (y0(μ),y1(μ)) is an optimal solution of the sub problem for a parameter μ.
From the duality theorem, the optimality value of the objective function of the primal
problem [SOsub-P] coincides with that of the dual problem [SOsub-D]:
Z(μ) :=
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
v0i,ty
0
i,t(μ) +
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
v1i,ty
1
i,t(μ)
=
∑
t∈T
μ0t p
0(μt) +
∑
t∈T
μ1t p
1(μt) + π0(μ). (5.47)
where p(μ), π0(μ) is the optimal solution of the dual problem (5.23) for a parameter μ. By
using the optimality value function (5.47), the objective function (5.46) is transformed into
the function (5.22). Finally, we can obtain the lower level problem of the problem (5.22)
by replacing the lower level problem (i.e., problem sub-problem [SOsub-P]) of the problem
(5.46) with the dual sub-problem [SOsub-D].
Appendix 5.C Derivation of equation (5.40)
We here derive the total payoff π0(s) by exploiting information, permit prices (p0∗,p1∗) and
wining valuations (or bids) (vˆm∗i,t∗)∀i, which are obtained in the auction phase at each stage s.
Note that a single asterisk (∗) indicates the optimal value of each variable at each stage (i.e.,
the value achieved through the auction mechanism).
The social surplus achieved by the auction mechanism is represented as
∑
m∈{0,1}
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
vˆmi,ty
m∗
i,t =
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
vˆm∗i,t∗ . (5.48)
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From the duality theorem, the optimal value of the objective value of the decomposed sub
problem [SOsub-Pm] coincides with that of the dual problem [SOsub-Dm]:
∑
i∈N
∑
t∈T
vˆmi,ty
m∗
i,t =
∑
i∈N
πˆm∗i +
∑
t∈T
μmt (s)p
m∗
t . (5.49)
By substituting this equation into Eq.(5.48), we have
∑
i∈N
vˆm
∗
i,t∗ =
∑
i∈N
πˆ0∗i +
∑
i∈N
πˆ1∗i +
∑
t∈T
μ0t (s)p
0∗
t +
∑
t∈T
μ1t (s)p
1∗
t . (5.50)
We here recall the deﬁnitions πˆ0i := π
0
i − π1i , πˆ1i := π1i . Then Eq.(5.50) reduces to the Eq.
(5.40):
∑
i∈N
vˆm
∗
i,t∗ = π
0(s) +
∑
t∈T
μ0t (s)p
0∗
t +
∑
t∈T
μ1t (s)p
1∗
t .
Chapter 6
Stochastic convergence of a hybrid
scheme of tradable network permits and
congestion pricing
Until Chapter 5, we studied the tradable network permits scheme in several situations, con-
sidering only queuing congestion. In contrast, this chapter1 deals with two types of conges-
tion: queuing congestion and ﬂow congestion. Queuing congestion is a negative externality
of a queue, while ﬂow congestion is a negative externality of the speed decrease arising from
an increase in trafﬁc density. Unfortunately, it is difﬁcult to eliminate both congestions by us-
ing only tradable network permits scheme, since the mechanisms of two types of congestion
are totally different.
To address the problem, we here examine a hybrid scheme of the tradable network per-
mits and congestion pricing. This scheme can simultaneously eliminate both queuing con-
gestion and ﬂow congestion, and does not require detailed user information. Also, Wada and
Akamatsu (2010) constructed an evolutionary mechanism of the scheme and demonstrated
that trafﬁc ﬂow dynamics arising from the mechanism converge to a system optimal state in
the sense that social surplus is maximized.
The above results were obtained in a deterministic situation: agents were assumed to de-
terministically adjust their behavior in response to the current trafﬁc state. However, agents’
1 This chapter is based on joint research with Takashi Akamatsu and Takeshi Nagae, presented in the 15th
International Conference of Hong Kong Society for Transportation Studies (Wada, Akamatsu, and Nagae,
2010).
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behavior in practice is stochastic (i.e., they sometimes make sub-optimal choices), and is
based on not only the current state of trafﬁc but also experiences of previous trips (i.e., agents
learn trafﬁc ﬂow patterns on a day-to-day basis). As such, in the current chapter we dispense
with a deterministic model, and instead employ a stochastic learning model. We then show
that the evolutionary mechanism of our hybrid scheme can operate robustly in stochastic
environments. Speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that the stochastic dynamics of the learning pro-
cess converge to an equilibrium state, and that a trafﬁc ﬂow pattern at equilibrium is efﬁcient
in the sense that social surplus is maximized.
In Section 6.1, we describe the preconditions used in the model. In Section 6.2, we de-
ﬁne a system optimal state. Section 6.3 presents the framework of the scheme and the user
learning model. In Section 6.4, we describe an auction mechanism of the trading markets.
Section 6.5 analyzes a stochastic dynamics of the learning process arising from the mecha-
nism. We then demonstrate that the dynamics converges to a system optimal state. Section
6.6 presents our conclusions about the model.
6.1 Model
6.1.1 Networks
This chapter considers a simple road network involving two residential zones and a central
business district (CBD), which represents a road system where an urban area is connected
with a suburban area (Figure 6.1). Each user commutes from a residential zone to the CBD.
This is a basic network in which both queuing congestion and ﬂow congestion exist and
interact with each other via users.
We assume that the upstream link has a bottleneck with constant capacity μ (point queue
model). In the urban street network, a speed-ﬂow relationship is assumed: the delay of the
downstream link means a space-average delay arising in the urban street network. The travel
time of the downstream link is given by a strict monotonic function c(x) : ∂c(x)/∂x > 0
where x is the trafﬁc ﬂow per unit of time. We consider time-dependent trafﬁc ﬂow patterns
within-day and day-to-day trafﬁc ﬂow dynamics. We then distinguish the day s ∈ S from the
time t ∈ T within day s.
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Figure 6.1 Network setting
6.1.2 Agents
The road manager aims to restrain trafﬁc congestion, and to maximize social surplus. To this
end, the manager imposes “time-dependent congestion tolls” on users in the downstream
link. The manager also regulates the trafﬁc ﬂow entering the upstream link using “time-
dependent network permits”.
Each user makes a single trip from his or her residential zone to the CBD. The user
chooses a destination arrival time based on his or her prediction of trafﬁc ﬂow pattern (i.e.,
users learn trafﬁc ﬂow patterns). Speciﬁcally, a downstream user j ∈ N chooses a destination
arrival time to maximize his or her predicted utility. On the other hand, an upstream user
i ∈ M must purchase a network permit to pass through the upstream bottleneck. This
implies that the choice of destination arrival time directly corresponds to purchasing a time-
dependent network permit on the trading markets.
Aggregating users’ behaviors determines the trafﬁc ﬂow xt at each time t. The upstream
travel demand QM and the downstream travel demand QN (i.e., trips per day) are given
constants.
6.1.3 Transportation demand management schemes
The tradable network permits scheme eliminate queuing congestion, but cannot eliminate
ﬂow congestion. We consider a hybrid scheme that combines the tradable network permits
with congestion pricing.
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Tradable network permits
We assume that the number of permits issued in each unit of time is equal to the trafﬁc
capacity of the bottleneck. From the deﬁnition of the time-dependent network permits, the
inﬂow rate of the bottleneck is equal to the number of permits issued: hence the inﬂow rate
cannot exceed the trafﬁc capacity, which entails that queuing congestion never occur.
The permits issued for the bottleneck are put on sale by the road manger in a trading
market. Each user who would like to pass through the bottleneck must purchase the permit
corresponding to user’s preferred destination arrival time. In the trading markets, permit
prices and the permits allocation are determined through an auction mechanism.
Flow-based congestion pricing
The ﬂow-based congestion pricing (FBCP) scheme relies on the notion of an evolutionary
congestion pricing scheme, as proposed by Sandholm (2002). Speciﬁcally, a congestion toll
λt(xt(s)) that is imposed on users arriving in the CBD at time t on day s is given by
λt(xt(s)) = αxt(s)
∂c(xt(s))
∂xt(s)
∀t ∈ T, (6.1)
where α is a coefﬁcient that converts travel time to a monetary equivalent, assumed to be the
same for all users. In the FBCP scheme the manager sets toll levels based on observed trafﬁc
ﬂow alone.
6.1.4 Travel costs and user utility
The transportation cost for a single trip made in the network under the proposed scheme
consists of the following costs. The schedule cost is the cost due to the difference between
the desired arrival time tˆ and the actual arrival time t, which is given by a convex function
st. To outline the essential aspects of the theory, the desired arrival time is assumed to be the
same for all users and is equal to tˆ. The travel cost on the downstream link is the monetary
equivalent of the travel time c(xt). The congestion toll λ is deﬁned in (6.1). The network
permit prices p are determined by an auction mechanism.
A utility that is perceived by each user varies from user to user: each user’s utility in-
cludes “private information” (e.g., willingness to pay) that is unobservable to other users
(we call this information “private utility”). More speciﬁcally, each upstream user i ∈ M has
111
stochastic private utility wit, while each downstream user j ∈ N has the stochastic private
utility wjt. The private utilities represent users’ bias toward a destination arrival time. The
utilities are assumed to follow i.i.d. Gumbel distributions. We can thus deﬁne each user’s
(net) utility as
πit(xt, pt) = w
i
t − ht(xt) − pt (6.2)
π jt(xt) = w
j
t − ht(xt) (6.3)
where ht(xt) ≡ αc(xt) + st + λt(xt) (6.4)
6.2 System optimal trafﬁc assignment
The hybrid scheme aims to achieve a trafﬁc ﬂow pattern that maximizes a social surplus. To
represent a social surplus, we deﬁne the users’ utility (not net utility) by
uit(xt) ≡ wit − [αc(xt) + st] (6.5)
ujt(xt) ≡ wjt − [αc(xt) + st] (6.6)
Note here that this utility does not include user payments to the road manager (the congestion
toll and the network permit purchase cost) because the payments are simply income transfers
between the users and the road manager. We then formulate an optimization problem [SO]
of providing the system optimal trafﬁc assignment:
max
y≥0 .SS(y
i,y j) ≡
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈M
uit(xt)y
i
t +
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈N
ujt(xt)y
j
t (6.7)
subject to
∑
t∈T
yit = 1 ∀i ∈ M (6.8)
∑
i∈M
yit ≤ μ ∀t ∈ T (6.9)
∑
t∈T
yjt = 1 ∀ j ∈ N (6.10)
xt =
∑
i∈M
yit +
∑
j∈N
yjt ∀t ∈ T (6.11)
where yt is a variable that represents the assignment of each user.
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Figure 6.2 Framework of the proposed scheme
This problem is to ﬁnd individual user assignments y∗ that maximize the social surplus,
subject to the physical constraints of ﬂows representing the performance of the network. The
(aggregate) optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern x∗ is obtained by aggregating the individual assign-
ments. It is, however, almost impossible for the manager to directly obtain solutions of [SO],
because the problem includes private utilities wit,w
j
t. To achieve the system optimal trafﬁc
assignment, we construct an evolutionary mechanism for the proposed scheme.
6.3 Framework of the hybrid scheme and users’ behavior
models
6.3.1 Framework of the hybrid scheme
A framework of the hybrid scheme is shown in Figure 6.2. This represents the relationship
between the evolutionary mechanism and trafﬁc ﬂow patterns arising from the mechanism.
The mechanism of the hybrid scheme consists of the trading rules of the trading markets and
a choice model of users’ arrival time (i.e., the SFP model), in which users’ behaviors are
determined by a series of processes. On the other hand, aggregating users’ behaviors derives
a trafﬁc ﬂow pattern.
To intuitively see how the scheme work under the framework, let us to explain the micro
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mechanism using a time-line from day s to day s+1. Firstly, the users’ trips on day s generate
the trafﬁc ﬂow pattern x(s). The road manager then imposes congestion tolls on users based
on the observed trafﬁc ﬂow pattern x(s). After this, each user chooses a destination arrival
time on day s+1 with considering information on trafﬁc ﬂow patterns {x(1), . . . , x(s)} realized
until the current day. More precisely, each upstream user chooses a arrival time through
trading permits in the trading markets, while each downstream user chooses arrival time
with the stochastic ﬁctitious play (shown in the next subsection). Each user then makes a trip
on day s + 1: the trafﬁc ﬂow pattern x(s + 1) is generated.
6.3.2 Users’ behavior models
Learning process
Users are assumed to predict a trafﬁc ﬂow pattern for the day on which they travel (we call
this “prediction”) based information on trafﬁc ﬂow patterns {x(1), . . . , x(s)} realized until
the current day; each user chooses an arrival time to maximize a “predicted utility”. The
prediction for the day s + 1 is deﬁned by the time average of trafﬁc ﬂow patterns:
x(s) =
1
s
s∑
s=1
x(s) (6.12)
where x(s) =
∑
i∈M
yi(s) +
∑
j∈N
y j(s).
Behaviors of upstream users
After making a trip on day s, an upstream user purchases a network permit of day s + 1
through an auction mechanism. In the auction, each user plays a myopic bidding strategy
based on their prediction: truthful valuations that each user has are given by
vit(xt(s)) = w
i
t(s) − ht(xt(s)). (6.13)
User i’s predicted payoff (or net utility) from permit at time t is also given by
πit(s) = v
i
t(xt(s)) − pt(s) = wit(s) −
(
ht(xt(s)) + pt(s)
)
. (6.14)
From the properties of the trading markets shown in the next section, the assignment of
the user is determined so as to maximize their predicted payoff: the probability that user i is
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assigned time t (i.e., yit(s + 1) = 1) is given by
Bit(xt(s), pt(s)) = Pr
(
t = arg max
t∈T
πit(s)
)
=
exp[−ηi(ht(xt(s)) + pt(s))]∑
t∈T exp[−ηi(ht(xt(s)) + pt(s))] , (6.15)
where ηi is a variance parameter for the stochastic utility wit.
Behaviors of downstream users
We describe the downstream users’ behavior using a stochastic ﬁctitious play (SFP) model,
as proposed by Fudenberg and Kreps (1993). According to the SFP model, users have
predictions (or beliefs) about how their opponents will behave; these predictions are deter-
mined by the time average of past play. Users make their choices after the predicted payoffs
have been subjected to random shocks. In our model, opponents’ behavior is aggregated as
a trafﬁc ﬂow pattern: their predictions are given by Eq. (6.12). Therefore, downstream user
j’s predicted payoff is given by
π jt(s) = w
j
t(t) − ht(xt(s)). (6.16)
After realizing the stochastic utility wjt, the user maximizes their predicted payoff: the user
chooses an arrival time t (i.e., yjt(s + 1) = 1) with probability
Bjt(xt(s)) = Pr
(
t = arg max
t∈T
π jt(s)
)
=
exp[−η jht(xt(s))]∑
t∈T exp[−η jht(xt(s))] , (6.17)
where η j is a variance parameter for the stochastic utility wjt.
6.4 Auction mechanism for implementing trading markets
Like the previous chapters, the trading markets are implemented by the proxy DGS auction
(see also Appendix C). Since the auction is strategy-proof (i.e., no user has an incentive to
manipulate the markets), users bid their valuations vit(xt(s)) deﬁned in (6.13) truthfully. Also,
the auction mechanism achieves allocative efﬁciency, i.e., the allocation of network permits
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on day s + 1 is determined as an optimal solution of the following assignment problem:
max
yi(s+1)≥0
.
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈M
vit(xt(s))y
i
t(s + 1) (6.18)
subject to
∑
t∈T
yit(s + 1) = 1 ∀i ∈ M (6.19)
∑
i∈M
yit(s + 1) ≤ μ ∀t ∈ T (6.20)
Permit prices p(s) are equivalent to the Lagrange multiplier for the constraints (6.20) and
satisfy the market clearing conditions:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑
i∈M yit(s + 1) = μ if pt(s) > 0∑
i∈M yit(s + 1) ≤ μ if pt(s) = 0
∀t ∈ T. (6.21)
6.5 Stochastic convergence of day-to-day trafﬁc ﬂow dy-
namics
Until Section 6.4, considering individual users, we developed a evolutionary mechanism for
implementing the hybrid scheme; the mechanism supports users’ behaviors y. Note here
that the users’ behaviors are not equal to the system optimal user assignments y∗ shown in
Section 6.2 because each user’s predicted utility (or payoff) πt(s) depends on the prediction
x about trafﬁc ﬂow pattern.
This section analyzes the stochastic dynamics of the prediction. The dynamics depend
on changes of the trafﬁc ﬂow pattern x, generated by aggregating users’ behaviors y. Sub-
section 6.5.1 deﬁnes the stochastic process and derives the mean dynamics of the process. In
Subsection 6.5.2, we show properties of the mean dynamics. We then prove that the original
stochastic process converges to the system optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern by using stochastic
approximation theory (Subsection 6.5.3). Here, when the prediction converges, the trafﬁc
ﬂow pattern is equal to it (i.e., x = x∗). Thus, the system optimal user assignments y∗ are
achieved though the evolutionary mechanism.
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6.5.1 Stochastic dynamics of the prediction of trafﬁc ﬂow pattern
As shown in Subsection 6.3.2, each user’s behavior on the day s+1 is determined by referring
only to the prediction on day s. Let us describe the changes of the prediction between day
s and day s + 1. From the deﬁnition of the prediction (6.12), the stochastic dynamics of the
prediction are given by
x(s + 1) =
1
s + 1
(
x + x(s + 1)
)
. (6.22)
A trafﬁc ﬂow pattern x(s + 1) realized on day s + 1 with probability
Pr
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝x(s + 1) =
∑
i∈M
yi(s + 1) +
∑
j∈N
y j(s + 1) | x(s) = x
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
∏
i∈M
∏
t:yit(s+1)=1
Bit(x(s),p(t))
∏
j∈N
∏
t:yjt(s+1)=1
Bjt(x(s)). (6.23)
We can then compute expected changes of x(s) by using Eq. (6.23):
E
(
x(s + 1) − x(s) | x(s) = x
)
=
1
s + 1
[
E
(
x(s + 1) | x(s) = x
)
− x
]
=
1
t + 1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(∑
i∈M
Bi(x(s),p(t)) +
∑
j∈N
B j(x(s))
)
− x
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (6.24)
where Bi = (Bit(·, ·))t∈T, B j = (Bjt(·))t∈T. To determine the long-run behavior of the expected
changes, allow day s to approach its limiting value (i.e., s → ∞). Then, expected changes
of the prediction are transformed into the following ordinary differential equation (or mean
dynamics):
dxt
ds
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∑
i∈M
Bit(x,p) +
∑
j∈N
Bjt(x)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ − xt ∀t ∈ T. (6.25)
6.5.2 Properties of the mean dynamics of the prediction
Rest points of the mean dynamics (6.25) satisfy dx/ds = 0. Therefore, the following condi-
tions should be satisﬁed at the rest points:
x∗t =
∑
i∈M
Bit(x
∗,p∗) +
∑
j∈N
Bjt(x
∗) ∀t ∈ T (6.26)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
p∗t > 0 if
∑
i∈M Bit(x
∗,p∗) = μ
p∗t = 0 if
∑
i∈M Bit(x
∗,p∗) ≤ μ
∀t ∈ T. (6.27)
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For the rest points of the mean dynamics, we can obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 6.1 The rest point of the mean dynamics of the prediction is equal to the system
optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern x∗ deﬁned in Section 6.2.
Proof See Appendix 6.A for the proof.
Proposition 6.1 can be directly obtained by reformulating [SO] with a deterministic per-
turbation function (see Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) more detailed discussion of this func-
tion):
max
y∈Ω
.SS(yi,y j) = −
∑
i∈M
∑
t∈T
[αct(xt) + st]yit +
∑
i∈M
Hi(yi)
−
∑
j∈N
∑
t∈T
[αct(xt) + st]y
j
t +
∑
j∈N
Hj(y j)
= −
∑
t∈T
∫ xt
0
ht(ω)dω +
∑
i∈M
Hi(yi) +
∑
j∈N
Hj(y j), (6.28)
where Ω is the feasible region that satisﬁes (6.8)–(6.10) and the deterministic perturbation
functions are given by the following entropy functions:
Hi(yi) = − 1
ηi
∑
t∈T
yit ln y
i
t, H
j(y j) = − 1
η j
∑
t∈T
yjt ln y
j
t.
Since the objective function of the problem is strictly concave, we ﬁnd that the system op-
timal trafﬁc assignment is unique: this means that the rest point of the mean dynamics is
unique. The above problem is also used to describe the stability of the mean dynamics.
To ensure that the mean dynamics dx/ds globally converge to the rest point, we consider
a continuous and differentiable function SSL(x) given by
SSL(x) ≡ −
∑
t∈T
∫ xt
0
ht(ω)dω +
∑
i∈M
Hi(yi) +
∑
j∈N
Hj(y j) − SS(yi∗,y j∗). (6.29)
Theorem 6.1 The function SSL(x) is a strict Lyapunov function for the mean dynamics.
Proof See Appendix 6.B for the proof.
Therefore, the following proposition is satisﬁed for the mean dynamics of the prediction:
Proposition 6.2 Under the hybrid scheme, the mean dynamics of the prediction globally
converge to the system optimal state.
Proof This proposition follows from Proposition 6.1, Theorem 6.1, and Lyapunov stability
theory.
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6.5.3 Convergence of the stochastic dynamics of the prediction
Proposition 6.2 states that the mean dynamics of the prediction globally converge to the
system optimal state. However, the original stochastic process (6.22) of the prediction jumps
past the optimal state with positive probability. Thus, we use stochastic approximate theory
to relate the behavior of the stochastic process to the rest point of the mean dynamics. We
then obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 6.3 The stochastic process of the prediction converges to the system optimal
state with probability 1.
Proof Proposition 6.1 and Proposition 6.2 state that the mean dynamics globally converge
to the rest point and the rest point is equal to the system optimal state. On the other hand,
Theorem 3.3 of Benaı¨m and Hirsch (1999) and Proposition 5.3 of Benaı¨m (1999) imply
that the stochastic process of the prediction converges to a set of the rest points of the mean
dynamics. Since the rest point is unique in our model, we conclude that the stochastic process
converges to the system optimal state.
From the Proposition 6.3, the stochastic process of the prediction converges to the system
optimal state x∗, which leads to that the system optimal user assignments y∗ are achieved
through the evolutionary mechanism.
6.5.4 Numerical Example
Finally, we show a numerical example to illustrates the convergence process of the day-to-
day dynamics of the trafﬁc ﬂow pattern with prediction.
Let the downstream travel time be given as the following BPR type function:
c(xi) = c0{1 + a(xi/μ˜)b} (6.30)
where c0 represents free ﬂow travel time and a, b, and μ˜ are parameters of the function. We
here set a = 2 and b = 5. The schedule cost function is given by
st = max{e(tˆ − t), l(t − tˆ)} (6.31)
with identical values for the positive earliness rate e = 25 (yen/min) and lateness rate l = 45
(yen/min); tˆ is the desired arrival time. The coefﬁcient that converts travel time to a manetary
equivalent is given by α = 30 (yen/min).
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Table 6.1 Physical parameters on the road network
Parameter values
The number of the upstream users (M) 2500 vheicles
The number of the downstream users (N) 5000 vheicles
Bottleneck capacity (μ) 50 vheicle/min
BPR parameter (μ˜) 500
Free ﬂow time on the downstream link (c0) 15 min
We consider a morning commute; all users have the same desired time tˆ = 8 : 00. We set
logit parameters ηi = 0.01, η j = 0.01. Physical parameters on the road network are shown in
Table 6.1. We also set time interval Δt = 1 (minitue) and S = 150.
Numerical results are shown in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4. Figure 6.3 illustrates a sample
path of the stochastic process of the aggregate trafﬁc ﬂow pattern per 10 minutes. This pro-
cess is obtained by aggregating each user behavior. On the other hand, Fig. 6.4 shows the
day-to-day dynamics of the total transportation cost2; the red line represents the total trans-
portation cost at the socially optimal state (i.e., minimum value of the social transportation
cost) and the blue line does the total transportation cost on each day. From these ﬁgure, we
see that stochastic process of the trafﬁc ﬂow pattern eventually reaches a steady state near
the system optimal state that minimizes the total transportation cost.
6.6 Conclusion
Wada and Akamatsu (2010) proposed a hybrid scheme combining tradable network permits
and congestion pricing, and demonstrated its efﬁciency in a deterministic situation. The
present study developed an evolutionary mechanism for implementing the hybrid scheme in
a stochastic environment, and showed that the mechanism operates robustly with stochastic
user behavior. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst described an auction mechanism for the trading markets
and modeled users’ behavior using stochastic learning model (i.e., stochastic ﬁctitious play).
We then derive a stochastic dynamics about trafﬁc ﬂow pattern. Finally, we established
2 Note that the social surplus is maximized when the total transportation cost is minimized in our model.
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Figure 6.3 Dynamics of the aggregate predictions per 10 minutes
Figure 6.4 Dynamics of the total transportation cost
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the following convergence result for the dynamics by relying on stochastic approximation
theory. That is, the dynamics converges to a system optimal state in the sense that the social
surplus is maximized with probability 1.
Appendix 6.A Proof of the Proposition 6.1
We ﬁrst consider the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the system optimal trafﬁc assignment prob-
lem [SO]:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
yi∗t > 0 if π
i∗ = wit − h(x∗t) − p∗t
yi∗t = 0 if π
i∗ ≥ wit − h(x∗t) − p∗t
∀i ∈ M (6.32)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
yj∗t > 0 if π
j∗ = wjt − h(x∗t)
yj∗t = 0 if π
j∗ ≥ wjt − h(x∗t)
∀ j ∈ N (6.33)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
p∗t > 0 if
∑
i∈M yi∗t = μ
p∗t = 0 if
∑
i∈M yi∗t ≤ μ
∀t ∈ T (6.34)
+ Equality constraints (6.8) and (6.9). (6.35)
where πi, π j, and pt are Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (6.8), (6.9), and (6.10);
these are interpreted as the upstream user’s net utility, downstream user’s net utility, and
permit price, respectively.
Eq. (6.32) represents that each upstream user chooses the arrival time that maximizes his
or her (net) utility. Therefore, the probability that the user chooses arrival time t is given as
Pr .
[
t = arg max
t∈T
.{wit − h(x∗t) − p∗t}
]
= Bit(x
∗,p∗). (6.36)
Similarly, from the Eq. (6.33), the probability that each downstream user chooses arrival
time t is given as
Pr .
[
t = arg max
t∈T
.{wjt − h(x∗t)}
]
= Bjt(x
∗). (6.37)
By using these two equation, we have
x∗t =
∑
i∈M
Bit(x
∗,p∗) +
∑
j∈N
Bjt(x
∗), (6.38)
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and Eq. (6.34) is rewritten as the following condition:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
p∗t > 0 if
∑
i∈M Bit(x
∗,p∗) = μ
p∗t = 0 if
∑
i∈M Bit(x
∗,p∗) ≤ μ
∀t ∈ T. (6.39)
It can be easily seen that conditions (6.38) and (6.39) are equivalent to (6.26) and (6.27).
Appendix 6.B Proof of the Theorem 6.1
We show that the function SSL(x) is a strict Lyapunov function for the mean dynamics (6.25).
First, we easily see that SSL(x) ≤ 0 with equality if and only if x = x∗ (i.e., y = y∗) (negative
deﬁnite). Next, we show that the following condition:
d
ds
SSL(x) = ∇SSL(x) · dxds > 0 (6.40)
is satisﬁed when x  x∗ (i.e., y  y∗).
To obtain this, we consider the following problem [P]:
max
y∈Ω
.SˆSL(x) = −h(x) · x +
∑
i∈M
Hi(yi) +
∑
j∈N
Hj(y j) (6.41)
where x =
∑
i∈M
yi +
∑
j∈N
y j
The objective function of the problem is the partial linearization of the Lyapunov function,
i.e., h(x) is given. Note here that we omit SS(yi∗,y j∗) of the Lyapunov function for simplicity.
Call this optimal solution x′.
We next deﬁne a feasible solution x(κ) of the problem [P] (or the original problem [SO]):
x(κ) ≡ x + κd = x + κ(x′ − x), (6.42)
where d is a direction vector and κ is a step size. If the step size is too small, the change of
the value of the Lypunov function is given as
ΔSSL =
∂SSL(x(κ))
∂κ
. (6.43)
Here, the only difference between SSL(x(κ)) and SˆSL(x(κ)) is the ﬁrst terms of them. There-
fore, (6.43) can be evaluated as the change of the value of SˆSL(x(κ)):
ΔSSL =
∂SSL(x(κ))
∂κ
=
∂SˆSL(x(κ))
∂κ
. (6.44)
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Meanwhile, since SˆSL(x(κ)) is concave,
SˆSL(x(κ)) ≥ (1 − κ)SˆSL(x) + κSˆSL(x′). (6.45)
Also, since x′ is the optimal solution of the problem [P], SˆSL(x′) > SˆSL(x). Thus, for any
κ ∈ (0, 1), the following inequality holds:
SˆSL(x(κ)) > SˆSL(x). (6.46)
Further, when κ→ 0+, this equation means
∂SˆSL(x(κ))
∂κ
> 0. (6.47)
From the above discussion, by replacing κ with s, we can conclude that
∂SSL(x(s))
∂s
> 0 (6.48)
when x  x∗ (i.e., y  yi).

Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have extended a theory of the tradable network permits scheme in two im-
portant directions: (i) to develop a supply side control based on the scheme and (ii) to design
implementation mechanisms for the scheme in three different situations. The common objec-
tive of the control and mechanisms is to achieve an efﬁcient allocation of network capacity
without requiring demand forecasting. To accomplish this objective, we employed an evolu-
tionary approach to achieving an optimal supply level while acquiring demand information
sequentially. In the following, the results of this thesis are summarized.
Chapter 3 proposed a distributed signal control policy based on the tradable network
permits, while considering a semi-dynamic trafﬁc ﬂow on general networks. The proposed
signal control policy has two desirable properties. First, it can determine the green time
proportion (i.e., capacity allocation) of each intersection by using only the information per-
mit prices of the intersection; it requires no knowledge of the entire network information
(e.g., origin-destination information). Second, an equilibrium trafﬁc assignment under the
proposed policy coincides with a system optimal trafﬁc ﬂow pattern that minimizes the total
transportation cost in a network. Moreover, we constructed an evolutionary implementation
method for the proposed policy and proved that the day-to-day trafﬁc ﬂow dynamics under
the scheme converge to the system optimal trafﬁc pattern.
Chapter 4 proposed an implementation mechanism for trading markets of network per-
mits on general networks. Although a naive formulation of the problem of ﬁnding a dynamic
system optimal allocation of network permits leads to a NP-hard problem, we avoided such
computational infeasibility by employing an evolutionary approach. Speciﬁcally, we made
use of a hybrid mechanism that consistently combines an auction mechanism with a path
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capacity control; these are repeated on a day-to-day basis. The former phase involves sell-
ing bundles of permits, and the latter phase involves adjustment of the number of bundles
of permits, which corresponds to the path capacities. We proved that the proposed mecha-
nism has the following desirable properties: (i) truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for
each user on each day and (ii) the permit allocation pattern under the mechanism converges
to an approximate dynamic system optimal allocation pattern in the sense that the achieved
social surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of users is large. Furthermore,
we showed that the proposed mechanism could be extended to obviate path enumeration by
introducing a column generation procedure.
Chapter 5 considered a more general situation where network permits for a speciﬁc day
are sold in multiple period markets. The multiple period markets not only provide a degree
of freedom in the purchase of permits but also allow for more efﬁcient resource allocation
than a single period market, especially when users’ valuations of the permits change over
time. Under such circumstances, the road manager needs to allocate a bottleneck capacity
to these markets, as well as allocate permits to users. As a ﬁrst step in implementing these
markets, we designed a dynamic auction mechanism in which the number of permits for each
market is ﬁxed. This mechanism can determine optimal permit allocation, along with the
actual sequence of time if each user truthfully bids “net valuations” (i.e., valuations minus
the option value of deferring purchase). It was proved that the truthful revelation of net
valuations is a dominant strategy for each user, and that it guarantees that the market choice
of the user is optimal. We then derived an adjustment rule of the number of permits sold
for each market and demonstrated that combining the dynamic auction and the adjustment
rule maximizes the social surplus in a ﬁnite number of iterations. Finally, we numerically
showed that the proposed mechanism works effectively for a dynamic population case where
markets participants change over time.
Chapter 6 developed an evolutionary mechanism for a hybrid scheme of the TNP and
congestion pricing, considering multiple negative externalities (i.e., queuing congestion and
ﬂow congestion). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst described a mechanism consisting of trading rules
of the permit markets and users’ behaviors expressed by a stochastic learning model. We
then derived a stochastic dynamics of the learning process from the mechanism. Finally, we
showed that that the stochastic dynamics converges to an equilibrium state, and trafﬁc ﬂow
pattern at equilibrium is efﬁcient in the sense that the social surplus is maximized.
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This thesis is the ﬁrst step towards implementing tradable network permits scheme.
Therefore, there are several challenges left for future research; the following are but two
of them.
1. Investigating robustness of the proposed mechanisms. All the implementation mecha-
nisms proposed in this thesis (except Chapter 6) are contingent on the assumption that
users behave myopically every day. To investigate the robustness of the mechanisms,
a more complete analysis must take into account the day-to-day strategic/learning be-
haviors of users. In addressing this subject, a full game-theory analysis of individual
strategic behaviors might be intractable in our situation, given that the number of users
is large. Instead, it would be useful to incorporate the mechanisms with the aggregate
dynamics of learning behaviors like Chapter 6. Additionally, analyzing the mecha-
nisms under a stochastic environment is an important topic that should be addressed in
future research.
2. Tradable network permits scheme in the second best situations. Throughout this study,
we considered the ﬁrst-best situation, in which the road manager can issue network
permits for all links. However, in practice, this condition does not always hold, as a
road network has a limited number of bottlenecks. Therefore, further investigation of
the tradable network permits scheme in second-best situations is needed in order to
determine which links should be controlled. To address this issue, we need to connect
the tradable network permits scheme to a dynamic trafﬁc assignment (DTA) prob-
lem; this is not a trivial problem, because we would face difﬁculties by virtue of the
non-convexity of the DTA problem. Nevertheless, since there is every possibility of
extending the scheme’s range of application, further exploration on this issue would
be a challenging but worthwhile topic for future research.

Appendix A
Benders decomposition
Benders decomposition has been known as an effective approach for mathematical programs
including several types of variables (e.g., mixed integer problems). This approach partitions
the variables of a problem into two subsets and updates those variables in each subset alter-
nately. Therefore, we can exploit special structures (e.g., network structures) of each type of
variables to solve the overall problem.
Consider a mixed integer problem with two types of variables, x and y:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
maxx,y c · x + d · y
s.t. Ax + By ≤ b
x ≥ 0, y ∈ Y,
(A.1)
where x is a m-vector of continuous variables, y is a n-vector of discrete variables, and Y is
a subset of the integer points in n dimensions. The matrices A and B and vectors c, d, and b
have dimensions compatible with those of x and y.
By ﬁxing variables y, we here formulate a linear program with respect to x:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
SP(y) ≡ maxx c · x + d · y
s.t. Ax ≤ b − By
x ≥ 0.
(A.2)
We call this “sub-problem.” The dual problem of the sub-problem is also formulated as⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
DSP(y) ≡ minu u · (b − By) + d · y
s.t. uA ≥ c
u ≥ 0,
(A.3)
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where u are dual variables, and we let S denote the feasible region of u: S = {u | uA ≥
c, u ≥ 0}. It should be noted that the the feasible region S is independent of variables y. If
S = φ, from the duality theorem, the primal sub-problem (A.2) (and the original problem) is
unbounded or infeasible. On the other hand, if S  φ, S is a convex polyhedron. Thus, there
are a ﬁnite number of extreme points, written upi , i = 1, . . . , n
p, and if S is unbounded, there
are a ﬁnite number of extreme rays, written ulj, j = 1, . . . , n
l. Note here that, for a extreme
ray ulj, if
ulj · (b − By) < 0, (A.4)
the dual sub-problem (A.3) is unbounded, i.e., (A.2) (and the original problem) is infeasible.
Therefore, y must satisfy
ulj · (b − By) ≥ 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . , nl. (A.5)
Conversely, if this condition is satisﬁed, an optimal solution of the dual sub-problem (A.3)
is obtained as one of the extreme points.
From the above discussion, if those extreme points and rays are known, the original
problem (A.1) can be reformulated as
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
maxy
{
minupi u
p
i · (b − By) + d · y
}
s.t. ulj · (b − By) ≥ 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . , nl
y ∈ Y.
(A.6)
But this problem is equivalent to the following:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
max . θ
s.t. upi · (b − By) + d · y ≥ θ ∀i = 1, . . . , np
ulj · (b − By) ≥ 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . , nl
y ∈ Y.
(A.7)
This problem is called the “master problem.” Denoting y∗ is an optimal solution of this
problem. There exists an optimal solution x∗ for ﬁxed y = y∗. Then a pair (x∗,y∗) is an
optimal solution of the original problem (A.1).
While we see that the original problem is reduced to the problem (A.7), it is difﬁcult to
solve this problem directly. This is because a number of extreme points and rays is generally
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too large and cannot be known in advance. However, only a small number of the constraints
will be biding at an optimal solution. Hence, we adopt an iterative procedure of generating
a new constraint successively. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst consider a relaxation problem of
(A.7) (restricted master problem) that has a small number of extreme points and rays. This
problem produces an upper bound θ on the optimal objective value of the original problem.
Then we add a new constraint to the restricted master problem successively by solving the
dual sub-problem until the optimal solution is obtained.
Algorithm
Step 0: Initial setting. Set the initial yˆ by solving the restricted master problem.
Step 1: Sub-problem. For a ﬁxed yˆ, solve the dual sub-problem (A.3). If the problem is
infeasible then, the original problem has an bounded solution, then stop. If the problem
is unbounded, we obtain a new extreme ray uˆlj and go to Step 2. Otherwise, we obtain
a new extreme point uˆpi . Then, if
θ = uˆpi · (b − By) + d · yˆ, (A.8)
a pair of yˆ and xˆ, which corresponds to uˆpi , is an optimal solution of the original
problem. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2: Restricted master problem. Add a constraint corresponding to the extreme point uˆpi
or extreme ray uˆlj to the restricted master problem. Then we solve a new restricted
master problem and obtain a new yˆ and a new upper bound θ. Go to Step 1. If the
restricted master problem is infeasible, so is the original problem, then stop.
Note that a new extreme point or ray is always generated in each Step 1. Therefore, ﬁnite
convergence of the algorithm follows directly from the ﬁnite number of constraints of the
problem (A.7) (see, Lasdon, 1970, for a comprehensive review of the Benders decomposi-
tion).

Appendix B
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
The VCG mechanism is the most celebrated sealed-bid (combinatorial) auction that achieves
allocative efﬁciency and induces truth-telling. This is a generalization of the well known
sealed-bid second price auctions proposed by Vickrey (1961). This generalization was made
by Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973).
To give a formal deﬁnition of this mechanism, let N be the set of bidders and M the set
of heterogeneous items. For every subset S of M, bidder i ∈ N is assumed to have the private
valuation vi(S) ≥ 0. Each bidder is also assumed to have the following quasi-linear utility:
ui(yi, pi) ≡
∑
S⊆M
vi(S)yi(S) − pi, (B.1)
where pi is bidder i’s payment and yi(S) = 1 if S is allocated to bidder i and zero otherwise.
The VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions is deﬁned as follows:
1. Bidders simultaneously report sealed bids vi giving their value for each possible com-
bination (i.e., bundle) of all items (we here assume that each bidder is truthful).
2. An auctioneer then chooses the allocation of items so as to maximize the sum of the
accepted bids (social surplus) by solving the following winner determination problem:
V =max
y
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆M
vi(S)yi(S) (B.2)
s.t.
∑
S j
∑
i∈N
yi(s) ≤ 1 ∀ j ∈M (B.3)
∑
S⊆M
yi(S) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N (B.4)
yi(s) ∈ {0, 1} ∀S ⊆M, ∀i ∈ N. (B.5)
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The ﬁrst constraint (B.3) represents a capacity constraint for each item. The second
constraint (B.4) is the condition no bidder receives more than one subset. Call this
optimal solution y∗.
3. Payment pi for bidder i is equal to the decrease in the value of the social surplus by
adding him or her to the auction, i.e.,
pi ≡ V−i −
∑
ki
∑
S⊆M
vk(S)y∗k(S), (B.6)
where the index −i represents that bidder i is removed from the auction.
From the deﬁnition, if all bidders report their valuations truthfully, the VCG mechanism
maximizes the social surplus (allocatively efﬁcient). Then, bidder i’s utility is
ui(y∗i , pi) = V − V−i. (B.7)
This is sometimes called the marginal product.
We next show that the VCG mechanism induces truth-telling. To do this, suppose each
bidder reports (possibly untruthful) bids bi. The auctioneer chooses the allocation of items
yˆ by maximizing
∑
i∈N
∑
S⊆M bi(S)yi(S). Then, bidder i’s utility is
ui(yˆi, pi) =
∑
S⊆M
vi(S)yˆi(S) − pi (B.8)
=
∑
S⊆M
vi(S)yˆi(S) −
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣V−i −
∑
ki
∑
S⊆M
bi(S)yˆi(S)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∑
S⊆M
vi(S)yˆi(S) +
∑
ki
∑
S⊆M
bi(S)yˆi(S)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ − V−i
The second term of the ﬁnal line is determined independent of bidder i’s bids. On the other
hand, the ﬁrst term is always maximized when bidder i reports truthful bids vi. This is be-
cause the ﬁrst term equals to the optimal objective value of the winner determination prob-
lem in that case, i.e., the auctioneer chooses the allocation by maximizing
∑
S⊆M vi(S)yi(S)+∑
ki
∑
S⊆M bk(S)yk(S). Therefore, there is no user has incentive to report untruthful bids.
Theorem B.1 (VCG mechanism) In the VCG mechanism, truth reporting is a dominant
strategy for each bidder. The social surplus is maximized when all bidders report their
valuations truthfully.
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Unfortunately, the VCG mechanism requires complex tasks to both the auctioneer and
bidders. Speciﬁcally, the auctioneer have to solve |N| + 1 combinatorial optimization prob-
lems exactly. It is computational burden when the number of bidders is large. On the other
hand, bidders have to report bids for possible combination of all items. This is not just the
computationally hard problem but also undesirable in terms of the privacy: bidders are re-
quired to reveal their private information more than necessary. See Ausubel and Milgrom
(2006) for a comprehensive review of the VCG mechanism.

Appendix C
Primal-dual algorithm
In this appendix, we brieﬂy introduce a primal-dual algorithm corresponding to the (exact)
ascending auction proposed by Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor (1986). This algorithm is
known as the “Hungarian method” (Kuhn, 1955).
Consider an assignment problem (notations used here are same as in Appendix B):
max
x≥0
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
vijyij (C.1)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
yij ≤ 1 ∀ j ∈M (C.2)
∑
j∈M
yij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N, (C.3)
and its dual problem:
min
(π,p)≥0
∑
i∈N
πi +
∑
j∈M
pj (C.4)
s.t. πi ≥ vij − pj ∀i ∈ N, ∀ j ∈M. (C.5)
where (π,p) are Lagrange multipliers for constraints (C.8), (C.9), which are interpreted as
the bidders’ payoffs and item prices.
In the primal-dual algorithm for the assignment problem, we ﬁrst set an initial feasible
solution (i.e., initial price): p = 0. We next deﬁne the admissible set Di(p) that satisﬁes the
following condition:
Di(p) = { j | πi = vij − pj} ∀i ∈ N. (C.6)
This set corresponds to bidder’s demand set in each round.
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Next we check the feasibility of primal variables by solving the following restricted pri-
mal problem:
max
x≥0
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Di(p)
yij (C.7)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
yij ≤ 1 ∀ j ∈M (C.8)
∑
j∈M
yij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N, . (C.9)
This problem can be seen as the maxi-ﬂow problem on a certain network. Thus, we adopt the
labeling algorithm (Ford-Fulkerson algorithm) to solve this problem. If a feasible solution
exists, the solution and the current dual variables are optimal, i.e., all bidders can be allocated
an item form his demand set and prices are competitive equilibrium prices.
Otherwise, we have to update dual variables. To achieve minimum competitive equilib-
rium prices, the DGS auction here chooses a minimal overdemanded set and updates prices
in the set. However, ﬁnding the overdemanded set is computationally burden in general. For
this problem, Sankaran (1994) demonstrated that such prices can be achieved by updating
dual variables in a certain overdemanded set. Interestingly, this set is identiﬁed by solving
the restricted primal problem based on the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm. Thus, we increase
values of dual variables in this set by one unit in each round until the optimal solution is
obtained.
Algorithm
Step 0: Initialization. Set dual variables p = 0.
Step 1: Checking the primal feasibility. First, we generate the admissible sets Di(p) under
the current dual variables p. Then, we solve the restricted primal problem using the
Ford-Fulkerson algorithm. If a feasible solution exists, the solution and the current
dual variables are optimal, then stop. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2: Updating dual variables. Increase values of dual variables in the overdemanded set
that is identiﬁed in Step 1 by one unit
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